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AN INTERPRETATION OF CHINA

By L. Y. Ho,
University of Pennsylvania.

After unpleasant experiences with the external world for over half a century, the knock of the Western Powers has at last been heard in China. To-day the old Dragon has awakened from her constitutional drowsiness and habitual isolation, and is ready and eager to play her part in the world drama. She has come to the world, or more correctly, the world has gone to her. No shirking on either side, each has to meet the other squarely face to face. China, as a nation, must either rise or fall forever. Whichever way it may turn out, she is going to exert a world-wide influence upon future history and affect the course of modern civilization. Viewed from the commercial and political standpoint, China is indeed a tremendously important and interesting problem—a problem looming larger and larger on the horizon of the world's consciousness, and engaging more and more its attention and thought.

More and more attempts are being made to study the country. More travelers now penetrate into that still mysterious land, and more scientists make researches and investigations—merely to increase the world's stock of human knowledge. Last but not least in importance are the press comments which appear frequently in periodicals or dailies. But as the writers have been other than Chinese, the situation is often viewed from a different angle. I attempt here to assume the task of treating the subject from an impartial viewpoint as comprehended by a Chinese student.

China is a typical example of arrested development. A contemporary of Egypt, Babylon, and Assyria, she is accredited to have a history of 5000 years. Her inventions and discoveries like the mariner's compass, block printing, and gunpowder were known respectively as early as the twenty-seventh, fourth century, B.C., and the third century A.D. The institutions of laws, marriage and other customs now extant were firmly established about 1000 B.C. Her greatest minds like Laotze, Confucius and Mencius were

produced 300 B.C. In a word, the monuments of Chinese civilization antedate the Christian era. Since that time, a period of over 2000 years has elapsed, and China has produced no minds comparable to the ancient trio, and for over fifteen centuries has made no new inventions worth speaking of. Up to a comparatively recent date, no change in her ideals and institutions, political, social, ethical, and educational, had taken place. Then all of a sudden, after 2000 years, she evinced signs of change. China has presented three distinctive periods: an attempt is here made to study each period and to offer an explanation of the phenomena of each.

I. Period of Progress

Roughly speaking, this period extended from the creation to the beginning of the Christian era. Like any other nation, China began with a tribe in the province of Shansi. Surrounded by naturally hostile tribes, conflicts between the Chinese and the aborigine followed, and the former, on account of their superiority in strength, survived. By conquest, China gained more territory and population; by intermarriage and assimilation, her blood became enriched, her ideals and institutions became broadened and strengthened. As long as there were hostile tribes around the Chinese, constant conflicts arose. In order to survive, efficiency had to be kept up or increased. With conquests, the nation grew in territory, population, organization, civilization, and ambition. The more she conquered, the more she wanted to conquer until there was nothing more for her to conquer, or she was stopped by some insurmountable barrier. By this time, her intellect and civilization came to a standstill. The career of China's formative conquest came to a close about 220 B.C. The country was then bounded by Chili on the north, Kwangtung on the south, the Pacific Ocean on the east, and Thibet on the west. Feudalism, the cause of her activity and progress, now gave place to absolute monarchy. She settled down with no further motive to strive. She built a great wall on the north, reorganized the country into provinces under thirty satraps, burned all the books, melted all weapons, and exterminated all the daring scholars. The Emperor had come to reign unto eternity; the people and the country were his property. The formation of the country was now complete, and this leads to the second period.

II. Period of Stagnation

This lasted from the beginning of the Christian era to 1840 A.D. It may be called a period of fluctuating stagnation. Since that historic Emperor who dreamed of reigning forever, eighteen different dynasties have followed each other. With every dynastic change, there was always more or less commotion and change in the laws and methods of government, but such commotion was always short in duration and internal in character, and such changes were changes of mere form, not of spirit and substance. When the history of the last two thousand years was summed up, China was not a bit more advanced in her ideals, arts, and institutions than she was at the beginning of the Christian era. In fact, had it not been for the little exercise of her national spirit she had every century, her energy and life would have long ago ebbed away. As it was, signs of backwardness and primitiveness were to be detected everywhere. Naturally, the question that arises is what were the underlying causes. Were there not the Tartars about 100 B.C. on the north, the Thibetans on the west, the Japanese on the east, and the Indo-Chinese on the south with whom the Chinese could contend? Right here we discover the cause of stagnation. The Tartars became amalgamated with the Chinese about the third century A.D. They adopted the Chinese civilization, and with them Mongolia came into the possession of China. Thibet was a region too mountainous; the Thibetans were in a low state of civilization, and their Dalai-lamas readily acknowledged Chinese sovereignty. The same applied to Anam, Siam, and Burmah, with the exception that these were level countries. On the east, the Koreans were reduced to a tributary nation, and as for the Japanese, they were separated from the mainland by a then impassable sea. There being no strong motive for a conflict, the Chinese, except for the expedition of Kublai Khan, never attempted to cross the sea and match strength with that people. Since the Tartars taught nothing to the Chinese, and since the Thibetans and the Indo-Chinese learned from the Chinese, what could or would elevated China learn? Furthermore, by this time, the nation had forgotten the causes of her early progress, and the people were thinking that they alone were the anointed people to remain supreme on earth. Under such circumstances, would they stoop to learn from inferior civilizations? Since China did not get anything, was not

the presence of these less civilized peoples around her tantamount to the absence of a rival or competitor? What could then be more logical as an outcome of the situation than the exaltation and maintenance by the Chinese of their own civilization leading to stagnation and the cessation of all progress?

The courses of the first and second historic periods have been briefly traced. Putting the matter into a nutshell, it was tribal assimilation and intercommunication that formed the nation; and later it was national isolation that arrested its development. In general, the effects of isolation are known; in detail, they are not. Narrowing down the consideration of its effects to those which act within the nation, it is sad to note how disastrous they have been to China. If we survey the forces operating in Chinese civilization, the whole is centered about Confucianism, the embodiment of all early Chinese culture. Like all other systems of philosophy, it has its strong points as well as its weak ones. It was Confucianism that made China; it was the overdoing of Confucianism that was the unmaking of China. The overdoing of Confucianism to which is traceable some of the major evils in Chinese civilization will be discussed here under three headings:

1. *Intellectual Backwardness.*—Confucianism advocates the superiority of antiquity. From that follows the corollary: "Love thy parents and reverence the Emperor." As the emperor is the head of heads, loyalty to the emperor precedes filial devotion to parents. The emperor being absolute over his subjects as the father over his children, it became his interest to inculcate unquestioning obedience in his subjects. According to the old conception of government, the best way of bringing this about was ignorance. So the emperor, who like the famous French monarch identified himself with the state, took no steps whatever to promote the intelligence of the people. On the other hand, he did everything he could to enthrall their intellect and eradicate their intelligence, as was shown by the holocaust made of liberalizing books, the killing of daring thinkers, the institution of the "eight-legged" essay, the encouragement of civil officials, and the contempt for military men. It was the interest of the state to preserve its traditions and to strengthen their sanctions. So the people, as the ruled, had no genuine encouragement from the state. Under such circumstances, no national compulsory education existed, and not many

went to school. But those who went in the face of so many restrictions and stumbling-blocks did not get an intelligent education. Moreover, being a more or less primitive country, in which hardly anything was very much developed, travelling was very difficult and dangerous. In consequence, little travelling was done. Everybody stayed at home and not many ventured out of the town. Few indeed went out of the province, and then only on an official errand or to seek a living. Most of those who could afford to study learned from their fathers or the class of hereditary teachers, while those who could not worked as their fathers did. Thus the scholar remained the scholar; the laborer, the laborer. In the scholar's family, the father taught the son, the son the grandson, and so on for centuries. In the laborer's family, the father handed down whatever experience he had accumulated in a lifetime to the son, the son to the grandson, and so on, always the same stock of ideas and experiences. What could be the result of such a process? In both classes, there was no broadening of the intellect, but a deepening of prejudices. In fact, education was more and more lifeless and narrow, the scholars became more and more bigoted and self-sufficient, and the intelligence of the people fell lower and lower. This was why China has not been able to produce a world mind, or an immortal book, or an epoch-making invention for the last twenty centuries.

2. *Economic Poverty*.—To understand why China had so few traders to follow the pursuit of domestic or foreign trade, we must go back to the family, the unit of the Chinese society. The keynote of the Chinese family is "Love thy Parents," one of the Confucian commandments. It is the imperative duty of the children to make the parents happy and allow no semblance of sorrow ever to cross their path. In order to see that they are happy, they have to be at home. The unenlightened parents, having nothing better to occupy their minds, indulged themselves in an intense craving to see grandchildren about them. Accordingly, they married their children early when the contracting parties hardly understood what matrimony was, much less the responsibilities therein involved. The outcome was the reckless production of weak offspring. The young husbands not knowing anything of the world, in many cases, still in school, had to fall back on their parents for support—not infrequently permanent support. These

same ignorant parents not satisfied with seeing the marriage of one generation and its offspring generally proceeded to marry their grandchildren as fast as they could grow, or as long as there was a cent in their leaking purse, or a chance to borrow, in order that they might be fructified and be sure before their death that the family worship would be carried on. Two things resulted from this unconditional obedience to parents: (a) Weak, helpless children were born to replenish the nation, to whom life could not but be a burden; (b) ever expanding families living on an ever contracting purse could not but impoverish the nation. In such a suffocating atmosphere, how could trade thrive? Who would be willing to absent himself from his home, if he could not afford to be away? This explains why China is so populous, and feeble, and poor.

3. *Political Disorganization.*—Because of their complete isolation, and the absence of an adventurous spirit, the inhabitants became self-sufficient; their language and dialects, customs, institutions, and ideals stereotyped; their views intolerant; and their sympathies narrow. In a word, each village was a nation unto itself, and China was a nation composed of a myriad of nations with a myriad of dialects and sympathies, disunited and disintegrating. When a nation is composed of a myriad of units, each speaking a different dialect, and having for its beliefs and views only those sanctioned by the past, how can these units understand, sympathize with, help and join with each other in a common patriotism? This was the cause why China was so backward, conservative and helpless. Such is the result of the overdoing of Confucianism, which brought about national disorganization and isolation.

III. Period of Change

The third period is one of national change, a period of transformation. With the introduction of the facilities of communication, a new epoch has been ushered into China. By means of the steamer, the hitherto impassable ocean is now as it were spanned and every part of the world is made accessible to intercourse and investigation. By means of the telegraph news can be flashed from continent to continent in no time. It was these two things that connected China with the outside world, and with their advent, China entered upon a new chapter of her history. Among the things which the steamer and the telegraph made possible are:

1. *International Commerce*.—China had little trade with the world till the middle of the last century, from which time its international commerce may be said to date. With the coming of merchants for the first time in many centuries, our own business men encountered new ideals, new methods, and new practices. To be able to accommodate themselves to each other, they found they had to deviate from the time-honored methods and make the necessary re-arrangements. Although China has been exploited financially, it must be said, however, that she has not been altogether without benefit therefrom. The utter inadequacy of her traditional methods has been exposed, the obsolescence of her antiquated ideals and practices shown up. Further, it has been found that business relations needed to be readjusted and modern commercial laws to be put into operation. What is of the greatest value, it seems, is the broadening of the mental horizon, at the same time accompanied by a new conception of modern business, a new conception of China, and a new conception of the world at large. In short, leaving out of account all the evil consequences, international commerce has done two distinct services: (a) The showing up of the utter inadequacy of existing business methods; (b) the creation of an earnest desire in the mind of the people to know. But its influence is slow and indirect to arouse a nation which has been dreaming for centuries.

2. *International Conflict*.—This factor is very powerful, and has done more to sting the nation to a sense of its corporate consciousness than anything else except modern education, which works rather slowly. Since 1840, China has directly engaged in five wars, and indirectly in one. In 1840, she waged the First Opium war with England, leaving Canton City to bear the brunt of the fight. In 1857, she fought England and France in Chili, which resulted in the sacking of Peking. In 1884, she had a little tussle with France in Tonquin. In 1894, she measured swords with Japan in Korea, because of differences concerning the Hermit Kingdom and Manchuria. In 1900, she struggled with eleven modern Powers, supported by the northern section of the empire. In 1904, the Russo-Japanese war woke up the whole nation. Needless to say, China was no match for the world, but it is interesting to note that the first conflict China had was that of a city against a nation; the second conflict, a province against two nations; the

third conflict, a protectorate against a nation; the fourth conflict, a protectorate and a section against a rising nation; the fifth conflict, half the nation against eleven nations; and in the last conflict, the whole nation viewed the struggle with unutterable anguish and inexpressible mortification. In all these conflicts, there was a progressive awakening. All these war-quakes were really tectonic in character. China had been too much intoxicated with her dreams, and these hard knocks brought her back to her sober senses—to sane thinking and sound judgment.

3. *The Missionary Movement*.—Of this, the soul is, of course, the missionary. As a factor in opening up the country, he has been both beneficial and detrimental. Directly, he is an evangelist, a social reformer, and an educator; indirectly, he is a political factor. As an evangelist, he has broken the spell under which Buddhism and Taoism had held China captive; as a social reformer, he has counteracted the baneful influences of the opium drug which came into the land through international commerce, and also crusaded against the cruel practices of bandaging the foot; as an educational worker, perhaps, he has done his greatest service. He opened the first modern schools in the country; he was the first to introduce modern teaching, he was the first translator of modern books, and lastly the first editor of periodicals, though these, at first, were, of course, of a strictly religious nature. To him must be given the credit for the opening of modern schools in China. But as a political factor, the missionary has often been a curse, causing China loss of territory, life and money, and endangering her sovereignty and even her existence. Such results have done more to hinder than to forward the cause of Christianity in China.

4. *Modern Education*.—The first impetus modern education received in China dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century. The first batch of one hundred and twenty students was sent to America in the early seventies. Later, there was a setback, a reaction against modern education. The craving for education did not really begin till after 1900 when the literati of the country started the exodus to Japan to secure modern training. In 1906, Tokio was literally swamped with Chinese scholars, numbering some 16,000, but now the number is considerably reduced. Most of those who discontinued their studies in Japan found edu-

cational facilities at home which had sprung up in the meantime, while others have gone to Europe and America to seek knowledge at its fountain head. There are about four hundred students in Europe and six hundred in this country. In addition to sending students abroad, an extensive system of schools is being put into effect, and the Board of Education has been created to take charge of the matter. *

Aside from schools, there is at present a very active press which furnishes dailies and other periodicals, and discusses all topics, ranging from fiction to all branches of science and religion. The circulation is large, and the average student is always thirsting for news. Besides, thousands of books have been translated, largely from the Japanese. Most of these will have only an ephemeral existence.

After the school and the press come a great many local clubs for the discussion of local government, constitutional government, the family, the school, and so on. Then there are public lecture halls, reading rooms, libraries, and exhibition buildings, though as yet not many of them exist. All these institutions are doubtless very primitive and cannot be expected to come up to the standard of more enlightened countries, but the significant feature of the matter is that modern educational ideals have taken such a firm hold.

To complete the list, mention might be made of the railroad, the steamship, the telegraph, the postal service, the rise of industries, the use of the Kuan Wha (mandarin dialect), the opening of deliberative assemblies, the deep interest in political affairs—these and a hundred others. They are powerful as factors of change. When once called into existence, the rapid changes they make in conditions are to be grasped only by the most imaginative minds. In summing them up, we may say that the primary and secondary factors are but the different forms of the communication, and interchange of ideas.

A word might be added in conclusion. The history of China has worked out exactly as would naturally be expected, and has been a typical example to show the results of isolation for centuries, and more recently of the revivifying effects of communication with the rest of the world. Her early progress was due to the necessity of struggling with her neighbors, her intermediate period

of stagnation to the fact that she had eliminated, by conquest and assimilation, every rival worthy of consideration, and her present awakening to the new forces brought to bear upon her. She moved slowly at first in the path of change, because she had the inertia of twenty centuries. She moves quickly now, because she has overcome that inertia and gained in momentum. Whether the present radical change is leading toward the haven of salvation or the port of destruction, it is too early to predict. But one thing is sure: if the change means a resurrection, it is forever; if it presages a fall, it is a fall forever. The fate of the world hangs upon the future of China.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

BY TAI-CHI QUO, B.S.,
University of Pennsylvania.

The entire civilized world, as well as China, is to be heartily congratulated upon the glorious revolution which has been sweeping over that vast ancient empire during the last three months, and which is now practically assured of success. "Just as conflagrations light up the whole city," says Victor Hugo, "revolutions light up the whole human race." Of no revolution recorded in the world's history can this be said with a greater degree of truth than of the present revolution in China. It spells the overthrow of monarchy, which has existed there for over forty centuries, and the downfall of a dynasty which has been the enemy of human progress for the last two hundred and seventy years. It effects the recognition and establishment of personal liberty, the sovereignty of man over himself, for four hundred and thirty-two million souls, one-third of the world's total population.

The Chinese revolution marks, in short, a great, decisive step in the onward march of human progress. It benefits not only China, but the whole world, for just as a given society should measure its prosperity not by the welfare of a group of individuals, but by the welfare of the entire community, so must humanity estimate its progress according to the well-being of the whole human race. Society cannot be considered to be in a far advanced stage of civilization if one-third of the globe's inhabitants are suffering under the oppression and tyranny of a one-man rule. Democracy cannot be said to exist if a great portion of the people on the earth have not even political freedom. Real democracy exists only when all men are free and equal. Hence, any movement which brings about the recognition and establishment of personal liberty for one-third of the members of the human family, as the Chinese revolution is doing, may well be pronounced to be beneficial to mankind.

But¹ is it really true and credible that conservative, slumbering

¹ Strange as it may seem, this doubt is entertained even by many intelligent and well-informed persons. A noted Japanese educator, author and statesman, in a formal address before the Contemporary Club in Philadelphia last December, refused to dignify the present movement in China with the term "revolution," and called it "merely a disturbance."

and "mysterious" China is actually having a revolution, that beautiful and terrible thing, that angel in the garb of a monster? If it is, what is the cause of the revolution? What will be its ultimate outcome? What will follow its success? Will a republic be established and will it work successfully? These and many other questions pertaining to the Chinese situation have been asked, not only by skeptics, but also by persons interested in China and human progress.

It is the purpose of this article merely to discuss, from the viewpoint of enlightened, educated Chinese, these various questions, some of which are too stupendous for the author to answer without posing as a prophet.

There can be no doubt that China is in earnest about what she is doing. Even the skeptics who called the revolution a "mob movement," or another "Boxer uprising," at its early stage must now admit the truth of the matter. The admirable order and discipline which have characterized its proceedings conclusively prove that the revolution is a well-organized movement, directed by men of ability, intelligence and humanitarian principles. Sacredness of life and its rights, for which they are fighting, have generally guided the conduct of the rebels. The mob element has been conspicuous by its absence from their ranks. It is very doubtful whether a revolution involving such an immense territory and so many millions of people as are involved in this one could be effected with less bloodshed than has thus far marked the Chinese revolution. If some allowance be made for exaggeration in the newspaper reports of the loss of lives and of the disorders that have occurred during the struggle, allowance which is always permissible and even wise for one to make, there has been very little unnecessary bloodshed committed by the revolutionists.

Although anti-Manchu spirit was a prominent factor in bringing about the uprising, it has been subordinated by the larger idea of humanity. With the exception of a few instances of unnecessary destruction of Manchu lives at the beginning of the outbreak, members of that tribe have been shown great clemency. The rebel leaders have impressed upon the minds of their followers that their first duty is to respect life and property, and have summarily punished those having any inclination to loot or kill. Despite the numerous outrages and acts of brutality by the Manchus and

imperial troops, the revolutionaries have been moderate, lenient and humane in their treatment of their prisoners and enemies. Unnecessary bloodshed has been avoided by them as much as possible. As Dr. Wu Ting-fang has said: "The most glorious page of China's history is being written with a bloodless pen."

Regarding the cause of the revolution, it must be noted that the revolt was not a sudden, sporadic movement, nor the result of any single event. It is the outcome of a long series of events, the culmination of the friction and contact with the Western world in the last half century, especially the last thirty years, and of the importation of Western ideas and methods into China by her foreign-educated students and other agents.

During the last decade, especially the last five years, there has been a most wonderful awakening among the people in the empire. One could almost see the growth of national consciousness, so rapidly has it developed. When the people fully realized their shortcomings and their country's deplorable weakness as it has been constantly brought out in her dealings with foreign powers, they fell into a state of dissatisfaction and profound unrest. Filled with the shame of national disgrace, and imbued with democratic ideas, they have been crying for a strong and liberal government, but their pleas and protests have been in most cases ignored and in a few cases responded to with half-hearted superficial reforms which are far from satisfactory to the progressives. The Manchu government has followed its traditional *laissez faire* policy in the face of foreign aggressions and threatening dangers of the empire's partition, with no thought of the morrow. Until now it has been completely blind to the force of the popular will and has deemed it not worth while to bother with the common people.

Long ago patriotic Chinese gave up hope in the Manchu government and realized that China's salvation lay in the taking over of the management of affairs into their own hands. For over a decade Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and other Chinese of courage and ability, mostly those with a Western education, have been busily engaged in secretly preaching revolutionary doctrines among their fellow-countrymen and preparing for a general outbreak. They collected numerous followers and a large sum of money. The revolutionary propaganda was being spread country-wide, among the gentry and soldiers, and even among enlightened government officials, in spite of govern-

mental persecution and strict vigilance. Revolutionary literature was being widely circulated, notwithstanding the rigid official censorship.

Added to all this are the ever important economic causes. Famines and floods in recent years have greatly intensified the already strong feeling of discontent and unrest, and served to pile up more fuel for the general conflagration.

In short, the whole nation was like a forest of dry leaves which needed but a single fire spark to make it blaze. Hence, when the revolution broke out on the memorable 10th of last October, at Wu-Chang, it spread like a forest fire. Within the short period of two weeks fourteen of the eighteen provinces of China proper joined in the movement one after another with amazing rapidity. Everywhere people welcomed the advent of the revolutionary army as the drought-stricken would rejoice at the coming rain, or the hungry at the sight of food. The great wave of democratic sentiment which had swept over Europe, America and the islands of Japan at last reached the Chinese shore, and is now rolling along resistlessly over the immense empire towards its final goal—a world-wide democracy.

All indications seem now to point to the success of the revolution. The Manchu dynasty has been reduced to a helpless and pitiful state, with neither supporters nor financial backing. It is doomed. Yuan Shi-Kai cannot prevent the inevitable. He either is blind to the trend of the time or overestimates his strength in trying to oppose the popular will. He cannot do it successfully, and no one can. The will of a people who are fully aroused is the supreme law of the land. They have the power and with it can have what they want. The Chinese people are now fully aroused, and "though they prefer peace almost on any terms to war," as a leading New York daily recently observed in its editorial column, "there are limits to their submissiveness, and when these limits are passed they can fight as well as anybody else. Certainly it is not courage they lack or the stern determination that does or dies." Yuan might just as well try to stop the mighty torrent of the Yangtze Kiang as to oppose the will of over four hundred million aroused Chinese. If he succeeds in checking it temporarily, he only makes it all the more violent and irresistible later. The revolution is sure to reach its goal, because it is the movement of the people

and the battle of the right and true, which are bound to win out in the end.

There is, however, just one thing which can prevent the revolution from attaining its ultimate success, namely, foreign intervention. But, fortunately, the ambitious Powers have not been furnished with any excuse to intervene and have observed strict neutrality thus far. It is to be earnestly hoped that they will maintain their present attitude so long as their citizens are protected in China. The Middle Kingdom ought to be given a chance to work out her own salvation, and she is fully capable of doing it. Let no civilized nation, on the pretext of protecting the life and property of a few of its citizens, kill a great cause for a small one and snatch away from millions of people their opportunity to gain liberty and personal rights in order to shield a handful of individuals.

Moreover, if commercial countries wish to see peace restored in the empire so that trade can be again carried on there, they should not for that reason bring pressure to bear upon the contending parties with the view of effecting an early settlement. In order that peace may be permanent, it must be established on a firm basis, on terms satisfactory to the people directly concerned. Should the Powers unite to compel the republicans to compromise with a constitutional monarchy, as it has been intimated, temporary peace might be brought about, but fresh trouble is certain to arise, resulting in a further stagnation of trade.

The prevailing sentiment in China is strongly in favor of the establishment of a republic, and nothing short of that, it seems, can satisfy the people. The question may be raised here with perfect pertinence, "Are the Chinese ready for a republic? Are they not like a child which, seeing other boys run, tries to do the same, while it is barely able to walk?" Upon this point there is a great divergence of opinion; some think the Chinese are absolutely incapable of governing themselves, while others claim they are fit for self-government, with a great majority of observers favoring a constitutional monarchy.

People in China want a republic not because they desire to be fashionable or up-to-date. They are not an imitative race, be it said to their discredit or credit. They are conservative and deliberate. They accept things they think are good for them and reject things they consider useless or harmful. How heartily they welcome

Western learning, railroads and steamships! How stubbornly they fought against the importation of opium into their country by England, much as they scorn the use of force!

The Chinese have reasons for wanting a republic and for not temporizing with a constitutional monarchy. To them the very thought of having a Manchu emperor as figurehead for the latter form of government appears ridiculous as well as obnoxious. They would consider it an act of insanity to retain him now that they no longer have to, after struggling for years to get rid of him. For nearly three centuries the Manchus have been an inexhaustible source of corruption and evil in the Chinese government. Young China wishes to have a thorough house-cleaning and to get at the root of the evil. Furthermore, a figurehead like that can be easily put there, but once there, is extremely hard to get rid of. If a logical candidate could be found among the descendants of Chinese royalty to head the limited monarchy, the people might agree upon a constitutional government. But, since there is none to be found, and the selection of a head from among the rebel leaders would breed quarrels and jealousies, it is deemed wise and expedient to avoid these difficulties by the establishment of a republic.

This most advanced form of government is not a brand new thing to the Chinese. Village government, which is self-government in miniature, has existed in Chinese communities for centuries, and has been a pronounced success in preserving peace and order among the inhabitants. It is a great feature of the Chinese civilization.

Nor is the idea of equality of man, which is the fundamental principle of democratic government, a new concept to a people among whom no class or caste system has ever existed. Among the Chinese there are no classes except such as those determined by vocations. According to the old and practically the only classification, scholars have the highest social status, with farmers next and laborers and merchants standing at the bottom of the social ladder. But, as every one is free to choose his own profession, the system is really based on a purely intellectual standard. What could be more democratic than this? Through sheer mental ability a person can become the prime minister of the empire. There is nothing to stop him. The age-long experience of the Chinese in village government and their intellectual democracy have indeed given them an excellent preparation for political democracy.

Besides, the Chinese as a race possess many good civic qualities, such as law-abidingness, industriousness and love for peace, which should greatly help to make self-government work successfully. The calm and orderly way in which they have conducted themselves during this revolution may be cited as a convincing proof that they are quite ready for a republic. No less encouraging to the republicans is the success of the various provincial assemblies, whose members were chosen with rare judgment by the people.

With able, intelligent and unselfish leaders in charge of government affairs and with the training and characteristics of the people already mentioned, there is every reason to believe that a republic is feasible and workable in China, and that order will be quickly brought out of the present chaos. Substantial and pressing reforms will be instituted and carried out along educational, industrial and other important lines, under a strong, responsible and responsive government. With a republic once securely established, and with the country properly started on her reform movement, it will not be long before China becomes a modern and progressive nation, and takes her rightful place at the world's council-table. When that peace-loving people are at last able to stand upon their own feet, a long step will have been taken towards realizing the long-dreamed-of and much-talked-about universal peace. The so-called balance of power of the world will then be established. No longer will there be any fear of international conflicts arising out of China's weakness, as has been the case in the past. China will continue to adhere to her traditional policy of peace and honesty and lend a strong hand to the world's peace movement—a movement which is supported by all interested in the advancement of humankind.

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF CHINESE RECONSTRUCTION

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It is a well-known and a very instructive fact that for the last eighteen years, China and the Chinese have increasingly monopolized the attention of the rest of mankind to an extent which finds no parallel elsewhere. This is not merely because—as we are so often reminded—China is the oldest, the most populous, and by far the most homogeneous empire now in existence, but because in a great variety of ways, China and the Chinese from being one of the most secluded of peoples, have gradually, unconsciously, and without any desire on their own part become involved in intimate relationship with practically all the leading nations of the world. The acquaintance with Far Eastern affairs on the part of Occidental peoples as a whole is of much too general and incidental a character to be described as knowledge.¹ Chinese history has been thought of as inherently interminable, monotonous, incomprehensible and arid. Although the same relations of cause and effect elsewhere perceived to be invariable in human affairs obtain in the evolution of China, it has until recently been assumed that the causes were inherently obscure, and the effects for the most part but slightly related to Western civilization. There have always been, of course, an instructed few who knew better, and who did their best according to their lights to make others recognize the truth, but their efforts met with but a limited success. The dramatic and swift-moving struggle between "little Japan" and "big China" in the years 1894-5 immediately attracted the attention of the world, and held it to the end. Never was a struggle more inevitable than this one, yet seldom has such a contest been so unanticipated, and its outcome so spectacular. This was not merely because the world at large knew too little of the real relations between China and Japan to serve as a basis for an intelli-

¹The chapter appended has been written during the exigencies of railway travel, without access to books, or to the copious clippings and memoranda which under normal circumstances would have been available. It is rather a rough charcoal sketch than an essay.

gent opinion, but also because nearly all things Chinese were wrapped in a more or less impenetrable haze, which made such knowledge of China as may be had of other countries hopeless of attainment. China was beaten, *that* was certain, although the greater part of the empire was never really aware of the fact, and many millions of Chinese seemed to suppose that the struggle with Japan was a "northern war," under the especial patronage of Lord Li Hung-Chang, and had no important relations to the rest of the "empire." There was, perhaps, also not a little satisfaction that "little Japan" had been balked of the most vital part of her conquests, through the collusion of France, Germany, and Russia, who demanded in the interests of permanent peace and the welfare of mankind that Japan renounce her hold upon the Liao-tung peninsula, and be content with Formosa and a cash indemnity. Ten years later the inevitable consequences of this action became obvious to the whole world. By that time Japan had secured Korea, had once more captured the little peninsula and a large part of Manchuria also, the remainder being largely dominated by Russia, who came to an understanding with her alert and invincible enemy, the real struggle being postponed to the uncertain future. And these two powers once in military, railway, and commercial possession have promised to evacuate Manchuria, as the Chinese phrase goes, "when iron trees bear flowers, and in the donkey year." The course of events in China was equally dramatic and surprising. For more than two years the empire was stunned, hopeless and helpless. The return to Peking in triumph from a long exile in Sian-fu the ancient and historic capital of China, of the late Grand Empress Dowager in January, 1902, seemed to promise a new lease of power to the Manchus, whose fortunes had been in grave doubt. She returned to power with a distinctly clarified vision. One by one each of the important reforms of His Majesty Kuang Hsu was adopted by her, as the time was considered ripe. Of these, by far the most important was the displacing (September, 1905) of the ancient system of education by "Western Learning," a compound term of unknown but far-reaching significance. Millions of Chinese scholars were thus automatically reduced to the level of brevet fossils, with no possibility of ever competing successfully for the new mysterious degrees. These mighty changes directly affected some millions of Chinese scholars and

students, and together undoubtedly constitute the greatest intellectual revolution in the history of mankind. But in so vast a country as China, where the impulse to stick by the old ways is overwhelming, it was inevitable that in most parts of most provinces things went on much as before.

The decree extending education to Chinese women (1907) was another landmark of progress, though its full effects can scarcely be realized for a century or more. The dispatch to Western lands of Imperial Commissions of Inquiry in regard to "Constitutional Government" (1905) was a skilful effort on the part of the Empress Dowager to withdraw the attention of the Chinese (especially in the southern province of Kuang-tung, Canton) from present ills, by contemplation of a free gift to the people from the Throne of a share in their own government. As the ancient sages and the sacred classics had much to say about "the People" (who are the "Root" of a country, Heaven thinking as the people think, etc.,) this, while a radical innovation, had, like much else, the air of a sudden return to first principles. There can be no doubt that the intention of the Throne was to tide over present dangers by throwing two or three empty tubs to the whale Demos. One of these was the "Provincial Council," one was "Local Self-Government," and the third and by far the most important, the promised "National Parliament," to meet in 1917. Experts in constitutional law have minutely analyzed the voluminous documents issued by the government, explaining the purpose and the explicit limitations of this imperial gift. It was a formal grant of the right of assembly, of discussion, and of petition, under careful precautions to guard against any assumption of a power to legislate, or to demand concessions from the Throne. In its lower ranges Chinese society has always been in theory frankly democratic—probably quite as much so as that of any Occidental land. It is only at the county (or *hsien*) the smallest sub-division of independent Chinese rule, that the oligarchical official superstructure imposed upon the basal democracy, begins. But theoretical democracy in China, as elsewhere, is so greatly modified in practices by the presence and the influence of wealth, a literary degree, connection with important families, or exceptional individual abilities, that the composition of these forces is frequently anything but really democratic.

To the "Local Self-Government" plan the Chinese are there-

fore inherently predisposed. But practically much less seems to have been made of it than might have been expected. This was not improbably due to the numerous points of friction between local self-government bodies, small, isolated and inexperienced, and the county magistrates with whose prerogatives and perquisites there would be almost inevitable interference. Nothing but extended experience, mutual co-operation, and above all, time, is needed to enable Chinese bodies for local self-government when duly authorized and recognized from making themselves universally felt.

The progress made by the "Provincial Councils" in the two short seasons in which they have had opportunity to find themselves and their place is altogether unique in Chinese history. These bodies be it remembered were never intended as other than harmless blow-holes and escape-valves for popular effervescence, with no real power and, indeed, with no functions of importance. Those who knew most about China recognized the inherent futility of elaborately constituting a complicated body with a totally uncoordinated membership merely to discuss matters of importance, but over which they could exert no practical influence whatever. The essential sub-stratum of Chinese democracy had now, however, an opportunity of asserting itself. Never before had gentry and commoners been summoned to deliberate, not, let it be remembered, to decide, in regard to public affairs—especially taxation—in the virtual presence of the Governor, a mighty official hitherto immune to popular suggestion much more to criticism. But every Provincial Council took itself most seriously. It did not indeed know its business, nor how to do it. But it listened to the primary lessons in procedure given by the Governor's deputy, and took careful note that the matter of public revenues was included in their somewhat narrow horizon—"What revenues do you want for the coming year?" the delegates in their innocence and verdancy inquired. When the sum was named, they at once proceeded to ask further: "What was done with the amount produced by last year's taxation?" In China nobody "from below" ever ventures to make inquiries like this. It is the business of the officials to levy the taxes, and of the people to pay them—"theirs not to reason why."

Under these novel and irritating conditions, and there were others aplenty, the Governors would gladly have swept the whole

set of "Councils" into extinction. But having been appointed by the Throne to do a specific act, no matter how futile, it was beyond the power of any Governor to deny or to ignore the right of the delegates to inquire. But more truly than in the Arabian tale the Afrite had actually emerged from the bottle officially uncorked, there he was large and threatening, and ever growing larger and more threatening. For behind all this "Constitutional Government" foam and sound, there was the great sea, the implicit rights of the people to be heard from and to be regarded, a right long ignored but soon to become more and more explicit and insistent. If the evolution of the Provincial Councils, albeit in very different ways and degrees from non-existence into "triumphant democracy" was rapid and striking, that of the National Assembly in Peking, the germ of the distant Parliament, was far more so. Half of this body was directly nominated by the Throne and must, of course, have been considered thoroughly safe custodians of the interests of the officials strongly entrenched in hereditary power. The other half of the body were appointed by the Governors of provinces from nominees whose names were sent in by the Provincial Councils principally, if not entirely, from among their own number. In this case also it is certain that only the *safest* candidates would have been appointed. The assembly was presided over by a Manchu hereditary Prince, an additional guaranty of conservatism. And yet the National Assembly, so constituted and limited in the range of its action, by lack of knowledge, lack of experiences, and the inherent difficulties of their position, succeeded during the three months of their session in achieving results of a most surprising character. They learned almost at once to take the opposition side and to act together. They forced the hands of the Prince Regent and virtually compelled him to shorten by some years the date of the longed-for Parliament, which was now put down for 1913. They freely criticized the heads of the leading departments of the government, and they even went so far as to impeach the semi-sacred Grand Council itself, as being an inefficient and an irresponsible nuisance. No such attack on vested rights and prescriptive privilege had ever, we may suppose, been made in Peking before. The insistent demand for a budget and for explicit statements of revenue and expenditure brought clearly to light the existing financial chaos,

and plunged the assembly into a morass and a jungle of accounts and statistics from which, after more than forty days of arduous work, they emerged, to say the least, with more credit than did the Board of Revenue. The Prince Regent not only did not summarily dismiss the assembly as the late Grand Empress Dowager would assuredly have done, but temporized with them, and added ten more days to their session.

This first meeting of the National Assembly in the autumn and winter of 1910 must be regarded as of prime importance as an initial flight of parliamentary petrels trying their wings in stormy gales. Every lesson here learned will be most valuable in the turbulent days which are yet to come, when China is more or less blindly attempting to solve anew the age-long and world-wide questions which even twentieth century democracy finds as perplexing and as insistent as ever they have been in the past—nay, much more so. How can ancient China sailing, with its clumsy junk-of-state, under a “republican” flag navigate such dangerous and uncharted seas?

Probably few Chinese have ever heard the name of Fisher Ames, one of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention which adopted the basis of the American Union. Yet his sage remark is strangely applicable to China to-day, as it was in the thirteen colonies in 1789. “A monarchy,” he is reported to have said, “is a stoutly built ship; yet it sometimes strikes a rock and goes down. A republic is like a raft, it never sinks, but then your feet are always in the water.”

For several months China has been once more thrown into convulsion and in an altogether novel manner. Owing to certain peculiar teachings of their most revered sages, Confucius and Mencius, the Chinese have always cherished and exercised what has been termed “the right of rebellion.” When the ruler has obviously lost “the decree of heaven,” which alone authenticates him as ruler, then may the Superior Man, who is himself taught of heaven, resist and depose that ruler; thus the Chinese have always been specialists and experts in the art of rebellion, insomuch that it is estimated that there have been fifty first-class rebellions in the past two thousand years, as well as minor ones quite beyond count. But no one of them bears any real resemblance to the present uprising, which not only potentially and prospectively pervades every

part of the empire, but is even more really felt by Chinese living abroad in every land and under every sky where Chinese emigrants make their home. Each passing week has showed how largely China's revolution, not rebellion,—the first in more than two thousand two hundred years of turbulent history—is at bottom a race question. It is now two hundred and sixty-seven years since the Manchus, not uninvited and certainly not at all reluctantly, took charge of the Chinese Empire. In the slow progress of the domination of so vast an area multitudes of Chinese were killed, and many more died of hunger, fright, disease, or committed suicide. All these are familiar phenomena in China and were only such as the ending and the beginning of other dynasties as well as the latest have always witnessed. But in the new national self-consciousness, the ancient memories of these wrongs have, like unquiet ghosts, risen from the dead to irritate the Chinese and to terrify the Manchus. The latter cannot be more than a few millions in number (how many in the absence of any census it is impossible to say), and with all China once aroused against them as never before, their position becomes precarious and untenable. Other aspects of the race problem in China are found in the friction, sure to increase, between Chinese and Mongols, Chinese and Mohammedans (who have been for much more than a thousand years a mechanical and not a chemical mixture with the Chinese), Chinese and the Thibetans, and particularly Chinese and the "aboriginal" tribes who form a large part of the population of some of the southwestern provinces, as Kueichew and Yunnan. They, too, have begun to awaken to self-consciousness, and can no longer be governed by the ancient methods of cajolery, bribery, and brutality.

Surely no problems of the coming China are more intricate, more exigent, more perilous than those relating to the numerous and diverse races of the vast territories of the Chinese Empire. The Chinese have always believed their theory of government to be perfect—it failed only in practice. Ages of corruption not unlike that of Turkey have necessitated ages of misrule and oppression, and have brought to pass the unhappy and until lately almost hopeless China with which we are too familiar. Can China under a so-called republic effect a radical cure of these hideous cancers and gangrene, which have been eating out the life of a great

people? The wonderful success in arousing not merely a national consciousness, but what is far more difficult, the national conscience in a life and death struggle with opium, against odds almost overwhelming, show what unanticipated and even unimaginable reserves of moral power are available in China.

Far more than most peoples in history the Chinese have always had ingrained in their moral race-fiber deep reverence for that righteousness which is one of their Five Constant Virtues. Their long history is studded with shining examples of its practice, even in times of darkness and despotism. New light has come to China from the West, from the past, and from above. A new public sentiment has begun to crystallize in China, and there is every indication that it may eventually be as resistless as a tidal wave. This may not, will not, come suddenly, but it will come, and it will be at once the bulwark and the backbone of the new nation. At the opening of a year certain to be full of surprises, when nothing can clearly be foreseen as to the specific turn of events in China one can only say that regarded from any point of view it is one of the most interesting, and one of the most important events of contemporaneous history that the oldest and most populous of empires should throw its past into the melting pot in order to gain a bright and a glorious future. In this great struggle China deserves and will have the sympathies of the great republic of the West, whose problems are so widely different, and yet in essence so alike. A new China will help to make a new Asia, and will both directly and indirectly influence the whole world.

REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT IN CHINA

BY CHESTER LLOYD JONES,

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For a quarter of a century political prophets have been foretelling the awakening of China. Each year seemed to promise the abandonment of the old and the entry of the new regime, but each year at its end left conditions surprisingly like they were at its beginning. So often were we told of the dawn of a new day for China and so often disappointed that many despaired that the sleeping giant would ever awake, and the countries of Continental Europe even concluded that his goods were for him who would take them.

Plans to Adopt Experience of Western Nations

The last ten years have shown, not a foreign policy increasingly strong but a realization on the part of China of her own weakness. She has recognized the necessity of an entire recasting of her form of government. The Boxer troubles and the subsequent settlement with foreign powers brought home even to the conservative Manchu throne the necessity of at least a conservative program of reform. In 1906 the first traveling commission of five members was appointed to discover by study in Europe and America the reasons for the national strength of Western States. China had ceased to look upon her own civilization as perfect, and was willing to adopt whatever had proved excellent in the experience of others. The returning commission reported, "It is the unanimous opinion of these commissioners that the backward condition of China is due in the main to the lack of confidence between the throne and the ministry, on the one hand, and the masses of the people on the other." On February 18, 1907, an imperial decree issued declaring: "Foreign countries acquire wealth and power by granting constitutions to their people with the privilege of the ballot. Thus the interests of the Sovereign and his people are interlaced so that what affects the one affects the other. It is necessary that we in China should, after careful investigation, prepare to imitate this constitutional type of government, and, while retain-

ing supreme control in the hands of the Throne, should entrust the administration of their own interests to the people themselves, through their chosen representatives."

But this could not be done at once. A preparatory program was outlined. The official system was to be reformed, the laws were to be revised, universal education established, the army was to be reorganized, an efficient system of police introduced, and the revenue and expenditures of the government placed on a sound basis. This was no small program in itself, a series of tasks which would stagger the boldest of administrators even in a country with a government as absolute as that of China is in theory, but is not in fact.

Provincial Experiments

In one province the policy of reform was immediately put to the test. In Chih-li, the most important viceroyalty of the empire, one of the ablest of Chinese statesmen, Yuan Shih-kai, was viceroy. He at once introduced important reforms throughout the province, especially at its principal city, Tientsin. Public works and police were put in a state of efficiency previously unknown. The provincial officials were given periodical instruction in constitutional government, at the provincial capitol. To prepare the people for their coming responsibilities, the first step the Viceroy concluded would be to introduce local self-government.

A beginning was made in 1907 when the first "popular" municipal government in China was set up in Tientsin. The government was organized on western models adapted to local needs. A municipal council of thirty members was elected for two years by a convention of 135 delegates chosen at a general election. This indirect election is not different in principle from the way in which Senators are elected in the United States.

The suffrage is restricted. Only males, twenty-five years of age or over, able to read and write, natives of the city or five-year residents, owning property to the value of 2,000 taels can vote. A candidate must be a qualified voter who is a college graduate or author of a work which has received official recognition, or a director of a school or public enterprise, or an ex-official. The voting methods follow the best western usage, and the proceedings of the council are protected nominally at least by the usual parlia-

mentary privileges. An executive board of nine, elected for four years, part of whom retire every two years, carries out the decrees of the council. The first election under the new regime was held on June 15, 1907, and the electoral college met on July 24, to select the Municipal Council of Tientsin. The latter body convened August 18th.

The experiment was one avowedly undertaken to test the possibility of introducing western forms of government into China. If successful the system was to be extended to other provinces so that training in self-government might precede the introduction of the national constitution. Each province was to be granted a provincial constitution and to conduct its affairs through a representative assembly, which was to serve *de facto* as a training school for the new national legislature. The success of the first experiment encouraged starting further reforms. September 1, 1907, an edict issued promising a constitutional government as soon as the people were ready for it. The people were promised a new national legislature to consist of two houses. A preliminary step was taken at once in the calling of a national consultative assembly known as the "Council of Advice." Its members are nominated partly by the central government, partly by the provincial assemblies. The functions of the body are indefinite, but are probably intended to be advisory rather than truly legislative, like the advisory councils of India.

Another edict established similar consultative assemblies in the provinces to discuss projects of provincial legislation. From these assemblies a certain portion of the members of the national body were to be selected. The provincial assemblies it was first planned to have chosen by the governors, but the protests which arose brought the issuance of a new edict in 1908 by which they were made elective. This does not mean, however, a true popular election; for in the provincial elections as in the municipal election at Tientsin a property qualification is enforced which, quite apart from other requirements, shuts out all but a small portion of the people.

The Proposed National Legislature

Public opinion now began to outrun the government's plans for reform. As mentioned above, the government had to make concessions in the manner of election to the provincial assemblies.

It was also objected that the decrees were not definite as to the powers and organization of the proposed national legislature. The nomination of a portion, presumably the majority, of the members, especially aroused criticism, because the people considered it an expedient by which the form of power was granted though the substance was withheld. The principle of election recognized in the provincial assemblies they felt should be extended to the national body and its powers should be made truly legislative. National regeneration could be brought only by the speedy creation of a sovereign parliament based on direct election by the people of the provinces. Universal suffrage they still recognized would be unwise. Property or educational qualifications would be accepted, but the representative principle must be recognized.

Feeling its hold on popular opinion slipping away, the government in December, 1907, issued decrees urging conservatism and asking that the people in their enthusiasm for western methods of government should organize in the orderly manner adopted by European political parties. Partly due to the pressure of public opinion, too, there had been created in 1907 a "Commission for the Study of Constitutional Government," to make a study of the political conditions and needs of China, and make a report to the throne and Grand Council as to what foreign political institutions should be adopted or adapted to Chinese needs. The commission set to work at once. A vote taken in May, 1908, is significant of the temper of its members. On the question of how soon a constitution should be granted, four voted for a delay of two years, seven for five years, eight for seven years, twelve for ten years, and one for twenty years. Those who voted for the shorter periods had been educated in the old Chinese classic schools or in Japan, those favoring a longer delay in America or Europe. The government still stood with the conservatives, and on August 28, declared again for the issuance of a constitution in 1917.

The Commission for the Study of Constitutional Government outlined a plan of reform which was to extend over the intervening period and would prepare the public for its new responsibilities. Prominent among the projects was the introduction of new educational methods by which the commission hoped that one-half of the population of China would be able to read and write at the time the constitution was actually granted.

The Work of the Provincial Legislatures

Meanwhile the plans for elective provincial assemblies were being rapidly forwarded. The first provincial elections occurred in the spring of 1909. On October 14, provincial assemblies met in every province of China to discuss the affairs of the respective provinces. They met again in 1910, surer of their powers and enthusiastic for local reforms. In several of the provinces they came into active conflict with the policies of the local governors. Differences of this sort were carried to the central government, which is said to have given its moral support uniformly to the local legislatures against the governors.

Constructive legislative work also seems to have been accomplished in most of the provinces. The success attending the suppression of opium in Szechwan, the most populous province of all China, is largely due to the action of the local legislature, and in Kwantung, the great southern province, gambling has been successfully repressed by the same means. It is the generally expressed belief that the provincial assemblies give promise of fully justifying their creation.

An interesting outgrowth of the provincial bodies is the "United Association of the Provincial Assemblies," formed in Pekin in June of this year, which has committed itself to the program "To respect the monarch and constitution, to improve and reform administrative matters in the provinces, to develop the financial resources of and for the people, to further popular intercourse with foreigners and exalt the military spirit in education."

The National Assembly

The second year of the local assemblies was the one in which occurred the first meeting of a national representative body in China. On October 3, 1910, the Prince Regent opened a meeting of an assembly of 202 members, the majority appointed by the government, the others elected by the provincial assemblies. Here, as in the Commission for the Study of Constitutional Government, the question of the date for issuing the new constitution forced itself into consideration. The conservatives again urged a period of delay for preparation, but public opinion had rapidly grown in favor of creating a national legislature of two houses as soon as possible.

It was strongly urged that every year of delay which left China without an efficient government increased the influence of foreigners in the Far East, accentuated the desire for exclusive trade privileges and threatened Chinese independence. Partly because of this fear of foreign influence and partly because public opinion would not be satisfied without concessions, the government yielded and fixed the summoning of a national parliament of two houses for 1913. Demands were made for a responsible cabinet, and the discussion of the national budget took much of the time of the assembly.

The most significant features of the first assembly were its moderation and its insistence that when the constitution is granted it shall include a grant of real responsible government. The expressions both within and outside of the national assembly were decidedly to the effect that the people would not be satisfied without the recognition of the elective principle and a responsible cabinet. To forward these ends there have already arisen political societies known as the Association for Study of the Constitution, and the Association for Preparing Constitutional Citizenship.

On October 22, 1911, at Peking, began the second session of the National Assembly. In the face of the rapidly spreading revolution it is not to be wondered at that it adopted an anti-dynastic and radical program. On the twenty-fifth, it denounced the policy of the government, and the following day memorialized the throne for the immediate institution of a popular parliament. Among its other demands were several for constitutional changes. Parliament is to have full power to revise the constitution. A responsible cabinet is to be formed with a premier chosen by parliament. The parliament is to share the treaty making power and control taxation and the budget. No appointive members are to have a place in the upper house of parliament until the reforms are completed. Under this pressure the government yielded, a constitution was drawn up embodying the reforms, which the crown is declared ready to accept.

The Revolutionary Program

During the year the revolution had spread so rapidly that these radical concessions were no longer acceptable, and opposition to the throne continued. On November 15, one of the most influential revolutionary leaders, Wu Ting-fang, former minister to the

United States, issued a proclamation to the world in which recognition for the Republic of China was asked. It represented the ideals of the more extreme Chinese reformers. It read in part: "Already we have provincial assemblies and a national assembly. Already we have a republic with a full set of competent officials. Within a few days the Constitutional Convention will meet. . . . A constitution of the most enlightened character will be adopted. Following will come . . . provincial national elections. Out of the chaos and dust of the falling throne emerges a free enlightened people, a great natural democracy of 400,000,000 human beings. They have chosen to set up a republic. . . . This is a great democracy." The words of the proclamation, like our own declaration of independence, are not to be taken literally. They represent a declaration of ideals rather than a program of action.

Outside of the empire the plans of the extreme reformers have been viewed with misgivings. The introduction of representative institutions resting on a broad popular basis which threatens to become a part of the reform program is a project which conservative opinion holds may be productive of worse disorder and inefficiency than that which is to be overcome. It is hoped that the influential middle class and the natural conservatism of the Chinese may save them from an advance which may by too rapid a break with previous customs and conditions bring a reaction as unfortunate as that which marked the closing years of the nineteenth century.

Republican Government Impracticable

Parliamentary institutions may be introduced in China, they have shown themselves adaptable to widely varying civilizations, but there are several reasons why a republican government in the sense in which that term is understood in America must still be something which for China will be an ambition rather than a reality.

The most important limitation on the possibility of a republican China is physical. We no longer believe that republics must be confined to small area and limited territory. The invention of the representative system made large republics possible even before the invention of the steam engine and the telegraph. But it still holds true that the difficulties of popular government increase in almost

geometric ratio when area and population become larger without a proportionate increase in ease of communication. We may well doubt whether republican government would be as great a success in the United States as it now is if our railroads, telegraphs and telephones should drop out of existence. Our local officers could still be elected for it is still possible for the candidate to reach them by word of mouth, but a national campaign with our present development in population and territory would be almost an impossibility. How much greater would be the difficulty of carrying on a campaign before a truly popular electorate in China in the face of the transportation conditions found there is shown by a comparison of land areas and population.

The total land area of China proper is 1,532,420 English square miles, that of Continental United States is 1,175,742 English square miles. Communication in the United States by telegraph and steam makes the country practically a unit so far as the transmission of intelligence is concerned. China has hardly begun on her railway and telegraphic development. The Chinese Imperial Customs estimated the population of China proper in 1906 at 438,000,000 souls, the population of the United States in 1910 was 91,972,266. Even assuming all other conditions to be equal the organization of any true republican government in China, under such conditions, would be a task which only a republican enthusiast such as William H. Seward would consider easy. But the actual conditions make the task a hundred fold more difficult. A population five times as great as that of the United States living under transportation conditions not even so good as obtained with us in the days of the canal and stage coach cannot conceivably be reached by party organization. The party machine operating under such disadvantages would break with its own weight. There could be no intelligent expression of public opinion. Not only in political affairs, but in every other field, it is impossible to develop an alert, quickly changing public opinion in a nation of over four hundred millions when mediaeval means of communication are supplemented only by a few thousand miles of railroad and telegraph. China cannot become a popular republic without an improved system of communication.

A second difficulty which confronts republican government in China is the lack of general education and the imperfect character of that which does exist. The people of China as a whole are not

educated for self-government. The grinding necessities of everyday life have shut them off from the possibility of intellectual development. Further, even the educated Chinese have no political training or experience. The old Chinese classic education, divorced from the affairs of everyday life and essentially unpolitical in character, was swept away by Imperial Edict of September 3, 1905, only seven years ago. Since that time great enthusiasm for "western learning" has overspread large sections of the empire. Large numbers of schools have sprung up to supply the demand, but the new instruction is still a reflection from foreign lands rather than a part of the national life, and even such as it has not touched the mass of those who in a popular government would be called upon to bear public burdens and determine public policy. China cannot become a popularly governed nation until her educational system has been modernized and brought within reach of the great mass of the population. This is not a problem of a decade, but of at least a generation. In any nation such as China the reorganization of instruction on modern lines means a great increase of national expenditure, an increase which China cannot now nor in the near future assume.

This brings us to the third limitation on the use of popular government in China—the poverty of the country. We are apt to think of China as a land of tea and silks in which the luxury which we associate with the word "Oriental" is a characteristic of the civilization, but the facts make the orient a synonym for poverty rather than riches.

Popular governments are expensive governments. Even if popular government in China would remove the official "squeeze", and the experience of other countries does not show that that result would be automatic, it is doubtful whether the people could bear the expense of biennial or even quadrennial popular elections. If the expense of a national election in the United States with ninety million people runs as high as sixteen million dollars, what would be the expense of an election covering four hundred millions with the added disadvantage of poor communications? It seems hard to avoid the conclusion that in a country so poor as China popular elections would not have popular support, and would even more surely fall into the hands of those who could profit by position, than is the case in western nations. China cannot hope for republican

government on a popular basis until her tremendous economic resources are unlocked in such a way that the standard of life of the average man will rise appreciably above the minimum of subsistence.

Finally admit that communication may be improved, that education may be brought within the reach of the average man, that the average citizen may be raised to an economic position of passable independence, and there still remains the difficulty of the enormous size of the electorate. This is not an insurmountable obstacle, the population of the United States is larger by half than the largest province of China, but a population over four times that of the United States and much over twice that of the two Americas is not easy to organize into political parties even if the unpolitical Chinese develop into the most politically-active nation of the world. The federal form of government might be adopted, but even this would leave the national elections a serious problem, and the organization of the provincial electorates would be no small matter.

The single province of Szechwan had a population in 1906 of 68,724,890, more than twice as large as that of the United States at the time of the civil war and almost six times as great as New York State in 1910. An election of Governor in Szechwan would involve a population half as large again as that now living in New England, the old northwest territory, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The average provincial election would be held in a territory containing three times as many people as Pennsylvania. The enormous cost of organizing such an electorate we may judge from our own much less extensive task. The chance for corrupt methods among those unused to political responsibility and living on a low standard of life can be left to conjecture.

Prerequisites for Republican Government

If China is ever to become a popular republic on western lines, that day is not near. Economic transformation must come before more than the form of popular government is possible. Revolutions may come and change the organization of the government, an elected president may take the place of the long lived Manchu dynasty, and political developments of this limited sort may help change the economic conditions which make more radical political

changes now impossible. But a republic as that term is understood in America, a government which is controlled through the suffrages of the people or of a considerable share of them, is still far off. China may have a government for the people, but not now one by and of the people. Popular government will come to China as it has come to the rest of the world, only through a slow change of custom and conditions and through a long period of national travail.

For a popular form of government the people must attain a measure of intelligence and a degree of economic independence. To create them, it is first essential that the economic resources of China should be unlocked. For this in turn enormous amounts of capital are necessary. China cannot lift herself by her bootstraps. She has no supply of domestic capital adequate to her needs so she must borrow, and borrow heavily. This was the experience of the United States. To create the possibility of borrowing on any terms which would not threaten the future of the country, the first essential is a strong government which shall inspire confidence on the part of foreign capital and make possible the contracting of both public and private loans on conditions which will assure the greatest benefit to China. When China has solved her economic problem, possibly while she is solving her economic problem, the question of better education for the population can be solved and a greater degree of popular control may be introduced. But for the present her first need is a strong government, and under present conditions that means a government by the few.

The sober thought of China does not overlook the country's limitations. It seems highly unlikely whatever success attends the revolution that there will be a hasty attempt to create in the Far East a New West. Many of the glowing accounts by representatives of young China which have found their way into American newspapers before and since the beginning of the revolution would have been more conservatively phrased had there been probability of putting the plans into action.

If republican institutions are to be introduced into China, it will be slowly and at first only in a very limited form. Whether an elective executive replace the monarch is not of prime importance. It has become familiar to us that the form of the executive is not an essential test of the existence of government by the people.

Lesson of European Experience

Out of the present turmoil some form of parliamentary government will be evolved. The general lines on which the government will develop can to some extent be estimated. To rule China with a system of prefectures such as are found in civilized France, would not only be to use a system under which it would be hard to adjust the law to varying provincial needs, but would run counter to the traditions of the Chinese. Government does not bulk large in Chinese life. The detailed regulation to which we in western countries are accustomed is absent. The government taxes, it controls appointments and examinations for office. Farther than this there have been only occasional assertions of authority. Local self-government is left to work itself out almost without interference. Whatever the theory of the government, the average Chinese is still an ardent advocate of *laissez faire*.

The introduction of parliamentary government in China involves therefore a balance of local autonomy and a strong government. The organization will almost certainly be federal in fact, even if a semblance of the present theoretical centralization be preserved. Since the central government has occupied in the past so restricted a field, how to secure for it the power it should have under the new conditions will be a difficult problem. It seems that whatever form Chinese parliamentary institutions may assume they will more closely resemble those of the more conservative European federative governments than those of the United States.

Germany and Austria, perhaps even Russia, seem likely to be the countries whose experience will offer institutions most easily adapted to Chinese conditions. The constitution of the former country has been given lavish praise by Chinese scholars. The preferences already shown by the Chinese in both provincial and municipal reforms indicate the popularity of the principle of indirect election, examples of which are found in the Prussian and Austrian electoral laws. The method of selection of the Central Parliament in Austria-Hungary, through co-option of a number of members from the local parliaments, is an expedient by which a national body is secured without a national organization of the electorate with its attendant expense, and the disadvantage of enforcing uniformity where diversity is needed. The right of wealth to be represented even to the exclusion of numbers is a rule of prac-

tice in the Chinese municipal elections so far set up. Even if the popular demands bring a wider suffrage the predominance of the well-to-do may be preserved by the adoption of the Prussian three class system of voting assuring to those who have the greatest economic stake in the community, the control over its government. Partly prompted by similar reasons many Chinese scholars have urged the adoption of a scheme of representation of interests such as has been used in Russia and Austria-Hungary. Spiritual interests, boards of trade, representatives of great landed estates, municipalities, universities and rural communes have in the practice of these countries been given a legal share in governmental control. The legislature has become representative of the institutional life of the state rather than of its individual members. Such a plan fits in well with Chinese conditions, the extra-legal guild organizations would if granted representation under such a system prove a valuable support to the government. As has been found in Russia, this method of organization of the state gives great flexibility for the representation of the most diverse sorts of interests and a large variety of governmental units having quite as little in common as Manchuria and Yunnan.

In summary, China will probably find the experience of the countries of Eastern Europe suggestive of what may well be done in the Far East. For this there are many reasons; in the countries of Eastern Europe

- (1) Federal relations are well elaborated.
- (2) A large degree of local autonomy is kept.
- (3) Local customs and preferences are respected.
- (4) Wealth receives consideration in representation.
- (5) The popular element is introduced into government,—distantly it is true, but perhaps as much as Chinese conditions render safe; and
- (6) All this is done while the central administration is left in a commanding position.

The Chinese have suffered too long from inaction. It can hardly be wondered if they desire now to turn to strong government to rescue them from the failures of a government strong only in theory.

THE ONE SOLUTION OF THE MANCHURIAN PROBLEM

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I.

The time has come when it is necessary to face the situation in Manchuria with the utmost frankness. The settlement of the Russo-Japanese war, described by that eminent jurist, the late Monsieur de Maartens, as the most hasty and imperfect settlement with which he was acquainted, still remains the question of all questions in the Far East. If the future is not to be marred by a further weakening of the Chinese polity, if the employment of such an expression as "The Break-up of China" is really to fall into innocuous desuetude, it is essential that the actual issues should now be generally understood, and the whole weight not only of public opinion but of neutral diplomacy thrown quite openly on China's side. Outlines have year by year grown clearer and better defined; the issues have been fined down; we know now what is and what is not. It is no longer a question of this or that opinion; it is a question of certain simple facts; and the facts now set forth, and the construction placed on them, may be quickly verified by any reasonable person.

The first thing to write down clearly is the international status of Manchuria. Manchuria is as much a part of China as the metropolitan province of Chihli. No one, of course, denies that Manchuria has long been an integral part of the Empire; nevertheless there has been a suspicion abroad that it merited being classed with Mongolia rather than with the home provinces. Nothing could be more erroneous; it is as purely Chinese as Shantung. The population is entirely Chinese, since the word Manchu to-day has only an academic value; their sympathies are entirely Chinese; the bonds which unite North China and Manchuria are closer than the bonds which unite the Yangtze provinces with South China, Manchuria having for many years been simply what

the great western plains were to the older states of the American union—a land to emigrate into; and, of all the many Chinese colonists Manchuria has received, ninety per centum come from Shantung and Chihli. To put it concisely, the region is as much Chinese as Australia is British.

This view is not original. It was even shared by the late Lord Salisbury's government in 1900, and was one of the reasons why the Anglo-German Agreement of 1900 regarding China proved absolutely abortive; Germany, after her signature of that document, having stated in no uncertain language that she considered Manchuria outside the scope of the agreement. Yet what a shallow and unreasonable view! Amongst the first acts of the Manchu Dynasty, after it was firmly established in Peking in 1644, is to be found the constant dispatch of expeditionary columns to the northern and northwestern limits of that land to effect the subjugation of nomad tribes, who still lingered in mountain fastnesses, and to check the infiltration of Cossack freebooters who were even then active along the upper reaches of the Amur. Two and a half centuries ago an open title to the land was claimed and made good. The sovereignty of China, publicly established over every inch of the present provinces, and far beyond, by the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1698 has never been an uncertain sovereignty. Russia, then the only Asiatic power of international importance, solemnly admitted by that treaty all Chinese claims. By subsequent acts Russia half a century ago modified this ancient arrangement; she acquired the uninhabited left bank of the Amur and the uninhabited Primorsk, or Pacific Province, thus giving her an outlet on the Pacific as well as certain valuable riparian territory fit for colonization. In this there was no proper question of territorial robbery, the region acquired had been clearly proved by the flux of time to be too far north for Chinese colonization. It all belonged legitimately to Siberia, which fate has marked as Russian and nothing but Russian. Since then, that is for fifty years, there has been no question of frontier rectification, no question of upsetting a settlement first conceived by Muravieff Amurski, a man with a vision as clear as crystal, for the good and ample reason that a proper and final delimitation had at last been made in 1860, based on what may be called ethnical grounds.

It is important here to insist upon this point very earnestly;

it was the question of Korea, a totally different question, which blurred the outlines and suddenly complicated a simple problem.

The policy of the Japanese in 1895, after they had driven the Chinese out of Korea, in attempting forcibly to annex the Liaotung Peninsula, by which term was included all the territory south of a line drawn from the Yalu River, via Fenghuangcheng and Haicheng to the port of Newchwang, was a false policy, a political error of the first magnitude. The question of the overlordship of Korea, it was only that then, had nothing to do with Manchurian territory; by deliberately mixing the two questions the seed of immense troubles was sown by Japan, both for herself and for others. Frustrated by the action of three European Powers in her attempt to annex Southern Manchuria, Japan publicly admitted in terms which admit of no misconstruction, "that such permanent possession would be detrimental to the lasting peace of the Orient." These are the words of no less a personage than the Emperor of Japan; and, as events soon showed, not only were they a declaration of policy but a grim prophecy as well.

The sequel proves it. The action of Russia in the years following the retrocession of the Liaotung territory, an action primarily induced by the false lead Japan had given, culminated in two far-reaching tragedies, the Boxer uprising and the Russo-Japanese war. Briefly, as the result of the first tragedy Russia openly attempted to take a great step forward; as a result of the second she was forced to take a half-step backward. Her so-called occupation of Manchuria had never been effective even in a military sense, since had it been so the conflict of 1904-1905 would not have come. Her deliberate attempt to argue that Korea was a geographical part of the Chinese *hinterland* was as cruel as had been Japan's attempt to argue that the northern littoral of the Yellow Sea, be the country Korean or Chinese, openly fell within her sphere of sovereignty. Thus it may be legitimately claimed that no right of eminent domain in any part of Manchuria has been successfully advanced by an alien Power for half a century and that no such right can be advanced. The frontiers of fifty years ago, by virtue of a law as inexorable as that great physical first-truth, the survival of the fittest, call their claims—the Chinese have settled on and cultivated the soil and own the soil. Modern frontiers consist not of rivers or mountains, but of masses of men. Races

occupy their final abodes, and so long as a race does not die a slow political death, the death which Korea died, the right of eminent domain cannot really pass to alien hands. The Chinese as a race are more vigorous to-day than they have been for hundreds of years. Manchuria is for them a microcosm of their future national existence—they cannot any more relinquish their sovereignty over that region than they can forsake their ancient capital. And this is precisely the view which a study of every important public document loudly proclaims. Let us see it.

It is now generally accepted that the Treaty of Peace, signed by Russia and Japan at Portsmouth, was nothing but an annexure to the real treaty which made war impossible, the second Anglo-Japanese alliance. Formally entered into at London before the plenipotentiaries at Portsmouth had settled any of the chief points of difference, it is this document which gives absolute guidance regarding the post bellum status of Manchuria, the point of peculiar interest at the present moment. For at the time of its making, this treaty, in a higher sense, was not so much an alliance as a pronouncement of policy, of exactly the same nature as the no less far-reaching declaration of President Monroe regarding the American continent. England laid down certain principles; Japan accepted them. It is a fact which is not disputed that Great Britain, through her control of the Suez Canal, not only controls the Oriental trade but dominates the political relationship that Europe bears to Asia, a relationship which is still almost entirely decided by sea-power, a condition amply proved by the Manchurian campaign. The strategic possessions, beginning with Gibraltar and Malta and ending with Singapore and Hongkong, are the outward and visible signs of that domination which is by no means as shaken as many suppose. Certain principles flow naturally from that domination: those principles found clear expression in the arrangement made in London.

The preamble of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty stated the three-fold subject of the alliance thus:

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India.

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the high contracting

parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions.

It is manifestly only the last paragraph of these three which concerns us here. Though the second paragraph deals specifically with the question of insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire, the third paragraph may seem to qualify that declaration by speaking of "the special interests" of the high contracting parties in the regions covered by the agreement. But a careful study of the eight main articles of the treaty proves conclusively that there was no question at all of Manchuria in the minds of the signatories; in the year 1905 this agreement was purely a defensive agreement from the point of view of both the signatories. The full explanation of the expression "the special interests of the high contracting parties" is to be found in Articles III and IV—the only two of the eight articles which say anything at all about territory or interests—the other six being in the nature of a military convention and nothing else, aimed at Russia. To quote these two articles is to show their singular force:

Article III.

Japan possessing paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

Article IV.

Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.

It must be at once apparent to the least reflective that these two articles, carefully set together, balance one against the other just because they are so juxtaposed. Japan had special interests in Korea, which was not then annexed; England had a special interest in all that concerned the Indian frontier. That is to say that the annexation of Korea and British action in Afghanistan and in the Persian Gulf as defensive measures against Russia, who was still the enemy and an unbeaten Power in both an economic and military sense, were contemplated as possible and even prob-

able. As regards Manchuria it was simply anticipated that, though military evacuation must come as soon as peace was officially registered by a solemn decree, it would require the passage of years to allow a vast region which had been the scene of such dissimilar ambitions and such heroic conflicts to revert completely to Chinese control. The writer has recently assured himself in London in the highest quarters that this view is absolutely correct. No one, then, who is not wilfully perverted, need now argue that England has acquiesced at any time in the dismemberment of Manchuria. What many suppose to have been a conspiracy of silence has been proved to have been nothing more than the indifference of an ignorance now happily dispelled.

A brief examination has now been made of what may be called, in Bismarck's phrase, the Imponderabilia of the Manchurian situation, the things which still exert influence and which qualify or modify, as the case may be, the active factors of the day. In other words, the general view is now complete. In the next section it becomes necessary to be much more specific and to show that all published diplomatic documents dealing with Manchuria, which China has given to the world in good faith, proceed clearly and absolutely on the only assumption which can be drawn from the text of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1905, to wit, that it would require the passage of years to allow a vast region which had been the scene of such dissimilar ambitions and such heroic conflicts to revert completely to effective Chinese control.

II.

The particular status of Manchuria, from the Russo-Japanese standpoint, finds no better definition than in those articles both of the Portsmouth Treaty and the confirming Chino-Japanese Treaty of the same year which deal with the question of military evacuation. From these articles it is likewise made absolutely and unquestionably clear, no matter what claims may have been subsequently essayed, that Manchuria is inevitably destined to revert completely to Chinese control, provided that the Chinese Empire as a political unit is consolidated and modernized. It is well to mention also at this point, though the argument belongs to later paragraphs, that it was just as specifically and clearly laid down as a condition of peace that China be at once allowed an absolutely free hand in developing

the resources of the entire region. There can be no more argument about these points than about the solar system.

Article III of the Portsmouth Treaty states:

Japan and Russia mutually engage:

1. To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of Additional Article I annexed to this Treaty; and

2. To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in the occupation, or under the control, of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned.

The Imperial Government of Russia declares that they have not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

And this is followed by this frank admission:

Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria.

It is well that there is on permanent and clear record such a political confession as this. For the use of this language makes it unalterably clear that save for the Manchurian railways and the leased territory, the redemption of each of which is specially provided for, neither Russia nor Japan can claim to-day in Manchuria any right whatsoever.

But there is more to confirm the leading idea so loudly insisted upon in the historic year 1905, that every possible vestige of alien political predominance should be removed as soon as China proved herself capable of maintaining law and order. The text of the Chino-Japanese Treaty of December, 1905, besides confirming matters relating to Manchuria dealt with in the formal Treaty of Peace, has the following remarkable declaration which it should be easy for the Chinese Government to give effect to, when constitutional government is in full working order two years from now.

Article II states:

In view of the earnest desire expressed by the Imperial Chinese Government to have the Japanese and Russian troops and railway guards in Manchuria withdrawn as soon as possible, and in order to meet this desire, the Imperial Japanese Government, in the event of Russia agreeing to the withdrawal of her railway guards, or in case other proper measures are

agreed to between China and Russia, consents to take similar steps accordingly. When tranquillity shall have been established in Manchuria, and China shall have become herself capable of affording protection to the lives and property of foreigners, Japan will withdraw her railways guards simultaneously with Russia.

As soon as this article is enforced, we shall get the final and proper view of the situation in Manchuria⁶, that is, the true perspective.

It will be this. Until 1923, Japan, manifestly the predominant power from the Chinese standpoint because her position is coastal and not inland and because she is at home in the Far East, will administer the leased territory of Port Arthur, the Antung-Mukden Railway, and the main double-track railway from Dairen to Changchun. After that date (*a*) the rendition of the leased territory, specifically provided for by Article III of the original lease agreement of March, 1898, and (*b*) the sale of the Antung-Mukden line specifically provided for by Article VI of the additional agreement of 1905, which says that "the railway shall be sold to China at a price to be determined by appraisement of all its properties by a foreign expert, who will be selected by both parties," will simply leave in Japan's hands the double-track commercial railway running from the port of Dalny to the Central Manchurian town of Changchun. In the year 1939 this railway can be bought back on terms clearly laid down by the original statutes of the Chinese Eastern Railway Company, Section 30 stating unequivocally that "on the expiration of thirty-six years from the time of completion of the whole line and its opening to traffic, the Chinese Government has the right of acquiring the line on refunding to the company in full all the outlays made on it." And on the same date the Russian trans-Manchurian system, the last remaining right which Russia possesses in Manchuria, should pass by purchase in the same way into Chinese hands.

There is nothing complicated or obscure about these facts; they are as clear as crystal. The only possible complication which can arise is not in Manchuria, but in China. Should China fail to modernize herself completely, that is, fail to take her place as a first-class military and political power amongst the family of nations within the period named, then, of course, this argument fails. Fundamentally, then, the solution of the Manchurian Problem has

nothing to do with either Russia or Japan; it is simply a part of the general problem of the modernization of China. The two Powers, having years ago proclaimed to the world what their only possible policy can be in Manchuria, evacuation and sale of all concessions to the sovereign Power, provided that sovereign Power proves conclusively that she has become master in her own house and is therefore able to prevent any disturbance of the balance of power and peace within the limits of her territory, these two Powers cannot to-day put forward new claims. To do so would be to place themselves outside the family of nations, by declaring their pledged faith to be a matter of pure opportunism and nothing else. It is indeed just as essential for Russia and Japan to secure the restoration of natural conditions. It was mutual suspicion and jealousy which brought them face to face in Manchuria; which made them go to war; which cost them untold millions; and the effective garrisoning of Manchuria by strong Chinese corps and the complete restoration of Chinese sovereignty will once and for all remove the danger of collision, which must always exist so long as they remain as they now are, by interposing a strong buffer state. Only in the frontiers of Korea should the three rival empires meet; and there the nature of the country is such that there is no more incentive to a forward movement than there is in the exactly parallel case of the Pamirs.

The case being such as has been detailed, it is to be regretted that the after-effects of a misleading obscurantism should still tend to mar the natural solution of a problem which can be resolved into the simplest elements. This obscurantism, the fear what it may lead to, alone blurs the outlines, alone disturbs the future.

The clause in the Treaty of Peace which is of the very greatest importance just now to the world at large in view of the large financial accommodation being given to China, is the Article IV already quoted, that "Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measure common to all countries which China may take for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria." Obviously this clause is susceptible of many constructions; but the natural construction is the simple one that China should be given a free hand so long as her action is not dictated by a crude desire to upset the delicate balance existing between two alien Powers—before the time for complete evacuation has arrived.

Now economic development in the modern world is impossible without modern appliances; and of all modern appliances railways are probably the most important. That China should be virtually restrained during a period equivalent to a whole generation, say from 1905 to 1939, from building railways in Manchuria is in itself an intolerable state of affairs. Yet something suspiciously resembling a veto was placed by Japan, and then by Russia, on the Chinchow-Aigun scheme, Japan basing her action primarily on a private arrangement virtually forced on China and conflicting directly with the solemn international engagement made at Portsmouth not to obstruct general measures for the development of the commerce and industry of Manchuria. It is best to state this matter frankly, as it must come up again very shortly.

The Chino-Japanese Agreement of 1905, ratifying the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Peace, was not brought to a successful conclusion without the danger of a summary rupture of negotiations. One of the rocks on which the conference nearly split several times was this particular question of railways. Japan was at great pains to insist that the building of any line parallel to her South Manchurian railway could not be tolerated because of the injury it would inflict upon the one and only financial compensation she had drawn from her great war. Consequently she pressed for a formal undertaking on the part of China that no such parallel line would be constructed. The Chinese plenipotentiaries, after a great deal of discussion, believing that Japan deserved special consideration in view of the special circumstances surrounding the outbreak of war, finally consented to this provision, but in return requested a definite explanation to be included in the definition "parallel railway." The persistent Japanese answer was that if China assented to the principle, she might in confidence leave it to Japanese honor not to oppose any legitimate Chinese scheme which did not conflict with the undertaking given. The Chinese, in a moment of generosity, assented. The net result has been that Japan, by a policy which has been given very hard names even in diplomatic communications, practically stultified the solemn declaration she made in Article IV of the Portsmouth Treaty. The pressure of public opinion—and diplomacy, has been such, however, that she has already been forced to modify materially her original attitude of blind opposition, and now simply alleges in semi-official publications that her real

objection to the scheme was based on the fact that she was excluded from a participation in that in which she was entitled to participate on the principle of the open-door and equal-opportunity-for-all. The ground, therefore, has already been cleared for a fresh approach toward a solution of this vital matter. It is one that cannot be much longer delayed, since more railways are urgently needed in Manchuria.

A second danger point which may be classed under the term obscurantism is to be found in Article XI of the same agreement. On the surface it is an innocent enough article, but in the near future it may be productive of most serious complications unless China's case is properly supported and properly fought. Article XI states:

The Governments of Japan and China engage that in all that relates to frontier trade between Manchuria and Korea the most-favored-nation treatment shall be reciprocally extended.

Now the most-favored-nation clause, as experience has amply proved in many parts of the world, is a most dangerous clause whenever one nation is very much stronger than another. In the present instance this clause can be so interpreted by Japan that she may claim on the Yalu frontier the two-thirds land-frontier tariff enjoyed by Russia on the Amur and Transbaikial frontiers, and by France on the Yunnan frontier. By landing goods brought from any part of the world at the Korean port of Wiju, which is just across the Yalu River, and then taking them into Manchuria across the new railway bridge by train, a land-frontier tariff can be technically claimed, irrespective of the fact that the economic conditions on this frontier are precisely the same as those encountered anywhere along the China coast, and therefore entirely different from the economic conditions obtaining in distant frontier points such as Manchuria station on the Transbaikial frontier, or Aigun on the Amur, or Szemao and Mengtsz on the Tonkin frontier. On the narrow margins of profits now prevalent in the foreign trade in China, a preferential Yalu tariff is sufficient to give a very decided advantage. Furthermore, there is the deeper question of the free trade zone which may be also claimed on the Yalu under Article XI. Russia has managed to extend the free trade zone, designed only for nomad peoples, from Mongolia to Manchuria; and at Aigun on the Amur the Chinese customs practice is to-day to pass Russian

imports across the frontier free of duty when certified for consumption within a 100-li zone. If this procedure were forced on the Yalu, it would be necessary for the Chinese customs to fall back to Fenghuangcheng and re-establish the old line of the Willow Palisade as the virtual frontier. But the danger would not end here. The coming extension of the Kirin railway via Chientao into Korea will provide a second line of commercial invasion under the much-abused most-favored-nation clause, and complete the breakdown of what is a vital defence if Manchuria is to remain really independent, a strong customs frontier. Already experience has shown that the Dairen customs house has not an effective control over the import trade, and cannot have an effective control, until Chinese customs barriers are established on the frontier of the leased territory, Kinchow, and all freight trains searched and checked. Without further dwelling on these important points it must be evident to every impartial person that though on the surface everything is now clear, beneath the surface powerful disintegrating factors exist in embryonic form or requiring prompt and careful treatment. The unfortunate clause in the original Port Arthur Agreement which permits a discussion of the question of the renewal of the lease on the expiration of the present term rises like a distant cloud on the horizon. The desire to make the Manchurian railways a permanent possession is scarcely less masked. And there are other minor points which discretion bids leave here undiscussed. If Manchuria comes through the ordeal of these many difficulties successfully, it will be simply due to the fact that Chinese dead-weight has at last assumed a more militant form and that Japan recognizes the change. For that Russia does not care to associate herself in any way with Japan in Manchuria; that she is bound in the end to fall back on her Amur railway seems unalterably plain.

Here we reach the third and last phase of this examination—the immediate Chinese task. By examining in the next section the vital points on the Chinese side we are able to understand once and for all the last limits of this vexing question.

III.

The situation being such as has been described, first from the general international standpoint and secondly from the more particular Russo-Japanese standpoint, it seems plain that if there is

one thing above all others on which Chinese efforts in Manchuria should immediately be concentrated it is on questions of finance: First, the primitive question of currency, and then the more complicated question of a general Manchurian budget which will harmonize taxation and expenditure, and oppose an effective modern system to the alien forces in the country.

In no part of the empire has currency been in such an inchoate condition as in Manchuria. For many years in certain marts there were actually no coins at all, not even copper cash, the entire business being conducted on a basis just one stage above primitive barter, a credit system which was peculiarly pernicious because it was grounded not on currency but on commodities. Conditions have been lately improved by a large importation of copper coins, subsidiary silver, and even silver dollars, but the absence of token coins is still so marked and primitive ideas show themselves still so tenacious that banks, such as the modern Bank of Communication, issue silver dollar notes promising to pay bearer not one silver dollar but ten 10-cent pieces! A region that measures its wealth in a petty subsidiary coinage, that is admittedly badly minted and debased in value, is surely deserving of the worst censure.

Were Gresham's Law an infallible law this debased currency should have swept the country clear of all sound currency, such as Japanese yen-notes and Russian roubles. But this law, although applicable in ordinary circumstances, is proved the very opposite in Manchuria, thanks to the existence of that formidable *imperium in imperio*, the Manchurian railway system, which knows no money but its own. Thus to all intents and purposes not only does the present defective Chinese currency penalize the people, but it exposes them to far greater political dangers by allowing the rapid expansion of these alien currencies which are becoming more and more highly prized because they are based on sound finance and not on makeshifts. Furthermore, so long as there is no sufficient stock of minted Chinese money in the country, neutral European banks—themselves a powerful guarantee of the open door—cannot be expected to open offices in Manchuria. Had there been in Manchuria even the relatively small circulation of silver dollars which there is in the other eighteen provinces, European banking agencies would have been opened long ago at the principal marts of Harbin, Changchun, Mukden and Newchwang. It has become

absolutely essential then that silver dollars and subsidiary coins, to the gross amount of at least two dollars per head of native population, or say forty million dollars in all, be put at once into circulation, and that the forced retirement of all the heterogeneous mass of paper money, such as tiao notes, merchants' transferable drafts, and subsidiary silver notes be forthwith ordered.

This means nothing less than that the whole of the new currency reform must be directed first of all on Manchuria, where modern methods have become for political reasons so vitally essential. A proper banking scheme must go hand in hand with mere currency reform; and in this one matter there are years of hard and conscientious work. The capital of the only two modern Chinese banks, the Ta Ching Government Bank and the Board of Communications Bank, is at present wholly insufficient even for the Manchurian provinces; that they, as at present constituted, should be expected to manage the internal finance work of an immense empire in the throes of modernization is ridiculous.

The second point which demands treatment equally urgently is the question of the complete policing, as distinguished from the mere garrisoning, of the country on a modern basis. A Manchurian mounted constabulary, of precisely the same nature as, for instance, the Canadian mounted police, or the Italian carabinieri, is urgently needed. Taking the latter illustration as a peculiarly useful comparison at the present moment, it may be mentioned that the Italian carabinieri, consisting of some 25,000 men, cleared Italy of a brigandage much older and better established than Manchurian brigandage, and speedily won that confidence in law and order which is precisely what is needed at the moment all over Manchuria. A mounted military police, distributed in chains of posts in every part of the country and centralized in the viceregal seat, Mukden, would soon secure the execution of Article II of the Chino-Japanese Treaty and thus immeasurably strengthen China's hand. A Chinese commission of study could not do better than proceed abroad, enlisting skilled technical aid in the establishment of the necessary training centers in Manchuria.

The third point, which is equally urgent if the future is properly measured, is the question of Chinese emigration to Manchuria, that is, assisted emigration. A proper government department is required which will steadily fertilize and strengthen the vast

resources of a region as extensive as France and Germany combined, by the simple method of directing a great stream of migration on to the unoccupied land from the more congested provinces. This will be the best monetary investment it is possible to find; in the modern world, as in all times, the greatest riches are industrious men, of whom China has tens of millions living on the verge of starvation. The most generous estimates give Manchuria to-day a population of only twenty millions; there is room for one hundred millions and more; and remembering that modern frontiers are formed by flesh and blood and nothing else, it will be at once apparent that every extra million of men that go into the country will increase China's strength and resisting power immeasurably.

These three points are undoubtedly the essentials which demand immediate attention: finance, police and migration. Automatically they will bring in their train that astounding progress which has marked Canada's latest years of development. But hardly less important is the need of better communications throughout the country. Vast regions are still virtually isolated save during the winter months, when the rude tracks which do service as roads are frozen over. A system of light railways, independent of the present system or of any future trunk system, is certainly needed, and in proportion as the strength of the country grows so should the means of rapid intercommunication be improved.

Likewise it should be borne in mind that in Manchuria there are few or none of the prejudices which linger in many of the older provinces, and therefore in the two great fields of agriculture and mining there is also room for instant action. In the matter of agriculture some progress had been made already in experimental work; but it is an open question whether the government should not have recourse at once to the methods adopted with success by Russia in Siberia; that is, of becoming a dealer on a large scale in agricultural machinery, and in securing the general introduction of that machinery amongst the peasantry by inaugurating a system of gradual payments for relatively high-priced articles. In Northern and Western Manchuria large model farms could be very successfully established; every one admits that. Similarly in the matter of mining it is senseless not to take the bull by the horns, and promote modern mining not by a system of concessions, which has proved so unsatisfactory in China, but by a claims system. By

making it a *sine qua non* that registration of mining companies can only be effected in Peking and that Chinese jurisdiction must be admitted in the articles of association, the beginning of a *modus vivendi* might be secured which could eventually be extended all over the empire, and lead not only to a great development of Chinese wealth, but to a great development of Chinese political strength as well. China should learn a lesson from Japan's signal failure in this field, where excessive protectionism has made the introduction of neutral capital next to impossible, and thereby directly arrested what should be in the modern world a normal and far-reaching growth. Mining in Japan is utterly unimportant compared with the development it has received in Europe and America; and unless mining becomes important in China her general industrial expansion will be directly impeded, whilst a new and profitable source of taxation will be left untapped. That a proper beginning on a modern basis should now be made in Manchuria is moreover a political necessity.

Whilst the truth of all this need not be doubted, it is now amply evident that in the last analysis, as the writer has already insisted again and again, the solution of the Manchurian question is no longer a local question, that is a question of this or that improvement, of this or that activity, but a question of pure Peking politics. That is to say, Manchuria is destined to be the infallible touchstone by which the success of the Peking Government as a modern governing instrument will be coldly measured. A plan needs now to be publicly laid down which will secure that in a single decade, before 1923, the currency, the complete system of railways, the army, will be in full working order. In the modern world the one argument that counts is the argument of readiness. Every access of strength in Peking will be automatically reflected in Manchuria; every sound move in Peking will strengthen the forces of conservation; every honest word will find its resonant echo on the banks of the Yalu as on the banks of the Amur, and tend to revive those spacious days when the decrees of a Chien Lung were not only listened to with awe from the deserts of Mongolia to the swamps of Annam, but unhesitatingly obeyed. Finished will then be those dreary times when the meticulous attention devoted to some petty question by the highest officers of the Chinese state awoke the derision not only of satirists, but of the simple-minded as well; and only in the halting

periods of some unperceptive traveler, whose footsteps had blindly guided him to a land falsely held to be steeped in unfathomable mystery, will it be possible to recover a confusing impression of vanished treaty-port and leased-territory days, with their vain talk of spheres of influence, of inalienable rights belonging to mediævalism and only the mediævalism. Modernization is all that is required, rapid modernization, instant modernization.

Out of chaos thus springs order, the order based on the proper development of inalienable ethnical rights. A general admission that this is so, that the curtain must be rung down on stupid days, is already growing. When everyone at last openly proclaims it, even the brain of a Moltke could not conceive of a militarism which would deny it. "There is somebody more clever than Monsieur Voltaire," said Talleyrand, "c'est tout le monde." It is, then, nothing more than the world's moral support that China sorely needs. May it soon be openly given!

THE OPEN DOOR

BY FREDERICK McCORMICK,
New York.

At the beginning of this century the attention of world men, by which I mean those who think in terms of nations not of pockets like the provincial, was called to the fact that as to nations, the future is to the Russians and to the Chinese. Of the two the advantages seem to favor the Chinese because of their moral solidarity, civilization, competence, and industry, which no internal or external disorder has ever been able to break down, and their extensive natural resources. The Russians hold these views, and the directors of Russia's destiny are guided by them as a vague and impressive fear.

Of the present great political doctrines of the world the foremost are the Monroe Doctrine, and the Open Door. Both are American. Unless America repudiates her place and responsibilities in the world at large, these two doctrines will dominate the politics and progress of this century, because they concern the undeveloped industrial regions of greatest potential wealth and power, and toward which mankind is turned.

Of these two doctrines the foremost is the Open Door, whose importance has been great enough to have dominated the first decade of the century. Here are a few of its influences: its principles caused the most extensive military pilgrimages of modern times—those to Peking in 1900—and a few years later were the avowed cause on Japan's part of what was in some ways the greatest war of civilization, the Russo-Japanese War. Besides causing all the wars of the decade (Open Door Decade) it became the bone of contention, dividing the great powers of the world into two strong groups, one under the leadership of Japan, the other under that of America, whose interests are apparently irreconcilable, and in this way it has created foreign affairs in their largest sense for the United States. And finally the war danger surrounding this contention over the principles of the Open Door has been the chief alarm behind the arbitration and peace movement in America

and Europe, and its complications were the direct means of bringing forward the arbitration treaties signed between America and Great Britain, and America and France, August 3, 1911, furnishing as they did, the opportunity for Great Britain by signing the treaty to remedy the evils which the Anglo-Japanese alliance had wrought in the position of Anglo-Saxons in the Pacific, the effect being to unite the British colonies with the United States in the causes of the West, and by effacing herself from the list of America's possible enemies leave the United States free to promote the principles of the Open Door. The world of international affairs has thus laid down the lines of an Open Door Era, or conflict, with America in the breach, and with problems in the solution of which there are no guiding parallels.

America's geographical and political position is midway between the theatres of these two doctrines of the Americas and Eastern Asia. America is a strong, unbroken, untried, and powerful nation of vast ideas and intense purposes. For several reasons, therefore, she is the center of the international stage of the Pacific, and one of several unknown elements of vast potentiality there, of which China is another. She has done several things to deserve this position, and the chief reason why she is the power in the breach of these Pacific questions is, that, after acquiring the Philippines and her Pacific territories in 1898 she, in 1899, established the Open Door, equal opportunity, and integrity of China doctrine among the Powers, in 1900 sent an army to Peking in its interest, in 1908¹ a battleship fleet to Eastern Asia and around the world for this purpose, and the Japanese question, and began with striking energy to open the Isthmus of Panama to let her navy and all Atlantic commerce into the Pacific—a work worthy of China that built the great wall and the grand canal—and in 1910 and 1911, with surprising diplomacy in which she challenged all the great Powers, she forged for her finance, industry, government, and national ideals, a firm place in China's industrial and political development equal with the greatest nations. And last, if she so elects, she is the "god in the car" of the future of the Pacific because she is the largest and most powerful state in the Western Hemisphere

¹ The dispatch of a division of the American Army, composed of all arms of the service and fully equipped for a campaign, was one of the most extreme acts of executive authority in the history of the United States.—JOHN W. FOSTER, *Ex-Secretary of State*.

and in the Pacific. What she is to do is a subject in the determination of which every citizen may now take a permanent interest, and most have already discovered a relation, if not along political lines, at least with respect to the question as represented by the presence of Mongolians in America and of the word in the American federal laws.

When the word Mongolian was employed in the federal laws, none imagined that it was itself to be the emblem of foreign affairs of immense magnitude for a nation whose first President warned against foreign entanglements. Those entanglements were ours at the end of what I have called the Open Door Decade (1900-1910). The United States was involved with Eastern Asia and Europe on the west (Open Door), as she is involved with Europe on the east (Monroe Doctrine). And since the greatest questions exist there, foreign affairs in their widest sense have come from Eastern Asia. Even the constitution was made in an age of darkness respecting Eastern Asia; Confucius was merely a name; the statesmen, sages, builders, artists, writers, of China and of Japan were not then known, as they are nearly unknown to-day. Since that age Eastern Asia has written its own mandate across the European tradition respecting Asia, and across some of our federal laws, the latter circumstance involving one of the problems in the Pacific, and the enlightenment respecting Eastern Asia that has now begun both in Europe and in America may be written down in the words Open Door Doctrine better than in any other form.

The Pacific question to Americans is locked up in the affairs of three countries, Japan, China, and America. Western Asia gave religion to the world. If China is the key to "the world's politics of the next five centuries," as John Hay said it was, Eastern Asia has given grand politics to the world, and Eastern Asia is China and Japan.

Japan is now a first-class Power in the Western sense, having a highly organized government with a competent military, and she is steadily increasing in enlightenment, prosperity, strength and power.

China is the nation of greatest bulk in the world, is in a state of change and progress, possesses the sinews and has the visible prospects of being a first-class Power, and furnishes not only the most important example of effort at constitutional and representative government ever attempted, but the most important attempt at reform in the history of man.

These two nations and races are America's permanent associates in the "world's politics of the next five centuries." A study of the world's politics during the awakening of China shows that in times of crisis over China a majority of Western nations, influenced by the American disseminated doctrine of the Open Door have held back in Eastern Asia, generally willing to be led by America, and this opportunity and responsibility has been permanently accepted by America in the interest first of her present trade and future commerce and peace, and second in the interest of China and all the Powers equally. American financiers entered the field of China's industrial regeneration, 1909, and now the United States has physical interests there identical with those of the greatest Powers, thus giving adequate support to the position she has taken as the advocate of the Open Door.

The natural effect upon Japan of the active material interest policy adopted by the United States in Eastern Asia, and the setting up of the Open Door principles of equal opportunity and especially that of the integrity of China's sovereignty and territory, has been to introduce along with it the influences and principles of the Monroe Doctrine upon which Japan seized and has now made a part of her policy towards the world. The Monroe Doctrine for Eastern Asia means that Western Powers are not to expect to extend their sovereignty and institutions there. This policy upon the part of Japan would exactly suit this country if it were a certainty that Japan herself was not destined to extend her own authority on the continent of Asia and thus traverse the principles of the integrity of China and the equal rights of Western Powers. The fact is that to Japan American policy introduces the principles of no extension of Western authority in Eastern Asia, because it throws into such insistent relief those facts of Japan's position on the Asian continent and her political alliances and complications with Russia and European Powers that make her an opponent of the integrity of the Chinese Empire. It cannot be disputed that for several years now a diplomatic battle has been going on between Japan and America, until recently much to Japan's advantage, which has divided the Powers interested in Eastern Asia into two camps. The superior political and diplomatic sagacity of Japan in Eastern affairs enabled her to marshal the frontier powers of China into a frontier compact. These frontier powers, Great Britain and Japan,

France and Russia, are allied offensively and defensively, while France and Japan have agreed together respecting frontier interests, Great Britain and Russia have agreed together regarding frontier interests, and finally Russia and Japan themselves reached an agreement on Chinese frontier interests July 4, 1910, the main point of which agreement is the maintenance of the *status quo* in northern China. Needless to say the "*status quo*" of Russia and Japan in north China is something which China considers to be contrary to the Portsmouth Treaty, the Ching-Komura Convention, a violation not only of treaties but of the Open Door, the integrity of China's sovereignty, and of her territorial integrity.

But with respect to influencing the great Powers in their attitudes toward China, the American policy, upon the success of Japan in getting Russia to sign with her an agreement, was thus outmanœuvred at the end of the Open Door Decade. The political forces of the Powers in Eastern Asia were then marshaled by Japan upon the side of material frontier interests, and America saw that the Open Door was becoming more of a name than anything else. It was at this juncture that the government in Washington devised a plan for marshaling the financial and capitalistic interests of the Powers in China proper and in Manchuria, and centering those interests on the policy of industrial development, persuading China of the wisdom of a liberal use of foreign capital in the development of her empire. In this way the political interests of Japan and of Russia especially, were combatted, so as to offset the tendency to territorial and jurisdictional encroachment, and as both Russia's and Japan's weaknesses were found in their several incapacities to furnish capital to China and therefore to formidably oppose this movement, this plan succeeded, and America was able to see formed in China an alliance of the interests of the four capitalistic powers already mentioned on financial and commercial lines which stand in opposition to the political interests of the frontiers. It may be said, therefore, that the Open Door Doctrine already has led the United States to undertake unusual measures, and assume unprecedented responsibilities, in the promotion and perpetuation of it in Eastern Asia. Unless China is broken up by some unexpected though not wholly impossible cataclysm her future will largely depend upon the outcome of the struggle between these forces of the frontier (or Manchurian) allies whose interests and

political action tend to disintegrate China, and the capitalistic allies whose interests tend to build up China from the center outward, and if China could have peace within might conquer the evils she has allowed to form about her frontiers. America's course for several years now has served to fasten upon her the responsibility of maintaining a foremost place in this contest, and these latest activities of 1910-1911 only leave her on the threshold of yet greater possibilities and responsibilities. What these are may be imagined by those students of Eastern affairs whose knowledge of the forces working within the Chinese race and nation equals their understanding of the necessities, aims, opportunities, and intentions of the frontier powers. That, in fact, is the Open Door question.

THE LIFE OF A GIRL IN CHINA

BY MISS LI YIENI TSAO, M. D.

Within the last thirty years, a great deal of literature has been produced on China and things Chinese. The prevailing tendency among writers is to belittle and condemn. Each writer tries to draw his own conclusion from a carefully selected set of facts ready for his manipulation. One-sided facts could very successfully hoodwink the readers who are not acquainted with other than what are furnished. However, it has been generally acknowledged that critics usually present the dark side more energetically than the bright. Recently, sociological studies have broadened the minds of men so that the attitude of one people for another has changed from one of off-hand condemnation to sympathetic interest. In depicting the life of a Chinese girl in China, the writer would neither defend the position of her country-women against the onslaught of critics, nor paint a rosy picture, but make a faithful description of the situation, with the hope that some of her readers might volunteer to furnish help in breaking down the bad religious and social customs that fetter the girls and women of China. Realizing the difficulty in ameliorating the condition of Chinese women without first locating the chief social bulwarks that have been responsible for it, it is with a deep sense of responsibility that the writer proceeds with the discussion.

Since it is not the writer's intention to prove any definite conclusion advocated, it would be well to lay down at the start certain fundamental sociological principles that have been generally acknowledged and which might likely serve to elucidate the situation.

I.—Man and woman differ, as Tennyson has it: "Woman is not man undeveloped but diverse." This is universally true.

II.—A. The society that is based upon the old, is conservative.
This is true of China.

B. The society that is based upon the young, is progressive. This is true of the West.

In China the young obeys the old, in the West the old yields to the young.

III.—A. Chinese home-life emphasizes solidarity.

B. Western home-life emphasizes individualism. The Chinese family is a co-operative community which necessitates a constant self-sacrifice. The western family is an independent unit which develops a self-reliant aggressive spirit.

IV.—In the struggle for existence, the protected becomes weak ; the unprotected strong.

Space does not permit the amplification of the above statements, but a little reflection would be sufficient to convince any one of their validity as they have been universally admitted. However, in the course of description, whenever occasion arises reference will be made to them explicitly. Wherever possible, comparisons between the eastern and western life will also be used. China is now undergoing a period of transition and so many conditions have changed that one is often placed on the horns of a dilemma in giving a faithful portrayal ; one is either tempted to present too much of the modern life or else of the life prior to the influence of Christianity and western culture. Inasmuch as modern ideals have only affected the coast provinces and treaty ports, it is deemed advisable to depict a Chinese girl's life which was universally true throughout China some thirty years ago.

A. Early Childhood

The advent of a *girl* in a Chinese family has rarely been an event of joy as compared with that caused by the arrival of a boy ; of course this is not true of Chinese Christian homes. Aside from the economic, the chief reasons for disappointment are because a daughter cannot offer the annual ancestral sacrifice, glorify the family by official appointment through literary attainments, and perpetuate the family name. In a society where reverence for the old (II A) has become ancestral worship, the above considerations assume an alarming degree of importance.

In general, the baby girl receives the same tender care as a boy would as soon as maternal philoprogenitiveness overcomes the first impulse of disappointment as shared by friends and relatives alike. Up to the age of five or six, the child participates equally in the privileges of her brother, excepting those that would tend to make her a "Tomboy." (I). At the age of five or six, however, the line

of demarcation becomes more distinct between the boy and the girl. This landmark is the wicked and senseless custom of foot-binding, which has done much to weaken the constitution of our women and harden the natural love of mothers for their young. A pair of small feet though at first considered as a form of beauty, has, in course of time, become a mark of gentility, and therefore all families which could lay claim to a genteel ancestry would feel duty bound to cramp the toes of their girls. This custom is by no means universal, for the Manchus of the north, the Hakkas of the south, and the agricultural class in many sections of the country do not appreciate this form of "hobble" beauty.

The duty of administering this unnatural torture devolves upon the mothers who, in stamping their own flesh with the mark of gentility, have for generations gone about the task with dogged determination and oftentimes with many a bitter tear. Fond fathers have interceded in vain against this invulnerable custom which has served time and again as a cause for an unquiet house. Rare exceptions are known when both parents agree to supply their daughters with stilted shoes as a measure to defeat the practice. Generally, the mothers have forgotten their past sufferings, and feeling proud of their own small feet, apply bandages to their daughters' feet desperately. On the other hand, the child is henceforth placed in a different sphere from the boy. Cries, protests, lamed feet and a sedentary life label her as a Chinese girl.

B. Her Education

The education received by the Chinese girl before the advent of the Mission Schools and the modern school system was a negligible quantity. Kindergarten and domestic science were unknown from the modern educational standpoint; physical education was impossible on account of the bandaged feet; for even walking was too painful at the beginning. Under the old tutorial system, education had as its aim, the training of men for business or government service, and since women were not supposed to receive official positions, their education was therefore not deemed as absolutely necessary. This, however, does not imply the utter negligence of female education: for loving parents had often given their daughters the rudiments of knowledge in common with their sons under the

same family or village tutor, and sometimes even an advanced literary education was imparted to them.

Under such circumstances, the children of the ignorant and the poor are wholly neglected as a matter of course, and it is only with the advent of universal and compulsory education that this condition can be remedied. But in the upper and middle classes, girls generally go to school till the age of adolescence when it was considered improper for them to be seen constantly out of doors, so it is only in families where tutors could be afforded that their education so far as reading and writing are concerned may be prolonged. The curriculum covered coincides with what a boy generally learns up to the age of twelve or fourteen, excepting a few books which have special reference to the duties of a girl. This implies a general knowledge of reading and writing letters and some ciphering. After that time till marriage, the greater part of the time would be devoted to sewing, embroidery, cooking and general domestic art. These duties often mean an endless task in helping to furnish the household with simple articles of dress and food, such as hats, shoes, socks, shirts and preserves, pastry, etc. In households of reduced circumstances piecework in sewing, pastry, lanterns, making match-boxes, weaving baskets and the minor employment of the silk and tea industries might be carried on as a means of keeping the wolf out (III A).

C. Her Social and Moral Life

A Chinese girl has very little social life to speak of. This is also true of the boy when compared with Tom Brown at Rugby. In fact, the rigid paternalistic oversight (IV) has reduced the initiative of Chinese youths to a considerable extent. As eastern society is based upon the principle of filial piety, it has become almost a second nature to obey one's parents, elders and superiors. While obedience is a good discipline, pushed to the extreme it has a weakening effect upon the moral fibre of the young. Often times, children have to put up with unreasonable parents just because custom requires it, and any infringement would be eyed with disapprobation from all. "Well, it may not be the best, but what of that, she is after all your mother," is a phrase constantly heard addressed to a revolting child. Westerners have watched with great surprise

the meek submission with which Chinese children, and even adults, receive the reasonable and unreasonable chastisement of their parents. It is likewise a surprise for the easterners to see the western youths behave towards their parents. In the East, society is based upon the old, and in the West, upon the young; thus in the former the young has no voice while in the latter, the old is considered a back number (II A, B).

Since of children is required so much obedience, a boy's climbing, swimming and fighting instincts are curbed as far as the apron strings could reach. As girls lead a much more indoor life, constant supervision has made freedom of action almost impossible. Physical exercise beyond the most rudimentary such as is seen in the kindergartens of the West, is practically unknown. The few social enjoyments usually mean dressing up and being on behavior. The chief occasions that send a ripple of cheer and excitement through the heart of a Chinese girl would be attending a fair, a theatrical performance, a sewing circle, a birthday or a wedding. Short trips are sometimes made to gardens during the flowering seasons, to a temple for worship or to witness a religious procession. But upon all occasions she is chaperoned. To go out with young men by themselves for a walk or a ride would shock the people as much as it would a nice old French aunt. Exceptions are made to this rule of near relations and intimate friends of the family in case of parties. Judged from the western standpoint, none of the above so-called enjoyments would appeal very strongly, but to a Chinese girl she would be lucky to have one every now and then.

The moral teaching is chiefly derived from two sources, namely: from the books she has studied and from parental teachings. If she is an untutored girl then her moral ideas are acquired chiefly from moral stories or through the incidents of daily life. Chinese folk-lore is rich with anecdotes and stories, and a few of them would expound certain morals as definitely as Æsop's fables do. Religious training is often no more than a series of minor household duties connected with sacrifices to gods and ancestors. On very rare occasions, young girls come into contact with Buddhist monks at masses either said at the house or at the monastery. These monks have often proven to be men of the world, and the learned ones are able to expound the doctrines as emphasized by Buddhism in a very convincing manner. But what has Buddhism

done for Chinese womanhood? It has degraded it. As long as the numerous superstitions of this religion and others remain in the Middle Kingdom, Chinese women will never be placed upon an equal standing with men. Therefore, the first duty is to enlighten the darkened minds, and with this enlightenment, superstitions will take their natural flight. It is needless for the writer to say, that only Christianity can accomplish this tremendous task, no human power ever can.

D. Engagement and Marriage

Foot-binding is the first landmark to a girl at the age of five, the other two landmarks of greater importance are engagement and marriage at the age of twelve to fourteen and sixteen to twenty, respectively. From these, the boys also are not exempted; only such a catastrophe is with them deferred by two to four years. Marriage is a universal custom in China, and spinsters are rare.

Marriages are arranged by parents. This is most unreasonable, viewed from the western standpoint, but if we give it a little consideration, this social custom is quite rationally evolved. Be it understood, that engagements and marriages are much earlier in China, and therefore to expect a girl of twelve or fourteen to make a free choice of her own would be disastrous. Therefore, in the West a law raises the age of consent, and in the East, paternalistic assistance comes to the rescue (II A, III A. B). While it is generally acknowledged that a girl should not marry earlier than eighteen, oftentimes, due to the desire of a grandfather or a sick parent on either side, marriages are hastened. In compliance to the last wish of such a parent (II A), youths are united in their early teens, and this is made feasible by the communistic family life (III A) or else the wherewithal for self-support could not be earned by the youthful bridegroom.

With regard to what part the personal consent of the parties thus united will play, the wishes of the parents will determine. Generally they alone would decide, but sometimes an opportunity for interview between the parties might be arranged. As parents would reasonably select a party of the same station of life and pay some attention to personal appearance and temperament, the youthful parties could be reasonably expected to give a blushing consent. The chief reasons why they do not protest and show so

much insubordination as a western youth would, are first, because they are young, and second, because they never had anyone of their own choice in view. It is not Romeo and Juliet, but the story of *The Tempest* universalized. Both the boy and the girl accept the other as the first love and as soon as they are united, each is willing to go half way to meet the wishes of the other. In addition to this, the difficulty to obtain a divorce further increases the mutual desire to live peacefully together. Marriage in the West often means the removal of sentimental masks of mutual consideration; while in the East, it is the beginning of love-making.

To sum up briefly, we cannot say exactly that the children have no voice in the engagement, but as a fact they have nothing to say, being young and having no one else in view; neither can we say that marriage is not sacred, for only the first wife enjoys the full privileges of a wedding ceremony and this binding tie is very difficult to annul; nor can we say there is no love, although no party ever openly admits it. Even foreign critics say that love does exist only in a manner that is to be taken for granted.

E. Her Married Life

The married life of a Chinese girl is doublefold, namely: her relation to her husband and to his family. She is married to the family (II A), more than to her husband, as he is often so young that he is merely a student or an apprentice. The bride is received into the family as an additional child to be trained in the duties of life. She is indeed no mistress in the house. Why should she and how could she be? The relation of a wilful bride and an unreasonable mother-in-law can assume all the critical degrees of such strained relations. But if the girl knows her duties as a daughter-in-law and fully realizes as most girls do, that she is merely on the par with her junior husband in his father's home, then things can proceed smoothly (II A). In a country where marriage is so early and education so limited among girls, to give control of the household to the inexperienced brides would wreck many a home.

This paternalistic and sometimes galling supervision is only reduced when the son becomes a self-supporting man or when the bride becomes mother to a son. It is motherhood and not wifehood that increases the privileges of independence in China. Wives are given to sons by parents that they may have an additional junior to

serve them. The old people expect service from the young who in turn may expect the same from their juniors later on, but not while seniors are still living in the same household—in a word, family solidarity rests upon obedience and service to the elders (III A). In contrast to this, we find in the West later marriages by personal choice, while the parents resign themselves to a lonesome old age, alleviated only by an occasional visit from their children and grandchildren (III). Communistic family life oppresses the young wife and individualistic life sends the old widowed mother to a boarding house or a home.

Another phase of a woman's life which may possibly fall upon her is widowhood. There is no greater calamity which can befall a Chinese woman than that of early widowhood. Of the four great virtues, patriotism, filial piety, fidelity and righteousness, to which monuments are erected all over the land, fidelity of women is the most commemorated. The moral reasons for this custom are not far to seek, but the practice of it is the most pitiful. Widows that have children and are in good circumstances would never think of remarrying, but the pitiful aspect is the struggle of poor widows practising fidelity.

F. Motherhood and Old Age

In the East, motherhood is the crowning period of her life in spite of cares for the young and worries over household affairs (II A, B). Old age is a continuation of motherhood, then she rules supreme in the family in the absence of her husband. Her past sufferings, experiences and maternal cares combine to make her a matron obeyed by her children and respected in the community.

In conclusion, a Chinese girl's life has none of the privileges and pleasures of her western sister. She has less education and social knowledge, but she is taught to be filial and self-sacrificing. This paternalistic policy assures her of marriage and she is not expected to earn her own living. The western sister is better educated and more independent, but she is expected to take care of herself.

Communistic life is conservative and weak as compared with the individualistic (III A), but progress has been bought with the trying struggles of self-supporting girls and bachelor maids. No doubt, with the coming of more universal education and better

economic life in China, the individual will be raised. Already, among the rising generation, constant rebellions of children against parental authority in early engagement and marriage are heard of (II A, B). Truly, the problem of the Chinese girl is a great one and nothing will solve it except that which will raise the standard of womanhood. Education alone does not accomplish it, for go back to the days when Rome and Babylon and Egypt were in the height of their education; what was the condition of womanhood in those days? It was demoralized beyond words. Therefore, the only solution to this tremendous problem is the widespreading of Christianity and Christian education. If the readers of this short and incomplete article could only go with the writer, first to a non-Christian home and then to a Christian home in China, even the most bigoted could see the difference and also find the factor which brings about this change—for to be a Christian in China is to live as one.

A WEDDING IN SOUTH CHINA

BY MISS YING-MEI CHUN,

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A wedding in South China is characterized by gay and noisy parades, and big and elaborate feasts. It is more attractive and expressive of merriment than an American wedding, but is less solemn and almost too trivial to mark the turning point of the history of two lives. There is no occasion, unless it is New Year, in China which gives a greater pleasure to youths and children than a wedding. There is nothing which grown people as well as children so thoroughly enjoy. Every person in town may enjoy seeing the parades and every friend or relative, no matter how distant, is invited to participate in the feasts which are prepared at the wedding.

Since a wedding is such an elaborate affair, it is not confined to one day. The ceremonies begin at least ten days before the actual marriage. They begin with what is called in the Cantonese dialect "The passing of the big parade." This "passing of the big parade" is a gift made by the bridegroom's parents to the bride's family. Unlike the gift which is either delivered by the postman or expressman, it is one that is carried in trays measuring three feet by six by twenty or thirty men dressed in festive costume. The gift consists largely of eatables, such as cakes, candies, nuts, ham, both cooked and live geese, chickens and ducks. Besides the eatables there are two or three articles which are meant especially for the bride. They are ornaments for the hair and a small sum of money. The bride's family accepts almost everything in the trays. In order to show their gratitude and appreciation they send back in the trays their good wishes, which are expressed in small red packages of money and also baked pigs, which are a sign of prosperity. As both families are unable to consume all the eatables on hand, they distribute them among their friends and relatives.

While they are making this distribution they take the occasion to invite the wedding guests. From the time the invitations are issued to the wedding day the two families are busily engaged in

completing their preparations. In a tactful manner the mother of the bride first announces the marriage to her daughter. Immediately the girl runs to her room to hide and weep, as a sign of her deep sorrow at having to leave her home. She refuses to appear at meals or come out to see anybody. During this time her intimate friends and companions come to stay with her and cheer her up. Since the marriage has been announced, nothing needs to be kept secret. The mother openly packs the trunks and puts in them articles which her daughter has expressed her desire for. She employs tailors to make her daughter's dresses and bed clothes; packers to fasten the furniture together; and decorators to decorate and arrange the trunks, bureaus, chairs, tables, cooking utensils and other things, so that they may look attractive in the parade. Three days before the wedding these articles are removed by men in festive costume to the house of the bridegroom. While the bride's mother is preparing the trousseau the bridegroom's parents are vacating several rooms where they may place the furniture of their daughter-in-law. As soon as the furniture arrives, they put it in place and the house is ready for wedding feasts and guests.

On the third day, that is, the wedding day, a long procession composed of lanterns, bands, flags, clowns and a gilded sedan chair, reaches the door of the bride at the time set by the augur. This arrival of the procession means that the bride is to be taken away from her parents' home. The two Chinese words, one used for the marriage of a man and the other for the marriage of a woman, are very descriptive of a Chinese marriage. The word for the marriage of a man is "take," that is, to take possession of some one or to take some one to his home. The word applying to the marriage of a woman is "cross over the door." The procession comes to take some one who is to cross the door or come out of her home.

The bride never intends to leave her home as soon as the procession arrives. She lingers until night assures the mother that it is unwise for her daughter to tarry any longer. She pleads at the door of her daughter's room for admittance. When she fails in her attempt, she, with the help of the servants, forces the door open. Finally the daughter and her companions give up resisting and she herself permits the servants to dress her. After she is properly covered with red, the color of the wedding garment, from head to foot, she is brought out to the parlor, where she listens to

the prayers of an augur employed for the occasion, and where she bows before the household gods, ancestral tablets and her parents, to bid them farewell. Although the wedding is represented as very gay and happy, this moment of separation is almost too sad for the friends and relatives to bear. It is evident that the merrymaking pertains mostly to the family that is to receive the bride and not the family that is to part with her. After the parting ceremony the girl is taken to the gilded sedan chair. Amid the noise of fire-crackers and inharmonious music the procession moves on. It is customary for the younger brothers to accompany their sister to her destination and then return to report her safe arrival.

While the groom's family are drinking and feasting the parade arrives. The groom comes out and knocks at the door of the sedan chair with his fan. He makes a bow to the chair and one to each of the bride's brothers. After having done so, he returns to the house. By this time the door of the sedan chair is open and the bride is taken into the house. Both the bride and groom kneel before the ancestral tablets and household gods and pay their honors to the aged relatives. After this the bride is taken to her room, where she awaits the groom to lift her veil. After the veil is taken off she puts on a beautiful court robe and a pearly crown.

She is ready to appear before the relatives and friends of her husband. She, with the assistance of her servants, bows before the guests and serves them tea. Each guest in return for this kind favor hands over to her a gift in money. The amount varies according to the ability of the donor and his relation to the family.

After feasting, and as a means of amusing themselves, the guests play jokes mercilessly upon the newly married couple, especially the bride. They make the bashful bride guess conundrums, puzzles, do tricks which belong only to magicians, and answer embarrassing questions. Should she fail or refuse to do anything that is asked of her, she is subject to a forfeit either in money or in kind. Such merriment and joking last all night.

On the morning of the third day after marriage the bride makes her parents a visit. The evening of that same day the groom pays his first respects to his father-in-law and mother-in-law. In his honor the parents-in-law give him a feast. After the feast is over he returns home. This formal ceremony of the third day marks the close of the wedding festivities.

CAUSES OF CHINESE EMIGRATION

BY PYAU LING,
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Chinese emigration is a movement of the most singular character. It is one which differs in purpose from emigration from European countries. Europeans come to America because of a surplus of population which depresses wages and drives the ambitious to better their economic conditions or to secure a greater degree of personal freedom. Apparently the same conditions lie back of Chinese emigration. In China the land is truly thickly peopled and the economic condition wretched. Still we cannot safely say that the Chinese emigrate entirely for these two purposes. Europeans may leave their abodes for political freedom or for religious tolerance. The Chinese do not. The Chinese government is indeed despotic at the top, but it is democratic at the bottom. Religious persecutions, such as Catholics against Protestants and churchmen against dissenters which have been so prevalent in Europe, are entirely unknown in China. There are other factors which make Chinese emigration peculiar. Europeans come from all parts of the country; the Chinese come from certain parts only. Europeans go everywhere; the Chinese go somewhere only. Europeans come to teach, to trade, to work and to till the soil; the Chinese primarily come to labor, although trading is a later result. With Europeans, no matter male or female, old or young, they all come; with the Chinese only the young men emigrate. Europeans intend to settle permanently; the Chinese intend to go back. Europeans become citizens and are assimilated into American citizenship; the Chinese do not care for naturalization, nor for the native customs, manners and dress. Europeans go to places where they can find the greatest fortune; the Chinese crowd to countries where they can find the greatest number of friends and relatives. Europeans emigrate to countries where they are most favored; the Chinese persist in landing where they are opposed by legislation and public opinion. With Europeans only the most favored class come; with the Chinese only the least favored classes come.

Chinese emigration has peculiar territorial limits not only in

its destination but in its source. It is chiefly composed of young peasants coming from only six prefectures of the two southeastern provinces, Fookien and Kwantung, lying between Foochow and Canton. These adventurous emigrants have for centuries penetrated through the Indian archipelago, have pushed through the Indian Ocean to Ceylon and Arabia, have reclaimed Formosa and Hainan, have established a remarkable trade with Cochin China, Cambodia and Siam and have introduced useful arts into Java, the Philippines and the Malay Peninsula. To-day they venture southward to Australia and far westward to Peru, Mexico, Canada, Cuba, and America in spite of the stringent laws those uncourteous countries have adopted to exclude them.

When we think of the peculiarities surrounding this emigration, we cannot help believing that there are certain local characteristics which make Kwangtung and Fookien differ from the other provinces of the empire. The inborn independent idea, the seafaring spirit, the early contact with western nations, the stress of war, the "Golden Romance," the traveling facilities, the social prejudice at home and the attachment to kindred—all these are factors that are laboring to make the Cantonese and Fookienese a migratory people.

Still while we are pointing out the reasons why the other provincials would not emigrate and why only the Cantonese and Fookienese emigrate, we cannot deny that the density of population in these provinces has an important influence. It is a world-known fact that China is overpopulated. Comparing the area and population of the Chinese empire and America, we find that in territory China is just about as large as the United States. But her population is five times as great. In China every square mile supports a hundred people, but in America twenty only, one-fifth as many. The mild climate of Southern China also encourages the increase of population. So Canton, one of the treaty ports, has an enormous population which, by the census of 1899, was 2,500,000,—compared with that of the northern cities, we find that this is more than thrice that of Hankow (709,000) or four times that of Shanghai (615,000), the great commercial center at the mouth of the Yangtse River. Much has been written by travelers about people living in boats on the Pearl River and about growing potatoes in the kitchens. Both these facts, though more or less exaggerated, show that the southeastern provinces are densely inhabited.

Aside from rapid multiplication, another influence impelling the people to emigrate is the peculiar family tradition which entitles the eldest son of the family to occupy the ancestral house. Suppose a man has five sons, which is not uncommon in Canton; his eldest son will have the house. The other four sons have each to build themselves a house. Again supposing these five sons each has a family of five children, how can these children, the land in Canton being so dear and labor so cheap, manage to house themselves? Generally they cannot, and emigration is the result.

If China is overpopulated, why do not the people of other provinces emigrate? Because China is not a migratory nation. The Chinese are home loving; the Middle Kingdom is to them the center of civilization and all the surrounding countries are savage nations, nations where there is little to gain but much to lose. Until the present time the outside world has been a chaos of mystery, unknown and forbidding to the Chinese. Not only would the respectable people not voluntarily go outside the limits of the Celestial Empire, but even the desperate convicts and exiles dreaded banishment to these distant lands. It is in democratic Canton that every man is considered the equal of every other man and all countries worthy of consideration. Even there the well-to-do do not emigrate. Students and merchants who can afford to stay, consequently stay. Conventional ideas, of course, keep the women at home. It is the wretched economic condition that has driven the young peasants out.

What is this economic condition then? The emigrants are almost exclusively peasants. At home they till their own soil and support their own families. Their income is little, but their families are enormous. When the harvest is good, they get barely sufficient to satisfy their hunger. In time of droughts which often occur in winter in the southeastern provinces, they suffer from the failure of crops. We have also to remember that it is the well-to-do peasants that have their own land to till. Those that have no land, labor for those that have. The misery of these laboring peasants in times when food is scarce we need not picture. When they are out of work, they seek to cut wood in the hills. By this new occupation they can obtain only enough to meet the demand of their home and an extra meal, the reward of the whole day's labor being twenty or thirty cents. But hills are soon deforested and their

families are constantly threatened with starvation. Naturally these able-bodied, young peasants aspire for something greater, something by which they can better their own economic conditions and secure the ease and comfort of life. At home such excellent opportunities are lacking. They have to seek them abroad.

But the economic condition like overpopulation, though having a good deal to do with emigration, cannot be said to be the sole cause. This is shown by the fact that in the north the provinces along the Yellow River are often not less disturbed by floods than are Kwangtung and Fookien by droughts. The great plague that ravaged the North last spring is one of the calamities that often befall those provinces and drive many to starvation and untimely graves. Yet the Northerners do not come out, not entirely because they are less ambitious, but because China is primarily not a migratory country. The emigration of the Cantonese and Fookienese can be accounted for only by the peculiar local characteristics of those two provinces.

A marked characteristic of the people of Kwangtung and Fookien is their independent, adventurous and unbending spirit. The independent spirit of the Cantonese for instance, has long been fostered by the independence of their province which despised submission to the Son of Heaven and which did not join the Celestial Empire till the Ming Dynasty about three hundred years ago. This unruly spirit their northern neighbors designate as "savageness," and they call the Cantonese tauntingly "the southern savages." Whether savage or not, Kwangtung preferred independence to servile submission to the despotic rule of the central government and homage which their northern neighbors take pride in as a sign of civilization. The tribute, however, they did not fail to send to the throne even during the turbulent time of anarchism at the latter part of the Tong Dynasty (907 to 959 A. D.), when the other provinces revolted against the government. So Kwangtung always preserves its individuality. What the northern provinces did, it would not do; what the northern provinces would not do, it did. This deep-rooted independent spirit no emperor could extirpate. Even the powerful Chen Chi Wong, who had in 249 B. C., brought the Six Feudal Kingdoms to subjugation, did not know what to do with Kwangtung. The expedition he sent there met with firm resistance. Half was starved and half slain. The emperors of the Sung

Dynasty (960 to 1279 A. D.), instead of requiring the servile homage from the Cantonese, sought to curry their favor. They built a wall for them against the depredations of Cochin China. This independent spirit is what the Northerners lack, is what the Northerners envy. It is, therefore, no wonder that, while their northern countrymen were bound by the idea of absolute seclusion, the people of Kwangtung and Fookien, on the other hand, traversed the South China Sea and crossed the Pacific Ocean to Hawaii and America.

Their adventurous spirit has been fostered by their distant commercial enterprises. Their early commercial history showed considerable trade with the Romans. During the period of luxury Rome stood in want of silk, and silk came only from China. We can trace this as far back as the time of Virgil and Pliny. Virgil spoke of the soft wool obtained from the trees of the Seres or Chinese. Pliny, on the other hand, condemned the useless voyages made merely for that luxurious stuff. Smarkand and Bokhara were in these days the emporiums between the West and the East. Caravans traveled through the desert of Gobi till they reached the north-western province of Shensi. This route would have led the north-western provincials to trade with the Westerners, if it was not cut short by the Tartar robbers who constantly pillaged the loaded caravans. A more expeditious way was pursued, which was destined to confine the commerce entirely to Canton. The merchants took their ships from that port to Ceylon, where they sold their goods to the Persian merchants who crowded thither.

During the Mohammedan ascendancy the Arabs penetrated the dreary deserts into China and established considerable trade in Canton, at that time known as Kanfu, literally the Cantonese Prefecture. From the "Voyages of the Two Arabian Travelers," we learn that Chinese junks loaded in Siraf for Maskat, thence for India and Kau-cammali. Having watered at Kau-cammali, they entered the Sea of Harkand and touched at Lajabalus whence they sailed for Kalaba. Thence they steered for Betuma and Senef. Having gotten through the gates of China, they waited for the flood tide to go to the fresh water gulf where they dropped their final anchor at Canton. This trade like the Roman trade was entirely confined to the southern port of Canton. So was the trade with the Indies.

The Indian archipelago has always offered a field to the Chinese trade. Even in the Han Dynasty (202 B. C. to 220 A. D.), many

Chinese junks laden with emigrants sailed southward in quest of fortune. They went as far as Arabia, traded with Ceylon and Malacca and penetrated Borneo. As they had touched Archeon, they might have ventured to West Africa, if their junks had been adapted to such voyages.

The Manchu inroads also forced many a Cantonese to leave his abode for the Straits Settlements. The Fookienese likewise preferred shipwreck and death to an ignominious subjection to the Manchus. Able-bodied, young men from the eastern parts of Canton (Chaouchoofoo) and the southern districts of Fookien, Tunggau, Tseueuchoo and Changchoo sailed in large numbers for the islands of the Indian archipelago.

This adventurous spirit was rendered unbending by the many struggles and difficulties they encountered, when they came into contact with the Western explorers. These haughty explorers, after their success in maritime discoveries in the sixteenth century, had rude ideas about the civilization of the colossal empire. Because China was peaceful, they thought they had found an easy prey—all their early acts being marked by bloodshed and violence. In 1520 the marauding Portuguese violated the family sanctuary of the Ningpo people. In 1543 the Spaniards occupied the Philippines and massacred the Cantonese traders. In 1622 the Dutch seized the Pescadores and erected fortifications there; this led to an incessant war of twenty-eight years with the Cantonese in Formosa. In 1635 the British fleet attacked the Bogue Fort of Canton. All these events led the Manchu government to stringent measures, resulting in the closing of all ports against the Westerners, confining the trade to Canton only. This gave the Cantonese the opportunity of dealing with these aggressive Westerners who were to them less mysterious than to their northern neighbors. Gradually it came to their knowledge that there was still land beyond the Four Seas and that there were countries rich in opportunities and fortune besides the Indies; when the great demand for labor in America arose, they flocked over the Pacific into the promised land.

Other occurrences were destined to make the emigration inevitable. First, the stress of war. At the end of the Ming Dynasty (1368 to 1644 A. D.), China was thrown into a chaos. The whole empire was at the mercy of dynastic aspirants and marauding soldiers. Other disasters naturally resulted from the war. The

Manchus came in. Their ruthless spirit was such as, to quote the phrase of a celebrated Chinese historian, "to make a patriot's hair stand on the end." Thousands and thousands were put to the sword. Cities were sacked and looted. The Manchurian invaders spread terror everywhere they went. The most unfortunate province was Kwangtung, where the survivors of the Ming Dynasty took refuge. Every means was employed to extirpate the royal family, so every means was employed to destroy the place of refuge. A traveler who visits Southern China can still see the great wastes which were formerly sites of flourishing towns and villages. Not only this, adventurous Canton could not enjoy a quiet day. The aggressive Westerners, who were disgusted with the haughty manner of the Manchu officials, not infrequently sent their cannon balls against the Bogue Fort and marched upon Canton. Twice did Canton enormously suffer from the Opium Wars. The British soldiers marched to the Viceroy's Yamen, causing consternation among the people. The Taiping Rebellion, which had its origin in Kwangsi, did not spare the cities of its neighboring province, the houses of which were as much robbed and destroyed as those of the northern provinces.

At the time of these disasters, there were also certain attractions to quicken the emigrating movement. The sugar plantation in Cuba, the demand of labor in Mexico, Canada, and Peru for other economic purposes, and especially the discovery of gold in California had stirred the whole world with hopes of unexpected fortune. The call of the Gold Mountains, the name given by the Chinese laborers to the Californian ranges, was ringing in the air of the distressed regions of Canton. To go over there and dig the gold up was the thirsty desire of the poor sufferers. "To be starved and to be buried in the sea are the same," said some young adventurers. "Why not plunge right into death rather than wait for death!" With this spirit they even embarked in their crude, old junks and combatted with the dangerous element of the sea without any fear or the least idea of receding. They sailed in these days directly for California before reaching Hawaii. Those who had made their fortune returned and spread the news of the "Golden Romance." The public spirit was stirred. Thousands and thousands forsook their homes.

We must also not forget the traveling facilities which the foreign

agents in Hongkong and Macao afforded to the Chinese laborers. Placards were posted on every street wall, narrating the charming news of getting fortune quick and the attractive facilities of going to these wonderful lands. Every able-bodied man, no matter whether he could afford the passage money or not, was induced to emigrate, if he could borrow the money to go. Those who could not pay for the passage readily received the most cordial assistance from the agents. A certain amount of money was advanced to the family. A certain amount was paid for clothing and other traveling equipments. What the employers needed was labor, labor of any sort. Nothing would interfere with the Chinese custom, dress and manners. Emigrants need not necessarily know the foreign languages. They need only to work and get good pay. So farmers laid down their spades, carpenters put aside their chisels, and woodcutters said good-bye to their old companions, the axe and the pipe.

Among the classes of peasantry who emigrate, there are in some parts of Canton another class, the class of semi-slaves, who run errands for the villagers and receive pay for their services. In form they are entirely independent. But, nevertheless, they cannot enjoy certain social privileges which the common people can. In spite of the social prejudice, this class has grown to be very intelligent and prominent. This also aroused the prejudices of the ignorant against them the more. Naturally in accord with the independent spirit of the Cantonese, they prefer to die abroad where they can enjoy freedom than to endure the social prejudice at home. Liberty, above all, is the star that guides these people to America.

Having taken a comprehensive view of the causes of emigration—the stress of war, the gold attraction, the traveling facilities and social prejudice at home,—which render an unmigratory nation migratory, it is easy to see why the Chinese laborers come to America. But aside from all these there is still another cause that accounts for the non-emigration to Europe. That is the Chinese sense of family attachment. To make clear what I mean, I may say that the Chinese stick to their friends and relatives. Where their friends and relatives go, there they go. Where their friends and relatives do not go, there they do not go. Formerly they flocked to the Straits Settlements only, and not a single one came to America, nay, not even by the gold attraction or any means of inducement. But as soon as a beginning was made, the adventurous

emigrant was soon followed by his friends and relatives. That is why, notwithstanding, only three Chinese emigrants appeared in San Francisco in 1830, by 1857, only forty-five years later, we find quite a large settlement in that city. From three, the immigration had changed to eighteen thousand, twenty-one, an increase wonderfully rapid when compared with that long period between American independence and 1830, when not a single Chinese stepped on American soil. Since the passage of the exclusion laws, of course the number of Chinese entering the United States has been curtailed, but the inducement to come has not stopped. In fact as the unfavorable conditions in China have not changed, the attractiveness of America to the Chinese emigrant still increases. High wages, higher by far than were obtainable in the old mining camp days continue to beckon him eastward. When such attractions are present, it is hardly to be expected that the Chinese laborers will look with respect upon an exclusion law which contradicts with their interests and seems to them an affront to their race. So I dare to predict, no matter how stringent the exclusion law is, it cannot keep these zealous men off, and I should add that it is useless to keep them off. I may also say that no matter how much less promising the economic opportunity of Europe may be, if these laborers have once set foot on that continent and become accustomed to living there as they have in America, there is sure to be a constant emigration thence as remarkable as is the present neglect of that field by the Chinese emigrants.

CHINA'S METHOD OF REVISING HER EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

BY F. L. HAWKS POTT, D.D.,
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In order to appreciate fully the magnitude of the task undertaken by China, and to get some adequate idea of the difficulties to be overcome, it is necessary to sketch in outline the old educational system as it existed before the reform movement began to make itself felt.

The first thing to be borne in mind is that, strictly speaking, originally there were no government schools in the Chinese Empire. With the exception of a few schools for Banner men, the clan of the reigning Manchu Dynasty, in Peking, education was left to private enterprise. The part played by the government in the educational system was the establishment of a series of examinations, corresponding in many ways to what we speak of as civil service competitive examinations. One of the chief aims of the private schools throughout the empire was to train up scholars who could pass these examinations successfully, and thus render themselves eligible for service in the government. The examinations had the effect of setting the standard of the educational system, and thus the same subjects and for the most part the same books were used in all the schools.

Any one could set up as a school teacher, and a great many scholars who had attained the first degree in the government examinations and a host of others who had tried and failed made this their chief means of obtaining a living. The scholars in the school paid small fees, and the life of a teacher was both penurious and laborious.

The course of study pursued in all schools was divided into three grades. First came the committing to memory the canonical books¹ and the learning to write characters. Then followed the period when the textbooks were explained to the pupils and they received their first lessons in the art of composition. Lastly, they

¹ The Four Books and the Five Classics.

were taught to read more widely, especially collections of essays of successful scholars, and to write the sort of essay and poem which they would be required to compose at a government examination. Many of the pupils never advanced beyond the first or second stage, but those ambitious of going up to the examinations were bound to take the whole course. The result was to turn out young men thoroughly versed in the Confucian ethics, Mencian politics, and the history of China, with ability to write an elegant literary style, and to compose stiff and stereotyped verses.

The government examination system began as far back as the Tang Dynasty (618 A.D.) and has been continued ever since. Altogether there were four examinations.

The first were held in district cities, annually. About one per cent of the candidates who came up were successful. They were awarded the degree of *Siu Tsai* (Budding Talent) equivalent in some ways to our B.A. degree, but not signifying at all the general range of knowledge possessed by a graduate of an American college.

The second were held in provincial capitals, triennially. These were much severer tests. The candidates were immured in the little cells of the examination halls for three periods of three days each, and were put to a strain both physically and mentally which was an ordeal which few could pass through successfully. Here again the percentage of those who won the degree was low, only about one out of a hundred gaining the coveted degree of *Chü-jên* (Deserving of Promotion). Bearing in mind what we have said in regard to the first degree, we may compare the "*Chü-jên*" to the M.A. degree of the American university.

The third examinations were held in Peking triennially. Those who had secured the second degree were eligible, and if they could pass the third test were rewarded with the degree of *Chin-shih* (Fit for Office), corresponding in a way with our Ph.D. Two of the three examinations in this test were held in the presence of the emperor himself. The highest of the successful candidates were drafted off into government service, or were admitted into the College of the Hanlin (The Forest of Pencils). The position of the Hanlins corresponded to a certain extent to that of Fellows of an English university.

From this brief outline it will be seen that the whole system was intended to train men for public service. The conception of

knowledge as a thing to be pursued for its own sake was overshadowed. The possibility of rising to be influential officials stirred the ambitions of a large number of the youth of the country, and led them to submit to the long process of intellectual training necessary to reach the goal.

Frequently the Chinese are referred to as an educated people. The statement is somewhat misleading. It would be fair to say that the Chinese hold education in high esteem, and that they look up to the scholar with great respect and reverence, but the system which has prevailed for all these centuries has only resulted in giving education to the chosen few. Among the poorer people there is a large amount of illiteracy. A fair estimate would be that only one in twenty of the male sex can read understandingly. The education of girls has been almost entirely neglected except among the richer people, and a woman who can read intelligently is regarded as a very rare phenomenon. Among artisans and small shopkeepers the amount of education possessed is only sufficient to enable them to read a few characters and to keep accounts. Even a knowledge of the characters sufficient for the reading of newspapers has not been acquired by the vast majority.

The inadequate system of education left the masses in appalling ignorance. This helps us to understand China's former conservatism and opposition to progress.

Having placed this picture before our minds, we will now proceed to describe the successive steps in the reform of the educational system.

The desire for reform manifested itself first in regard to the course of studies pursued by the scholars. Contact with Western nations opened the eyes of the Chinese to the fact that those who aspired to be the future officials of the empire needed other knowledge besides an acquaintance with the canonical books of China, and something more than the ability to write eight legged essays and stilted verses.

After the war with France (1884-1885) we note among the principal reforms then instituted that mathematics was introduced into the government examinations, and the attempt was made in this way to broaden the curriculum. Owing to the fact that the literary chancellors who presided over the examinations were themselves entirely ignorant of the new subject, very little, however, was

accomplished in the way of modifying the old stereotyped classical examinations.

In 1872 a detachment of Chinese Government students was sent to the United States under the direction of Dr. Yung Wing. It was intended that they should receive a thorough education in American schools and colleges, and upon their return to China be instrumental in the introduction of reforms and of an enlightened system of education. Unfortunately the experiment was never carried out to completion, as all the young men were recalled just as they had reached the stage where they were ready to enter college.

The next step in the reform of the educational system was in connection with the reforms instituted by the late Emperor Kwang Hsu in 1898. The young emperor was eager to abolish as far as possible the old classical examinations, and a decree was promulgated that henceforth those competing for degrees were to have "a knowledge of ancient and modern history, information in regard to the present-day state of affairs, with special reference to the governments and institutions of the countries of the five great continents, and a knowledge of the arts and sciences thereof."

It will be noticed that both in the proposals of 1885 and of 1898 nothing was said about the establishment of schools throughout the empire. The chief emphasis was laid upon the modification of the examination system in the direction of making it less antiquated.

Certain special schools, such as military and naval academies and some government colleges were established, but no steps were taken toward founding a government system of schools graded from the primary up to the university.² This did not take place until after the period of reaction which resulted in the terrible upheaval of 1900.

After the central government had been re-established in Peking the late empress dowager went over to the side of reform, and advocated the measures to which she had been so bitterly opposed before the Boxer outbreak.

A board of education was established in Peking in 1905, and an edict was issued abolishing the ancient system of government examinations. Largely under the direction of two high officials,

² It should be noted that the only schools in the Chinese Empire up to a recent period giving a liberal education were those established by missionaries. The missionaries may justly claim to be the pioneers in the introduction of an enlightened system of education.

Sun Chia-nai and Chang Chih-tung, a comprehensive scheme was worked out "which included the establishment of a central university in Peking, affiliated colleges, technical and normal schools in each provincial capital, high schools in each prefectural city, and primary schools in each departmental city and village."

The whole scheme, including regulations as to discipline, curricula, suggestions as to the method of establishing schools, etc., was carefully drawn up in a memorial submitted to the throne by H. E. Chang Chih-tung. When printed, it consisted of five volumes. The memorial was immediately approved, and the carrying out of the scheme was authorized by imperial edict.

This may be considered the beginning of the introduction of a national system of schools into the empire.

A careful perusal of these volumes shows that the memorialist was largely influenced by Japanese methods, and accounts for the similarity between the Chinese and Japanese systems of education.

The grading of schools is as follows:

- I. The kindergarten and primary schools.
- II. The first grade elementary school.
- III. The high grade elementary school.
- IV. The middle school.
- V. The high school.
- VI. The university.

The nomenclature is somewhat different from that to which we are accustomed. The middle school corresponds very closely to our grammar school, and the high school to the German gymnasium and the first years of the American college. The university follows the German idea and consists of eight special faculties.

In addition to the above general course of education, technical schools have also been established, some of them being included under the heading of middle or high schools, and others as being departments of a university. Provision was also made for normal schools.

In compiling the course of study, the attempt was made to provide for thorough instruction in the classical and historical literature of China, "thus enabling the new system of education to attach itself without too great a wrench to the earlier system which centered around civil service examinations." This, of course, made it necessary for the student to devote a good many hours of study

to his own language and literature. To carry this burden in addition to acquiring the new Western learning overloads the student and is apt to result in superficiality. The problem of how to combine the new with the old is probably the greatest which the Chinese educator has to face. The system already adopted is probably more or less tentative, but if in drawing up the new schedule of studies no provision for the old learning had been made, the whole scheme would have been regarded as too revolutionary and would probably have failed to find favor in the eyes of the government.

Another feature in connection with the curricula adopted in the schools is the emphasis laid on ethical teaching. The Chinese have always entertained the idea that knowledge and morality are closely associated. The old system of training was intended to produce "the princely man," one who possessed intelligence but at the same time a perfectly rounded moral nature. The scholar of China in the past has been fond of expounding ethical principles and has posed as their embodiment. Too often it has been a case of *video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*.

Real alarm has been felt lest the introduction of Western learning and a knowledge of the natural sciences would undermine the ethical principles upon which Chinese society is based, and consequently in the courses of study drawn up an important place has been given to moral culture.

The system having been settled, the question arose as to the best way of putting it into operation. It was an undertaking of tremendous proportions, nothing less than providing schooling for some 40,000,000 boys and girls. As we have already indicated, everything had previously been left to private initiative, and the schools which existed were all the result of private enterprise. The government issues the edict "let there be these new schools," and it becomes the duty of officials and people to see that the mandate is carried out.

There never had been in China anything corresponding to school rates, and no provision had ever been made for assigning a part of the government revenue to educational purposes.

In the provincial governments the same was true, no regular allocation of a portion of the provincial revenue had ever been made to education.

The task of carrying out the will of the central government was

laid upon the shoulders of the provincial authorities. The viceroys and governors had to assume this duty, and funds were secured in the following way: Some schools were founded by the officials themselves, who squeezed the money needed out of the provincial revenue, other schools were founded by money obtained from the people as contributions for this purpose. Still other schools were founded as acts of merit by wealthy gentlemen, who in return for this public service were rewarded by receiving some official rank,—the right to wear the blue or red button.

As may be imagined, schools established in this way have had a somewhat precarious existence. The officials finding the cost more than they anticipated, have tried to curtail the expenditure, and the contributions from the people have sometimes not been forthcoming. Up to the present time, as will be seen later on when we quote statistics, very inadequate provision has been made for the education of the whole nation.

At the beginning of the reform, as was perhaps natural for those inexperienced in educational matters, the chief aim was to provide the schools of higher grade, and primary education was neglected. The government was in haste to produce the new scholar and seemed to think he could be manufactured in a short space of time. It was hoped that in this way the teachers for the primary school could be obtained. It soon became apparent, however, that the attempt to introduce the new education from the top was an impracticable one, and the need of establishing a large number of primary schools was realized. Recently more effort has been expended in this direction.

Another difficulty in the introduction of the new schools into China was in connection with securing qualified teachers. At first it was thought that the supply could be obtained by sending young men to study for a year or two in Japan. As many as twenty-five thousand young men, representative of the best type of learning under the old system, entered the schools of Japan, hoping to take a short cut to a knowledge of Western science. For a time a wave of enthusiasm swept over the country, and Japan was looked upon as the Mecca for those seeking enlightenment. In a short time, however, a reaction took place, and the Chinese became convinced that there was no royal road to learning, and that there must be the same patient toilsome labor as was required in the old system.

The normal schools established in China have proved for the most part unsatisfactory, and the reason is not far to seek. The young men who have attended them never had the mental training in primary and elementary schools essential as a basis for more advanced work. A large number of subjects were taught in a superficial manner, and the men turned out for the most part have not proved efficient teachers.

Here, perhaps, we may say something in regard to the students sent for study to the United States and Europe. Realizing that it would be many years before the government could establish efficient higher education in the empire, the movement to select young men who have completed their elementary education in China, and to send them abroad for advanced study, has been encouraged. At first these young men were sent from each province at the expense of the provincial authorities. When the American Government decided to remit a portion of the Boxer indemnity, it was decided by the central government of China to employ the money, saved to her as the result of this act of generosity, in sending students to study in the United States. It was arranged that for five years one hundred young men should be sent annually, and after that fifty each year. A competitive examination was held in Peking for securing the best candidates. Three batches have already been sent, but, strange to say, the government thus far has never been able to secure the full quota. Last year a new method was adopted. This was the founding of a special school near the summer palace outside of Peking (the Ching Hua Hsioh-tang). A large number of American teachers was secured and a course of study was drawn up to prepare young men to pass the American college entrance examinations. The school has only been open for a short time, and thus it is too early to pass judgment upon it. It is hoped it will produce better results than the former method of selecting students from all schools throughout the empire by competitive examination.

The present status of the new system of education in China may be learned from the statistical reports submitted to the throne by the ministry of education, one in 1908, and the other at the end of 1910.

A comparison of these reports is interesting. In 1908 the number of students in provincial schools was 1,013,571, and at the

end of last year 1,284,965. Thus there was an increase of 274,518. This included 3,951 more students in special studies, 4,923 additional students in industrial studies, and 265,644 more in ordinary studies. Students in training schools for teachers (normal schools) were 3,394 less in number.

The number of students in Peking showed an increase of about twenty-five per cent, the figures being 15,774 and 11,417, respectively. There was a considerable increase in the number of schools. In the provinces there are now 42,444 as compared with 35,597, and in Peking 252 as compared with 206. It also appears that when the first report was presented the number of government schools, those supported by officials, exceeded those supported by public contributors and private individuals, and that when the second report was sent in the public and private schools were more numerous than the government schools.

On the whole these reports are encouraging, but at the same time they show that China has only begun to grapple with the problem. In Japan, with a population roughly estimated at sixty millions, we find that about six million young people of school age are under instruction. If the same proportion, that is, about one-tenth of the population, was provided with education in China, it would mean that forty million young people must be afforded school facilities. Thus far not as many as two million are to be found in the new schools and colleges.

We have already spoken of the grades of schools. We will now give a brief outline of the course of study in each grade.

I. Kindergarten

The aim of these schools is "to gather the children from three to seven years of age during certain hours of the day, to separate them from the dangers of the street, and to give them primary ideas of morality. These schools are free, and are to be established near orphanages and the homes of virtuous widows."

II. The First Grade Elementary School

The teaching includes morals, the study of the canonical books, the Chinese language, arithmetic, history, geography, physical sciences, and gymnastics. Children of seven years of age may enter

these schools. The course is five years and there are thirteen hours class work per week.

III. The High Grade Elementary School

The subjects taught are the same as those in the first grade elementary school, with the addition of drawing. The study of foreign languages is forbidden except in schools situated in cities open to foreign trade. The course is four years and there are thirty-six hours class work per week.

IV. Middle School

The instruction in these schools corresponds to what is called "Seconde Moderne" in France, and the High School in the United States. The subjects studied are twelve in number, namely, morals, Chinese canonical books, foreign languages (Japanese or English compulsory, French, German or Russian optional), history, geography, mathematics, natural history, physics, chemistry, political economy, government, drawing and gymnastics. The singing of patriotic songs is to be taught both in the middle and the elementary schools. The course is five years, with thirty-six hours class work per week. Pupils who have obtained the diploma in the high grade elementary schools or who have passed an equivalent examination are admitted into the middle schools.

V. High School

The aim of the high schools is to prepare students to enter the university. There are three divisions corresponding to the three groups of faculties in the university. The students in the first section will be prepared for the faculties of classics, law, arts and commerce; in the second for the faculties of science, civil engineering and agronomy; and in the third for the faculty of medicine. All the scholars will study ethics, law, Chinese literature, foreign languages, and gymnastics. In addition to these, the students in the first section will study history, geography, elocution, law and political economy; the students of the second section, mathematics, physics, chemistry, geology, mineralogy and drawing; and those of the third section, latin, mathematics, physics, chemistry, zoology and botany. The foreign languages to be studied in the first and second

sections are English, and French or German, and in the third section, German, and French or English. The course is three years, with six hours work in the classroom each day (thirty-six hours per week). Students who have obtained the diploma of the middle school or who have passed an equivalent examination are admitted into the high schools.

VI. The University

The university is still in an embryonic condition, due to the lack of both students and professors. Eight faculties are to be established:

1. The faculty of Classics, comprising ten courses, among which are: (a) The Book of Changes, (b) The Book of Annals, (c) The Book of Poetry, (d) Spring and Autumn Annals, (e) Rites, (f) Confucian Analects, and the Books of Mencius, with commentaries, (g) Philosophy.

2. The faculty of Jurisprudence, with two courses: (a) Administration, (b) Legislation.

3. The faculty of Arts, comprising nine courses: (a) History of China, (b) Universal history, (c) General geography, (d) Geography of China, (e) Geography of England, (f) Geography of France, (g) Geography of Germany, (h) Geography of Russia, (i) Geography of Japan.

4. The faculty of Medicine, comprising two courses: (a) Medicine, (b) Pharmacy.

5. The faculty of Science, comprising six courses: (a) Mathematics, (b) Astronomy, (c) Physics, (d) Chemistry, (e) Natural history, (f) Geology.

6. The faculty of Agronomy, comprising four courses: (a) Agriculture, (b) Chemistry relating to agriculture, (c) Forestry, (d) Veterinary science.

7. The faculty of Engineering, comprising six courses: (a) Civil engineering, (b) Mechanical engineering, (c) Electrical engineering, (d) Architecture, (e) Industrial chemistry, (f) Mining engineering.

8. The faculty of Commerce, comprising three courses: (a) Banking and insurance, (b) Commerce and transportation, (c) Customs.

The course of study in the university is for three years except

in medicine and law, in which it is four years. The students have from two to four hours class work per day.

Students who have secured diplomas in high schools may enter the university. The situation of the university is at Peking. If a province wishes to open a university, it may do so, provided it can establish at least three faculties.

Students who graduate from the university with high standing are allowed to do further post-graduate work for five years. Means will be provided to permit of their traveling abroad for purposes of study. Each year they must render a report of their work.

There are two grades of normal schools, the lower and the higher.

I. The Lower Normal School

The object is to train teachers for the first grade and high grade elementary schools. The subjects to be studied are morals, study and explanation of law, Chinese language, pedagogy, geography, history, mathematics, natural history, physics and chemistry, calligraphy, drawing and gymnastics. The course covers five years, each having forty-five weeks with thirty-six hours class work per week. Students who wish to enter these schools must have completed the high grade elementary school. According to local circumstances, one or more of the following subjects may be added: foreign languages, agriculture, commerce, manual training.

II. Higher Normal Schools

The object is to train teachers for the schools of higher grade. The course is three years, with thirty-six hours class work per week. The subjects in the first year are the same for all students, but in the last two years the students are divided into four courses: (a) languages, (b) history and geography, (c) mathematics, physics and chemistry, (d) natural history.

Nothing has been said thus far about girls' schools. According to the decree which appeared in April, 1907, elementary schools of the first grade and high grade were to be established for girls, but no provision has yet been made for higher education. There are also normal schools for girls to train teachers for the girls' elementary schools. The studies in the girls' schools are the same as those in the boys', with the addition of fine art and needle work, housekeeping, sewing and music.

As has been described, according to the old system of education degrees were conferred on the successful candidates at the civil service examinations. They are now given to students completing in a satisfactory manner the courses in the new schools. Graduates of the high grade elementary schools may receive the title of "Siu-tsai" (B.A.), those of the middle schools the title of "Kun-sang" (presentable bachelors), those of the high schools Chü-jên" (M.A.), and those of the university "Chin-shih" (Ph.D.).

Students who have studied in the United States or in Europe, after completing their courses abroad, upon their return to China may attend a special examination in Peking held in the autumn of each year. Upon the result of these examinations they are given Chinese degrees equivalent to those obtained in foreign countries and are made either Chü-jên (M.A.) or Chin-shih (Ph.D.). Thus they put themselves in line with the Chinese educational system, and become eligible for employment in government service.

A word may be said as to the employment of foreign teachers in Chinese schools. When the system was first inaugurated it was necessary to secure good foreign instructors, especially for the middle and high schools. During recent years the number of those employed has diminished, although at no time has it been very large. The attempt was made for a while to replace American and English by Japanese teachers on the ground of economy, but it has not proved very successful.

Rules have been drawn up by the board of education in regard to the employment of foreign instructors, and it is strictly stated that they are not allowed to interfere in school matters outside their own classrooms, and are not permitted to proselytize in regard to religion.

It has often happened that men who have come out from their own countries to accept positions in Chinese schools find on their arrival that they cannot secure students competent to study higher branches, and consequently they have been obliged to spend most of their time in imparting elementary instruction.

As the educational system develops foreign specialists will be needed in greater numbers, for it must be some time before China can provide the teachers needed for university and high school work.

Thus we have given an outline of China's method in revising her educational system. Much might be said in way of criticism.

Notwithstanding the present inefficiency of the system, we must still wonder at so much being accomplished in so short a space of time, and must sympathize with the Chinese in the innumerable difficulties which they have to surmount. The financial burden of the new system has been very great and has retarded progress.

Perhaps the least pleasing feature has been the unruliness of the student class. The new ideas of liberty and equality have turned the heads of the young men and they have often proved an intractable body to manage. Many a school with bright prospects has been wrecked by rebellion against the authorities on the part of the students. Those placed in charge of the schools of higher grade have, for the most part, been officials with absolutely no experience in educational matters, and naturally they have not commanded the respect of the student body.

As time goes on such matters will be rectified, and we may confidently expect that an efficient educational machine will be constructed in China similar to that already existing in Japan.

Such a revolution as this implies must produce results so far-reaching that it is impossible to make an accurate forecast. When enlightening education pervades China, it will produce effects which even the more sanguine can hardly imagine. The next ten or twenty years will prove the value of the new education in China.³

³ Since this article was written, a report has been received of the Imperial Educational Conference, held at Peking during the past summer. Among the important subjects discussed were the following: (1) The Extension of Primary Education; (2) The Adoption of Compulsory Education for Children from Six to Fourteen Years of Age; (3) Military Training in Public Schools; (4) The Discontinuance of the Study of the Canonical Books in the Primary School; (5) The Discontinuance of Granting Degrees to Graduates from the Schools of Lower Grades. The decisions arrived at are to be submitted to the National Assembly (Tzecheng Guan) at its next session. The holding of such a conference is an evidence of the deep interest felt throughout the Empire in the subject of educational reform.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA

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By largely similar treaties with eighteen of the powers, China has granted full exemption from her territorial jurisdiction in favor of the nationals of these powers residing or traveling in China, and over the property of these nationals, real and personal, situate in China. These eighteen, in order of the dates of their first treaties, are: Russia, by a treaty of 1689 for the Mongolian border; the United States by the first of the modern and distinctly extraterritorial treaties—a treaty negotiated by Caleb Cushing, afterwards United States Attorney-General, whose draft was so excellent as to have been generally followed as a model in the negotiations of the treaties of other powers with China; then Great Britain, France, Norway and Sweden (now as two powers with one treaty), Germany, Portugal, Denmark, Holland, Spain, Belgium, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Japan, Peru, Mexico, and Brazil. These are practically all of the powers that have treaties of any nature with China. Even if there were commercial treaties with other countries containing most-favored-nation clauses, such clauses would probably not extend the extraterritorial exemption; yet it has occurred that when powers without extraterritorial treaties have permitted exercise by a friendly power of jurisdiction over their nationals, for instance, jurisdiction over Greeks by consuls of France, China has acquiesced, and it has also occurred that in isolated cases a non-treaty consul, like the consul of Cuba, has adjudicated over his nationals in China without effectual protest by the Chinese government; but such friendly and non-treaty jurisdiction is a negligible minimum. The substantial fact is that China has continuously maintained her jurisdiction sovereignty excepting as specifically abrogated by treaty.

The counterpart of this treaty exemption from Chinese jurisdiction is the agreement to extend the respective national jurisdictions into China. The rule of the treaties is that a defendant is sued in the court of his own nationality, and by mutuality of practice this rule is extended in favor of a plaintiff of whatever foreign

nationality he may be. The jurisdiction is mostly exercised by consuls at the various ports. Some of the powers have but one or two consuls for all China. Few of the consuls are men of any training or experience in the law. In some cases a consul may be assisted by one or more assessors, and, with them, the consul judges both of law and fact. Most of the foreign jurisdictions are but meagerly developed. The larger powers, however, have special legislation as to their courts in China. Great Britain and the United States have each established higher and general courts independent of their consular systems, respectively known as H. B. M. Supreme Court for China and the United States Court for China. These two higher courts exercise their jurisdiction mostly at Shanghai, where court business readily concentrates. They hold sessions in other consular cities in China when the public interest requires. They exercise general appellate and certain supervisory powers. They and the systems of courts of which they are the head are the highest and most extensive development of extraterritorial courts in the world. The United States Court is analagous to a federal circuit court, though with wider jurisdiction inclusive of the jurisdiction of a higher state court, and the British Supreme Court has the jurisdiction of a high court of justice in England.

Another form of court has been evolved by time and necessity but without close adherence to the treaties. This is the so-called mixed court. It is a court existing in each of the consular cities. It is for the trial of Chinese defendants. A Chinese magistrate presides over it and with him sits a foreign assessor, regularly of the nationality of the plaintiff. The consul himself may be the assessor, but in the main cities a vice-consular officer, ordinarily a Chinese linguist, is assessor. At Hankow the Chinese magistrate goes from one consulate to another to hold trials on regular days. The practice varies in different cities. At Shanghai the mixed courts are extensive establishments, with three or four Chinese magistrates, the criminal cases being heard almost entirely in the presence of British, American, German and French assessors, the French having a separate court. It is also distinctive of Shanghai that the assessors there, while having, as in other cities, strictly but a right to be present and to object in cases involving their own nationals as plaintiffs, in effect direct what the judgment in every criminal case shall be and have assumed an almost

equally preponderating authority in civil cases that involve their respective nationals as plaintiffs. The premise is taken that criminal jurisdiction exercised in or respecting the international foreign settlement at Shanghai involves such foreign interests, whoever the complainant may be, that a foreign assessor representing those interests has an implied right to appear and to direct the judgment. There is practical advantage in this system, however far it departs from the letter of the treaties. The mixed court at Shanghai is but a very low court in the jurisdiction systems of all the powers that have to do with it, yet it is the busiest of all the courts at Shanghai and it adjudicates actions involving very large values and most important personal interests.

The consular courts also are far from having reached a development adequate to present conditions. They mostly rest upon treaties made soon after the British war of 1842, and renewed with little change soon after the British and French war of 1858. In those years the foreign inhabitants of China were men in charge of large business concerns and missionaries and the immediate dependents of both, and all foreigners were located in or near to the principal ports; but in 1911 there are in China all classes of Western society, and foreigners resident in China number many thousands. There are also many tourists. No restriction on immigration excepting that of health inspection exists. The most cosmopolitan aggregations and combinations populate the ports and penetrate to remote places. The foreign population of China exclusive of the Japanese and Russians in Manchuria, must be well above 30,000. These are mostly merchants and missionaries. There are few men of the professions and of course few or none of the large classes of industrial and agricultural populations familiar at home. Adventurers and vagrants, gamblers and prostitutes infest the ports, affirming or disclaiming their nationality according to the lenience or severity of their national authorities. Foreign missionary societies enjoy a treaty privilege of acquiring land for mission purposes both in the consular cities and in the interior. Foreign merchants have extended their trade into the most distant regions. The last twenty years have seen an increase at high ratio of all sorts of contractual relations between foreigners and Chinese. Partnerships and companies, numerous and varied in nature, having a foreign name and protection but involving

Chinese members and not infrequently being controlled by Chinese, have come into being without adequate executive and jurisdictional regulation. In fact the requisites of the extraterritorial communities in China have come far to exceed the legislative provisions made for them. The British interests in China are probably more adequately provided for than any other.

British legislation has been founded upon the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, the latest of which is the Act of 1890. This Act is very brief, general and fundamental. On it are based the Orders in Council amplifying and perfecting the system. Orders in Council have been frequent and they seem to be readily obtained. Besides, there is the often and very timely exercised authority of the British Minister at Peking to make regulations of the nature of substantive law and having the force of law until and as modified by the higher legislative authority. By this power of the Minister local and temporary conditions usually of emergency nature are regulated. But the control of the jurisdictional system, that is of court procedure and, as shown mainly in the well and lengthily developed Rules of Court, of the operation of the courts generally, rests primarily with the Judge of the British Supreme Court for China. This court was organized in 1867. Unfortunately there is no collected series of its reports, and reference must be had to the reports published from 1867 to date in the official organ, the *North China Herald*. The long and eminent standing of the British Court and its wisely directed and wide-reaching activities have well and effectually protected, regulated and promoted British interests in China.

The British Crown Colony of Hongkong, situate at the commercial portal of South China and having, with other branches of government, a Supreme Court, has adjudicated many of the most important cases arising out of extraterritorial relations with the Chinese and has also largely enhanced British prestige. This court has of late years a collected series of reports. British companies in China are regulated by Hongkong Ordinances. This arrangement may in time be modified to meet difficulties due to the fact that business at Shanghai has now become proportionately greater, and authority may be given to register and regulate companies through British officials at Shanghai; but the facility and security of registration and regulation through British colonial offices at Hongkong in the last half century has brought under the British

flag vast foreign business in China, especially German, American and Chinese.

The German government has now under consideration the establishing of a higher and general court for all Germans in China. It is also considering a modification of companies' statutes so as to favor the association or incorporation of companies in China under German law with registration in Kiaochau, the German leased area in North China.

The United States government has no specific legislation as to companies in China. The usual way of organizing American firms has been to register the articles of association at one of the consulates or to incorporate under the Hongkong Ordinances. In a few cases there have been incorporations under home jurisdictions as of Arizona or Delaware or the District of Columbia, and this is easily done under some jurisdictions. The degree of liability of such corporations in China is not clear. There is some doubt whether the incorporation statutes of the home jurisdictions were intended for or can be held to have force with regard to business firms conducting their business entirely outside of the continental territory of the United States. What is the status of home corporations doing business under American jurisdiction in China has not been determined. With a number of such corporations doing large business, this backward condition of the law, though strange, is an evidence of their good management and fair dealing. It is a tribute also to American diplomatic and consular officials who have conducted negotiations with the Chinese government and its officials affecting these companies. On the other hand, the ease with which unscrupulous persons have at times and in certain consular districts formed themselves into companies largely with Chinese capital under an American name and American consular recognition has not been creditable and has been a detriment to legitimate business.

The repression of crime in so large and so fluctuating a foreign population as now exists along the China coast is one of the chief reasons for maintaining the extraterritorial jurisdictions at a high degree of efficiency. Vagrancy is more difficult to deal with in a land where few Europeans do manual labor and where honesty and respectability are presumed to belong to foreigners generally. Yet the almost daily convictions, at Shanghai for instance, of low-class petty offenders have at last necessitated the stone-pile and

the work-house. In most of the consular courts in Shanghai the only penalties for vagrancy have been fairly comfortable imprisonment and further charity. Deportation is expensive and impracticable except as to the more serious offenders. In other grades of society there is now and then a criminal offender whose offense is not easily prosecuted because of the extraordinary local difficulties of securing convicting evidence. The consuls and other court officials are relatively few, and measures of detection and proof of crime feasible in home jurisdictions entirely fail in China where the jurisdictions are so many and so complex. Of crimes of violence by foreigners of the degree of murder, burglary, robbery, arson and rape there are very few. Commercial wrongs, such as embezzlement and obtaining goods on false pretenses are not infrequent, and at times there is forgery. Gambling at roulette for foreign patronage and at a Chinese game called pai-chu for Chinese patronage has been opened whenever the vigilance of the authorities has relaxed or whenever with the connivance of unscrupulous persons, even of officials and lawyers, a ruse or tangle of jurisdiction or evidence could be devised. Prostitution among foreign men and women has given the China coast an evil reputation, but there has been rigorous dealing with this vice at Manila and in American jurisdiction in China. At Shanghai liquors are sold in bawdy-houses without municipal licenses and the income from this sale is said to be the principal income of these places. The compulsory registration of prostitutes in the consulates of their nationalities would, by definitely fixing jurisdiction over them, aid at least in placing responsibility for their indecencies.

For the apprehension and custody of criminal offenders there are attached to the consulates of the leading powers in the principal cities officers in most cases known as marshals, and at Shanghai there are prisons and prison-keepers. British long term prisoners go to Hongkong; those of other nationalities are usually sent home. The principal foreign municipalities have police or constables; the police in the International Settlement at Shanghai have on their rolls about 250 foreigners, almost all British, 500 Sikhs and 1,200 Chinese. The foreign army, marine and navy contingents on service in China or Chinese waters may be called upon for assistance when necessary. The Chinese have authority under the treaties and customs to arrest, except in foreign settlements, a foreign crim-

inal offender and bring him to the nearest consulate of the offender's nationality. Thus an American charged with homicide was brought, in 1908, by the Chinese from the borders of Thibet to Chungking in central China, 600 miles, and thence, with the witnesses, to trial in Shanghai, 1,200 miles. He was acquitted on a finding of accidental homicide, but had he been convicted to serve imprisonment for more than a year, he would, in usual course, have been sent thousands of miles farther to a federal prison in the United States.

Extradition of fugitive offenders to and from China is not provided for by treaty. China is the greatest and most accessible area in the world not yet protected against the coming and going of criminals. A criminal slips aboard a steamer at Shanghai and is off to Japan or Hongkong leaving the prosecuting officers to contrive means not provided for in the law to bring the fugitive to justice. A British offender in China can be returned from any British jurisdiction because extradition acts are extended to British jurisdiction in China. But it has been ruled that the British and American extradition acts do not reciprocally extend to their extraterritorial jurisdictions—a ruling which on the principles of law involved appears rather too narrow. It is a surprising and embarrassing fact that an American offender cannot be extradited to or from the United States from or to China, though United States jurisdiction is as absolute over him in one place as the other. Legislation, which could be in a simple form, is requisite; the United States extraterritorial jurisdiction in China should, for the purposes of its administration solely, be designated as a jurisdiction of the same standing as federal jurisdiction in one of the territories of the United States, and the extradition statutes should be extended to this China extraterritorial jurisdiction just as they were to the Philippine Islands.

Legislation is also needed for better establishing the jurisdiction and supervising the administration of estates of American decedents in China. The number of estates, their value, the complexity of the jurisdiction, the want of the assistance of American lawyers except at Shanghai and Tientsin, and the undeveloped probate procedure have made this feature of the jurisdiction the most constant business before the American courts in China and have put upon executive officials of the courts an extraordinary respon-

sibility. All estates of a value above \$500.00 are, by judicial interpretation of a statute, required to be formally administered under decrees and orders of the United States Court for China. Such estates are reported from the consulates and the initial procedure for bringing them into the court is usually taken by the clerk of the higher court acting on instructions from the judge. Many of these estates are not much in excess of \$500.00 and such are likely to be the estates of missionaries residing in out-ports or in the interior whose families and beneficiaries prefer as simple and inexpensive an administration as can be had. For this class of estates the gratuitous assistance of the clerk of court is well deserved and much appreciated, and it has the advantage of facilitating and of tending to standardize the procedure. Such assistance consuls had previously given under their general instructions and by customs special to this jurisdiction. This feature of the duties of the clerk of the higher court could very well be formally recognized by making him a registrar of probate with statutory functions including some of the functions of a public administrator. The larger estates have been administered without difficulty through the exceptional care to each step of the procedure which has been given by the judge of the higher court. This has enabled him as the judge of a court established only in 1906 to familiarize himself with every feature and problem relating to the administration of American estates in China; but it is a burden which, with the increase of his duties in connection with the other features of the jurisdiction, and with the development of probate procedure will distribute itself, as it does in home jurisdictions, amongst the lawyers engaged by executors and administrators especially now that there are a number of well established American lawyers in Shanghai and other ports.

The entire probate jurisdiction, however smoothly it has thus far operated, needs to be better established by statutory enactment. There never has been a specific grant of the jurisdiction to the American Courts in China. The consular courts had for many years customarily exercised probate jurisdiction. The United States Court for China has supervisory powers over consuls in their executive duties with respect to estates of Americans in China. The first judge of the court, Judge Lebbeus R. Wilfley, decided that in granting common law jurisdiction to the courts in China, Congress had granted such probate jurisdiction as the common law courts of England had reserved to themselves, notwith-

standing that when the colonies became independent of the mother country, probate jurisdiction was being exercised principally by the ecclesiastical courts and notwithstanding that in the colonies, as later in the states, probate jurisdiction was exercised only upon specific statutory grant. This decision, and any other decision regarding the probate jurisdiction of our courts in China, has not been reviewed by an appellate court in the United States. Legislation is nevertheless apparently necessary.

In another decision Judge Wilfley established that there had been no grant of jurisdiction of matrimonial causes. The distinction lay in the fact that the ecclesiastical courts of England in the time of our colonial dependence had exercised this jurisdiction exclusively. In the United States jurisdiction of matrimony rests absolutely on statute. Consequently divorce cannot be had in American jurisdiction in China. As a matter of public policy, and considering that courts of other foreign jurisdictions in China, either have only a limited jurisdiction of matrimonial causes and practically never exercise the jurisdiction, it is unquestionably better that no American court in China should have more than such a limited jurisdiction. The American consular courts, however, had, prior to the creation of the higher court that took over the main jurisdiction, granted absolute divorces. On the other hand the lack of some such jurisdiction has proved a severe hardship in several instances of non-support of a wife and of desertion. What power, if any, the courts would exercise as courts of equity for relief in such cases has not been tried.

Other leading decisions by Judge Wilfley were as follows: Domicil is acquired in extraterritorial jurisdiction in China on principles analogous to acquisition of domicil in a jurisdiction at home. The term "common law" in the statutes establishing extraterritorial courts in China is interpreted to mean those principles of the common law of England and the statutes passed in aid thereof, including the law administered in the equity, admiralty and ecclesiastical tribunals, which were adapted to the situation and circumstances of the American colonies at the date of the transfer of sovereignty, as modified, applied and developed generally by the decisions of the state courts and by the decisions of the United States Courts and incorporated generally into the constitutions and statutes of the states. The United States Court for China, though analogous in some respects to a federal court, has no jurisdiction

under the federal bankruptcy act, the enforcement of that act having been restricted to certain federal courts.

A bankruptcy case involving large amounts and in which the principal creditors were a German bank and a Chinese bank, one having actual possession and the other claiming constructive possession of assets, was adjudicated by Judge Rufus H. Thayer, who succeeded Judge Wilfley late in 1908. Judge Thayer exercised jurisdiction on the basis of common law insolvency, but, under the circumstances, and after consent of the creditors, the insolvent having left the jurisdiction, he adjudicated the case in much the same way as an arbitrator might do in an effort to effect substantial justice among the parties.

Judge Thayer's decisions have been numerous and important. It is difficult briefly to state how much they have defined and improved the jurisdiction. In a homicide case in which a Chinese official had a treaty right to be present and to question witnesses, the policy and procedure under a somewhat difficult treaty provision were so controlled as to form an excellent precedent comports with the high authority of the court and declared by the superior Chinese authorities to be eminently satisfactory to them as a fulfilment of the treaty. In the estate of a decedent who had held real property in trust for a Chinese, Judge Thayer held that a question of title was not to be determined in the court having jurisdiction of the estate, but in the court of the Chinese who had granted the trust. The law governing a contract when not stipulated by the parties he has held to be the law of the nationality of the party sued. Jurisdiction of real property in China in whatever foreign consulate it is recorded follows the jurisdiction of the person who holds the fee simple or similar title. The nature and requisites of appeals from consular courts have been ruled upon. Jurisdiction has been taken of three civil cases against consuls concerning performance of official duties. A consular court marshal and a legation stenographer have been tried for embezzlements. The court has, on the principles involved, ruled adversely to a claim of foreign nationality set up as a bar to a criminal action. It has upheld the local regulation of the nature of a statute of limitations in a criminal case in place of the federal statute. It has found void a local regulation of the Minister as to vagrancy, and in its stead has followed and differentiated the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the effect had in China by federal legisla-

tion for the North American territories and the District of Columbia.

Appeals lie from the consular courts to the United States Court for China and from the latter to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals at San Francisco and thence to the United States Supreme Court. Appeals from the United States Court for China have been few, especially since the court has become well established. The main appellate decisions have been as to right to bail, as to what constitutes assault with a deadly weapon, as to procedure of writ of error, and, what appears most important of all, as to the significance of the term "laws of the United States" to be administered in the courts of the United States in China. In the latter decision—*Biddle v. United States*—on the error assigned that obtaining money on false pretenses was not a crime under common law or under the laws of the United States available in China, the Court held that laws enacted for jurisdictions where the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction, as in the territory of Alaska or the District of Columbia, or the military and naval reservations in the states, were laws of the United States available for the definition of the offense of obtaining money on false pretenses in China. This decision was most far reaching and its full effect has been difficult to comprehend. The resulting conflict of definitions of statutory offenses remains for further determination.

A most important *habeas corpus* case, that entitled *In re Ross*, was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1890. It arose on a claim of right of jury trial for the defendant on a charge of homicide. The opinion of the court, prepared by Justice Stephen J. Field, who had had earlier study of extraterritoriality as Circuit Court Justice in California through his decision of a case on appeal from the Consular Court at Canton, examined into the fundamentals of the jurisdiction and disclosed the nature of the consular courts as courts intended to aid in fulfilling our national treaty obligations and as such having a special and limited jurisdiction, favorable to a defendant as being exercised on principles similar to those of his home jurisdiction even though unfavorable to him as not having certain home privileges, such as trial by jury, vouchsafed to him. No court opinion is more enlightening as to fundamental principles of extraterritoriality than Justice Field's opinion *In re Ross*.

The extraterritorial courts of the several powers in China are

closely related to their consular systems and are under the foreign affairs departments of the respective governments, yet in the exercise of their purely judicial functions the judges and the consuls constitute independent courts with their decisions not reviewable except by the higher courts. The incumbents of the principal offices in the courts should be and generally are men not only thoroughly trained and of experience in the law, but also men of large acquaintance with conditions in China and of special aptitude for maintaining relations with Chinese and other foreign officials. The rapid development of foreign interests in China and of Chinese relations with foreigners incessantly raises novel and complex problems. To maintain justice, secure protection and promote friendly relations is the object of the treaty extraterritorial courts; it is an object of the first importance, and under the conditions in China it requires for its attainment a high grade of court personnel and a highly developed system of courts and of statutes and decisions defining the law.

China is developing her own system of law and of courts on European models. This development has been slow and irregular. Yet it may, under the present changes of government, come rapidly and permanently. In their commercial treaties of 1902 and 1903 Great Britain and the United States agreed to give every assistance to the reform of the judicial system of China and to be prepared to relinquish extraterritorial rights when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements for their administration and other considerations warranted so doing. To foreign residents in China the time when relinquishment of jurisdiction will prove feasible seems far distant. The extraterritorial system has advantages, but in modern conditions it is at best anomalous and unsatisfactory as a means of doing justice and it tends to fall of its own complexity and weight. Only the larger powers can afford to maintain it and only they appear able readily to adapt their systems of laws and courts to the rapidly changing conditions. All relations with China and with the Chinese will be better when China shall have resumed her full territorial sovereignty and risen to the place of international power which her vast territory and resources, and her great people and newly progressing government shall justify and command.

THE CHINESE YOUNG MEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION

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For the milleniums of history, Old Age has reigned in Asia. A well known Oriental has said: "The East has never had a young man." The young man of China was born with the travail of the Boxer uprising. From that time the Celestial empire ceased to remember that "The past excels the present," and set itself in earnest to attain its true golden age. "The Renaissance, Reformation and Revolution at one time and in one country," is a most fitting description of present conditions. These changes have produced the young man. Schools were to be established, railroads constructed, army and navy reorganized, law codes revised, telegraph and telephone installed, new industries fostered, form of government changed, moral evils righted, sanitation introduced, western institutions investigated, vast resources developed, intricate political situations met. These all called for the young man with his training in the new education. He was the one fitted for the task and was put in important posts in every department of government in the new China. To help this young man in his new and old physical, social, intellectual, moral and religious needs is the duty, opportunity and purpose of the Young Men's Christian Association in China. This is its task and reason for its establishment.

That there are needs which such work is suited to meet is shown by its rapid growth and firm hold on the communities where it has been carried on for a number of years. Although a few Student Associations had been established for some time previous, yet it was not until 1895 that Mr. D. W. Lyon, the first foreign secretary went to China. He was soon followed by Mr. F. S. Brockman, Mr. R. E. Lewis and Mr. R. R. Gailey and work began in Shanghai and Tientsin. The above changes created opportunity, and growth thereafter was rapid. The foreign staff has increased from the above four to forty-six, and still more important is the

equal number of Chinese secretaries. There are fourteen fully organized general associations with a membership of 4,631 and work is being carried on in initial stages in seven more places. The call for further expansion is beyond the possibility to meet, in fact, it would be easy to name ten more cities, important student and commercial centers, where work should be started at once, and where delay means loss. It has always been the policy for the beginning years to establish well organized, well manned, efficient Young Men's Christian Associations in important centers as models for future expansion, and organization in smaller cities where proper secretarial help and supervision are impossible has been discouraged. Were it not for this, a mushroom growth of a large number of inefficient Associations would quickly follow, a thing to be avoided and only mentioned here as an indication of the spread and approval of the idea of all around work for young men. In fact, such is the call for this form of work that one of the secretaries has described the task of the foreign secretary as "Sitting as far out on the lever of the safety valve as possible that the pressure of work and opportunity might not become too great to be controlled."

The most fully developed individual association is at Shanghai. Here the conditions are most suited for the work. It is a large commercial center with many thousands of young men away from home and it is wholly under foreign control, minimizing Chinese prejudice against the new and western. These two things were favorable to growth. In 1905, it was felt that it was time to leave rented quarters and have a permanent equipment. A sum of \$100,000 was subscribed, half in China, and half abroad, for a new building. This was finished in the spring of 1907, giving a large well equipped plant. Yet within three years, the work had outgrown these quarters. The membership increased from 350 to 1,600, the employed force from 17 to 52, educational enrolment numbered 600, and there was need of room for a boys' department. So in 1910, \$46,000 was raised, entirely in Shanghai, for a large addition to the present building. A significant thing about all this is, that though foreigners have helped it has been essentially under Chinese control. The board of directors is composed entirely of Chinese and has numbered many who occupy prominent positions in government, education and industry. Of the fifty-two employed

as secretaries and teachers, only four are foreigners. Other salient features of this work will be brought out later in the paper, the above will suffice to show a rapid expansion and a deep hold on the community life attained through Chinese approval, effort, and support.

Not service by foreigners to Chinese, but by Chinese for Chinese is the heart of the policy of the movement. The greatest good that can be done a community is to get the best of its members working with tested methods for the rest. To establish a self-supporting, self-governing and self-perpetuating Chinese Young Men's Christian Association is the purpose of the foreign secretary. To this end, the boards of directors of all the fully organized associations are composed entirely of Chinese. They assume complete control of the work, the foreign secretary being under the Chinese board of directors just as the secretary in this country is under his board of directors. They assume financial responsibility for the current expenses, in some cases amounting to \$20,000, and raise it locally. Only the personal budget of the foreign secretary and some permanent equipment are provided from America.

This appeal to the spirit of service, ability to carry through large undertakings, independence, self-respect and national pride of the Chinese has produced its fruit in the procuring of strong men to give their time as secretaries, committee men, and directors. Mention should be made of Mr. S. K. Tsao, who for years has been the mainstay of the Shanghai association, refusing salary twice as large in government service in doing so; Mr. C. T. Wang, a graduate of Michigan and Yale universities, for a time president of the Chinese Christian Student Federation of America, who is giving his fine qualities of leadership as a national secretary; Mr. H. L. Zia and Mr. P. S. Yie, who have put the literary work of the association on a very high basis; Mr. C. H. Fei, who comes to the Peking Association, a M.A. of Yale, and for three years principal of the Paotingfu Provincial College, and a number of others. Prominent as directors have been Mr. K. S. Wang, superintendent of the Han-Yang Iron Works; Mr. P. L. Chang, a prominent educator of North China; H. E. K. S. Tang, twice representative of the Chinese government at Opium Conferences, and a director of the Indemnity Scholarship Bureau; Mr. T. T. Wang, now superintendent of Chinese students sent by the govern-

ment to America, and Rev. C. Y. Cheng, representative for China on the continuation committee of the Edinburgh Conference. Men, men with high abilities, dominated by a spirit of service and trained in efficient methods are the strength of a nation, the hope of a people. Perhaps the greatest service the association can render, then, is its Diogenian search for men who will give their talents for the service of their fellow countrymen.

A Christian institution, getting its financial support almost entirely from non-Christian sources, is the strange fact about the Young Men's Christian Association in China, a marked testimonial of the value of its broad work and the equally broad mind of the Chinese. At Shanghai during the last decade, more than \$100,000 has been contributed to the association; this last summer at Foochow, \$20,000 was raised for two building sites; and previously \$27,000 at Canton and \$22,000 at Tientsin were procured for the same purpose. Far the greater part of all the above came from non-Christian Chinese sources. This is largely explained, apart from the generosity of the Chinese people, by the policy of having a Chinese institution without the taint of foreign control, the making of no distinction of religion as far as privileges of membership are concerned, and appreciation of the educational, physical and moral value of the work. This Chinese financial support has not only the mercenary value of dollars and cents, but it has done much to arouse the spirit of service among the contributors. We know of at least one instance where a large gift to the association started a wealthy man on a career of philanthropic service. Often the giver is the most blessed.

With this summary of the purpose, policy, extent and deep root of the Young Men's Christian Association in China, let us now proceed to some of the needs which it is trying to meet.

"The Hope of China," is a book inspired by the late famous Confucian statesman, Chang Chih Tung, setting forth the need of education. This title epitomizes the faith of most Chinese to-day. One cannot describe the hue and cry for knowledge during these years—knowledge of government, science, economics, sociology, western institutions, anything which will shed light at this time of a nation's changing. In 1902, modern schools were established and grew in enrolment to 1,300,000 in six years. Students in great masses have gone abroad over the whole world. It is not strange,

therefore, that the Young Men's Christian Association has found a great opportunity in education. So great, in fact, has been the demand that against all association precedents, day schools have been started in some places. In Tientsin the Putung school, established by the Young Men's Christian Association was the first high school in the north and is commonly known as "The Parent High School of Chihli Province." It is one of the few schools under Christian management that has official recognition of the Chinese Board of Education. Founded at the time when schools were springing up everywhere and in touch with prominent local educators, this school has taken the lead in the athletic and extra-curriculum student life of the city, and through secretary and teacher has been of real assistance in advice, example and even active teaching to a number of government schools. In Shanghai, also, a very successful high school of 250 pupils, sons of prominent men of the city, has been carried on for years. It prepares students for a large college of the region and the sustained attendance and satisfaction given are sufficient justification for its continuance. However, with the increased efficiency and number of government schools, the question of the continuance of the day school has already been raised and most agree that its time is short. Yet without doubt, through these few schools, the association has rendered no small service to government education in its pioneer days.

A more distinctive and permanent opportunity is that of night school work. The great demand for trained men has forced students into active life before their education has been completed. The cities are filled with those who wish to improve their position and efficiency by education. The great cry now is for English. It is the language in favor in the Far East. An English night school is often the first work started by the association. Everywhere this has been found an open door of opportunity. The one in Peking has an enrolment of over one hundred and turns away many for lack of accommodation. The clerk comes to better his position, the student to improve his conversation, the official to increase his efficiency. All ranks of society meet each other in such schools. One class in Peking contained a general in the Chinese army, an official prominent in municipal government, a teacher, besides students and telephone operators. Such an intermingling is a real leveling influence. Besides the call for English,

French, German, type-writing, stenography, bookkeeping, arithmetic, etc., find a demand in certain places.

In Korea, the Seoul Association, affiliated with the China movement, is helping a nation industrially bankrupt to develop new trades. Modern carpentry, shoe-making, ironwork, etc., are being taught. This is the only effort of the kind in the country, and has met with such government approval that an annual grant of Yen 10,000 is made. In China no such work has been done heretofore, but at the present writing, the Hongkong Association has plans for doing so.

The Chinese are lecture hungry. Anything which promises light on any of their problems will draw a good audience. Preparation for Constitutional Government, Student Life in America, Evolution, Modern Applications of Chemistry, etc., are typical popular subjects. Many prominent foreigners traveling through China, have been used to bring the best of western thought to the Oriental student. The moving picture machine is sure to overcrowd any hall. The Chengtu Association gave the first such exhibition in the province of Szechuen, an event witnessed by the governor. The exhibit of scientific apparatus in laboratory and lecture, by Dr. Wilson of this association, has done much to open the eyes of the literati of this inland province. The most striking example of the value and demand for lectures with educational value is the present work of Prof. C. H. Robertson, formerly of Purdue University faculty. When he lectures on the gyroscope, has a mono-rail in operation, makes a wheel rise against gravity, and lets anyone in the audience wrestle with an encased gyroscope, the audience is on edge with enthusiasm. This lecture was given a dozen times in Shanghai without diminishing interest. All the officials of Foo-chow turned out *en masse* with their retinues to listen to one of these science lectures and enjoyed much seeing an X-ray picture of the Tartar-general's hand. A wealthy merchant, when explained the nature of these lectures, could not contain his enthusiasm, but danced about the room in his excitement. Professor Robertson has further prepared a number of lectures with practical demonstration on such subjects as Aeronautics, Air as a Lubricant, The Telautograph, Wireless Telegraphy, etc. He is planning to give them himself in the more important centers of China and to further increase their usefulness by training lecturers for smaller cities.

Thus this is no less than a national campaign to furnish a widespread knowledge of the latest applications of scientific investigation. It will do much to enlighten the people, stimulate progress, and reform and open up doors for further approach.

"Put waste paper here," is the sign on large cans which has only recently greeted us in our cities. For centuries baskets for this purpose have been common in China. This is not from a sense of cleanliness as the filth of the street clearly shows, but from the reverence in which any printed or written thing is held. No nation has exalted literature as has China. It is to prevent the defiling of the printed page that such baskets are provided. No wonder then that the publication department of the association has a great opportunity. This is enhanced by the thirst of the student of to-day for good reading pertinent to the problems of the nation and student life. It is hard to conceive of this great craving on his part and the very little there is to satisfy it. Attempting to meet this need in some small measure, there has just been started by this department a magazine called *Progress*. It is published in Chinese and English and aims to bring light and sane judgment on reform, government, social conditions, education, etc., to those who in a short time will be prominent in Chinese affairs. As such, it is unique in journalism in China. *China's Young Men*, the official organ of the Christian Student Movement, already has a larger circulation than any other religious periodical, its number of paid subscribers in 1910 being 6,528, an increase of twenty per cent over 1909, and sixty per cent over 1908. The English edition of the same paper is a fine expression of Chinese Christian thought and is read widely by English speaking students. These three periodicals are edited entirely by Chinese and are each unique in their field. Further, no less than forty books and pamphlets are published including Bible study, devotional and general books, such as "Habit," by James; "Secrets of Success," by Marsden; etc. That there is a marked need for such literature is shown by the total sales of 31,390 copies for 1910, an increase of sixty per cent over the previous year.

For the first time in her history, China's students are gathered in large numbers in the city away from home. One of the great problems arising therefrom has been that of their social life. No people are more friendly, enjoy social times more, have a keener

sense of humor, are better story tellers than the Chinese. The theater is the delight of all. A whole country side will stop work for a week to enjoy a tedious play given by traveling actors, and crowds throng the city theaters. Feasting is very common. As one student said: "My favorite amusement is to eat." It is no uncommon thing to have five or six invitations for an evening. Billiard, pool and bowling halls are very common and much used. All these entail great expense, causing many to live beyond their means, and bring the young man in touch with the worse side of city life. It is a sad fact that immorality is rapidly on the increase. To preserve the good and avoid the evil of all this, the Young Men's Christian Association is providing social centers equipped with billiards, pool, bowling alleys and other games where the surrounding atmosphere is positive and for the good. Social evenings are frequent and the zest with which western parlor games are enjoyed by these orientals would astonish some who have judged all China by the inscrutable laundryman in America. Returned students from America are sounding the cry of the need of extra-curriculum "school life" such as they have known there, and through teacher and social groups, much is being done. Every such effort has met with a ready response.

Goggled-eyed, dignified, stately in tread, unperturbed in demeanor, speaking in aphorisms from the classics, ceaseless in concentration on study—this the old Chinese scholar. What an example of pedantry, of one-sided development he has often been! A change has come now. Go to the city of Tientsin and see five to seven thousand people including many of the leading men and women and even the governor of the province eagerly watching the new students of China from leading schools of the whole province compete in the annual track meet of the Tientsin Association. They sprint, run over the hurdles, put the shot, vault over the bar at a good height, do everything except show the false dignity of the old, and are further gaining strength of body, self-control, cleanliness of habit, sense of good sportsmanship, appreciation of team play, grit, perseverance and the art of success in doing so. In all this athletic life, the association is playing a leading part. In some places like Tientsin it has organized and developed a large share of the interscholastic athletic life of the whole city. Soccer, football and basket-ball leagues have been formed and some atten-

tion paid to regular gymnastics. In Shanghai the success of this last has been marked and a physical director's training class started. A year ago in connection with the Nanking Exposition, a national interscholastic athletic meet was held by the management and school teams from all parts of the Empire participated. The authorities asked the Young Men's Christian Association to direct this feature, an assistance gladly rendered. Co-operation with the municipality in the management of a public playground and athletic field has also been undertaken at Shanghai, a feature which will doubtless be developed in other centers. This message of a strong body is one much needed in China. Too close and long concentration on study for many generations has meant a weak physique and tendency to certain diseases, notably tuberculosis. It was found at Shanghai, that forty per cent of those examined by the physical director had tubercular chests. Enlightenment on hygiene, sanitation, disease, heredity, etc., is a broad field for the physical department. Lectures on Plague Prevention drew large audiences at Shanghai that forty per cent of those examined by the physical were favorably commented upon by the Press. At a student conference near Peking, a talk on The Physical Results of Immorality had the closest attention, and was new thought to most present. We remember how in Tientsin, a talk on "Purity," by Rev. F. B. Meyer, of London, was greeted with a smirk and smile at first, which turned to rapt attention and deep earnestness at the end.

Judged from the probable effects on China, the thronging of Chinese to the schools of other nations is one of the most important migrations of history. In 1905 there were no less than fifteen thousand such in Tokyo, a number which has decreased to three thousand since then, a fact due to the withdrawal of short term students, who it is feared received more harm than good, the residue being those taking full courses. As is well known, the unused balance of their portion of the Boxer Indemnity Fund has been returned to China by the United States, and is being used to send students here. This means the arrival of fifty or seventy young Chinese each year to pass four to five years in our schools. Statistics show that there are 725 students here now. A guess would place the total in England and the Continent at five hundred. Here then is a steady number of more than a thousand Chinese students who are in foreign schools and universities. This fact is at

once an opportunity and a duty. At Tokyo, a Young Men's Christian Association for Chinese has been established since 1906, with quarters in the Central Association of that city and a branch at Waseda University. This has furnished a social meeting place for the students, a large night school work has been done, and a successful hostel run. The whole method might be characterized as a Campaign of Friendship. Most striking, however, has been the religious work. This has shown clearly that away from the restraints and prejudices of the homeland and faced with the loneliness and temptations of a foreign city, the message of Christianity is very welcome. A Chinese pastor who has worked there for years says that three-fourths of them favor it. The Chinese Union Church with which the association has been closely co-operating, has received one hundred and forty of these students into membership. What the lives of these educated, intelligent students of good family may mean to China is hard to estimate. For students in America, the Student's Information Bureau, which is prepared to help those going abroad, while not connected with it, yet has quarters in the Shanghai Association building. Parties of students have been met by association secretaries at American ports and every possible assistance rendered. A Chinese Christian Student Federation has been organized in America, which has two qualified Chinese as secretaries. A feature of the work is the holding annually of three summer conferences. It is the object of this work to be a friend to those away from their friends, to bring them into touch with the best of this land that they may return equipped with high ideals as well as detailed knowledge to help solve the problems of their country. And let me add as an exhortation to all interested in these capable strangers in our schools that the universal testimony of those of them who have returned to China is that the greatest thing to attain the above ideal is the influence of the cultured Christian home. They should be given as much chance as possible to get in touch with such.

Before there was a Young Men's Christian Association movement in China, individual student associations had been organized in a few of the mission schools. It is a striking example of the vitality and need of such organization where student control and initiative are given free course that these early associations have lived some for twenty years with practically no outside supervision,

instruction or help. I have in mind an academy in Peking, where an association was organized about 1890, and though receiving no help until within the last few years, yet persisted in its existence in spite of suggestion from teachers that it might be better to unite with a larger church meeting. The little chaps wanted their own society and kept it. At the present time in this student department there are ninety-three associations with 4,459 members. Feeling that besides the curriculum Bible study required in the mission schools, it was necessary to inculcate a love for the personal study as a great help in maintaining a high standard of life, stress has been laid on voluntary Bible discussion groups with emphasis on daily study. To this end much literature has been prepared. For the most part it is translation of Bible study books used in this country and while not wholly suited to the different conditions, yet is far the best of its kind in Chinese at present. Last year there were 2,732 students in 372 classes with an average weekly attendance of 1,806, a proportion of the total field which compares very favorably with the work in America. We know of at least two associations which in spare hours are carrying on small schools for outsiders and records show that ten per cent of the total membership use parts of vacations and holidays to work in street chapels and even for itinerating. Some associations furnish courses of lectures on general topics for the whole student body. A most significant feature of this work has been the holding of six student summer conferences in different sections of China. They have gained in power and usefulness each year. To have students trained in the spirit of service, filled with the high ideals and dynamic of the Christian life, measuring their character and actions by the standards of the Bible to go forth to furnish leadership in China is the object of this department. No work is more important.

We know the force for righteousness in a community that an active church is. It goes without saying that a necessity for a strong, vigorous, wise church is an efficient ministry. At this time in China when the spirit of nationalism is on the increase and young Chinese are taking the lead in every movement, it is of vital importance that highly educated strong Chinese be in the pulpit. Otherwise it will have but little place in the life of the nation. Of great concern therefore, has it been that comparatively

few of the graduates of mission colleges, splendid as has been their service in other lines, have taken up this particular form of work. The great loss in salary and social standing involved largely account for this. It is a thing that thrills our hearts that it is a Chinese pastor, Rev. Ding Li Mei who has providentially arisen to meet this need. He is a man of the spirit and power of Moody, a profound believer and user of prayer and a constant Bible student. He is an example which convinces one that we are waiting for the interpretation of Christianity which the Oriental will give. Giving his time for the past two years to the student department, there have been over seven hundred students who have decided to devote their lives to the ministry. In doing so they take a calling without position in the community, with hardly a living salary, and a task full of discouragements, whereas with their training they could get five to ten times as much salary and occupy honored places as government teachers. Surely much can be expected of men with this spirit of sacrifice and the churches led by them.

Moral and religious changes following the new conditions of society have been marked and serious. The restraints of old religions have fallen off. The true Confucianist has of old looked askance at Buddhism and Taoism and now that western learning has come in, the students regard them as superstitions and the priest a joke. Confucianism is still the heart of the Chinese. The classics are taught in all schools both government and mission and rightly so. As a moral code, they are laudable; as a conservator of civilization, most powerful; as stimulating progress, a stumbling-block; as a religion, agnostic; and as a force to stop the growing immorality mentioned above or to meet any other evil old or new, defective. Writes a Chinese: "The ideal of statesmanship found in Confucianism is not fit for our statesmen of the present day. . . . Confucius did not fight against the corruption of the king of Chi but yielded and left. The Chinese statesmen at the sight of difficulties will ask sick leave; the western statesman will stick to his post." A well known Chinese educator says: "The Chinese students need the gospel of Hope. Teach them that Christ can give them hope for their nation and faith so that they will not give up and will play their part. This is one of the greatest teachings that Christianity can give China." Further the agnosticism of Confucius coupled with science of to-day and a smattering of

Darwin, Huxley, Spencer and Mill has led many into pure materialism. Says one: "The strength of western nations is entirely dependent upon science, and Christianity is simply one means of governing the more ignorant." Finally add a strong prejudice. "Many men connect Christianity with the foreigner and the missionary with his foreign government, we have our religion; why do we want to adopt a foreign one which opposes our customs in every way," are common objections. The above is enough to show the twofold situation of a need for a dynamic which will make moral teaching bear fruit in character and lead men to combat evils in society, and a strong prejudice to be overcome if Christianity furnish that power.

Work for these students has largely fallen upon the Young Men's Christian Association as the form of effort most suited to meet the need. Events of the past few years have given great grounds for encouragement. In spite of prejudice, there is a spirit of inquiry and search. In 1909, a series of lectures on Science and Religion were given in student centers and met with a surprising hearing. At Paotingfu, 800 students in spite of a great cold hall, noisy attendants, smoky lamps and few seats, listened with rapt attention for an hour and a half to an interpreted address on the argument for God as Cause. This spring Mr. G. S. Eddy, accustomed to the Oriental mind by fourteen years in the Young Men's Christian Association in India, gave a series of lectures in a number of cities of China. His audiences were as large as two thousand five hundred and in some cases insisted on protracted meetings. The Shanghai Association has seventy men who are preparing to enter the church as a result of his work. Mention should be made of the author of one of the statements quoted in the above paragraph, an educator, who after years of study and contact with the Tientsin Association became a Christian. The best product of Confucianism together with modern training, he found in this teaching fulfilment of all he had. The reality of his experience, the beauty of his life, his lead in all good things has led above twenty students and prominent men to take the same step. As a result of this, a church supported and controlled entirely by Chinese has been started in Tientsin, a church that during the first six months received twenty-six new members, for the most part of the student class.

Only this past summer there was held near Peking by the Young Men's Christian Association, a summer conference unique in China and as far as I know in any other country. The subject of the conference was Present Day Problems and Christianity. The program was printed in full that there might be no misunderstanding of the purpose of the meeting. Non-Christian students in government schools were asked to spend eight days, a fifth of their vacation, and to give a fee of five dollars (Mexican) merely for the purpose of going to a beautiful Buddhist Temple in the mountains to listen to four hours of lectures a day on Christianity. It was decidedly an experiment, but yet it was felt that the subject would appeal to a good number. Results showed that it did, for there was a total of thirty-eight who came representing twelve different schools. Of these, but six were already Christians. It was felt by the program committee that there were but two points of view from which to approach the subject, one from that of science and the other from that of China's needs. These are undoubtedly the two subjects in which the Chinese students are most interested. So one lecture each day was devoted to "The Modern View of the World," showing the present thought regarding Evolution, Sociology, Psychology, etc., and bringing out clearly that all these at least permit a spiritualistic conception of the universe; and another was given on the "Needs of China," showing Christianity's place in meeting them. Of the remaining two hours one was used in small discussion Bible classes, which proved the most interesting part of the whole conference, questions being frequent and showing thought, and the other to Life Callings, showing what ideals should fill a man in the different occupations that China be most benefited. Clearly it was the idea of service and Christianity as fitting the individual for the highest usefulness that appealed most to these men. The seven who at the conference for the first time took definite Christian stands all bore testimony to this. One of them said: "I know the real need of our nation is the purity of the individual and Christianity can help men to be pure." More striking yet are the words of one of the three representatives sent by the government from suspicion of the revolutionary nature of all student gatherings. He said: "I have heretofore had little use for Christianity. I thought it a religion for coolies. But I have at this conference been much instructed. I have listened

day by day to scholars, and have been much impressed, learning many things. I also have noted the patriotic spirit of the gathering. The sort of Christianity here taught would be a real blessing to China. If such men as these students would accept Christianity and lead the church, the church would be improved and would be a great power in China."

China is awake and stirring. At least a fourth of the world's population is engaged in the tremendous task of adapting a civilization but little changed for milleniums to the new conditions surrounding it and is meeting with wonderful success. When we stop to think that four hundred million industrious, capable, intellectual people are living in a country with vast undeveloped mineral resources and sparsely settled territory larger than the United States, we must ask ourselves, what are the possibilities of such a nation? What may it mean to the whole world to have this people from being a negligible quantity in world affairs turn to helping in the solution of the scientific, economic and religious problems of the day. On the other hand, in this development, should commercialism, selfishness, revenge be the leading motives what problems would be created, what troubles arise! The key to the situation is the young man of China to-day; he decides the question. Bring the best of the world to his attention, show him friendship, help him in all his problems, fill his life with high ideals, instil in him the spirit of the brotherhood of man, ground his character on the rock of true religion and the greatest task of the present day has been done.

MEDICINE AS PRACTICED BY THE CHINESE

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In the preparation of this article I have referred largely to a work entitled "*Medicine et Pharmacie chez les Chinois et chez les Annamites*" par le Dr. Jules Regnault, A. Challamei, Editeur, Paris, Rue Jacob 17. I have also included notes made from personal observations in Canton, China, and conversations with a Chinese scholar who had read some of the medical classics.

Medicine in China may be divided into two classes,—the purely superstitious, which depends on charms and magic, and the art of medicine, as practiced by the Chinese physician. The former I shall dismiss with a few words. In the City of Canton may be found temples dedicated to the "Spirit of Medicine." In these the ignorant people, especially women, believe that the presiding deity will restore health upon the payment of small sums of money and the performance of certain rites. The Chinese physician, proper, is quite a different individual from the Taoist priest, although magic and astrology do play an important part in his armanentarium. Thus, for example, we read that as heaven has its orders of stars, so earth has its currents of water, and man his pulse. As heaven has twenty-eight constellations called the three hundred and sixty-five orders, so earth has courses of water called lakes, springs, etc., and man has his courses in the pulse,—the three *yang* and the three *yin*. The practice of medicine is unlicensed and is usually hereditary, the skilled physician handing down his secrets to one of his sons. All the efforts of the students are directed to the pulse and the various phenomena revealed by its palpation. There are at least fifty-one variations in the pulse which may be detected and each one indicates some special condition in the body. For simple complaints home remedies and the formulas of old women are resorted to and only when grave symptoms develop is the doctor consulted. In case of warfare the Chinese soldiers attend to their own wounds.

The first authority on medicine in China was the Emperor Chen Song 2737 B.C. who classified about one hundred medicinal plants.

In 2637 B.C. medical science, so far as it had advanced, was written up by another Emperor.

The Chinese distinguish three kinds of practice:—Internal medicine, external medicine and children's diseases.

The drugs and other medicaments are weighed out according to a decimal system as follows:

1 tael or leung.....	equals	40.00 gm.
1 tsin	"	4.00 gm.
1 fan	"	.4 gm.
1 lei	"	.04 gm.
1 ho	"	.004 gm.

The study of human anatomy has been retarded by two factors,—respect for the dead and the lack of any co-operation or organization among the practicing physicians. The body is said to be divided into three parts: (1) The upper, or head; (2) the middle or chest; (3) the lower or abdomen and inferior extremities. Life depends on the equilibrium of the *yang* and the *yin*. It is but one manifestation of the universal life. The whole order of the universe results from the perfect equilibrium of these two factors. The *yang* is the warm principle, the actively flowing and is often symbolized by the sun. The *yin* is the moist principle, passively flowing and is symbolized by shadow. The equilibrium of these two forces constitutes the health of man. If the yang, or active principle predominates there is excitation; if the yin, or passive principle predominates there is depression of the organism. Harmony between the yang and the yin is often represented by two dragons ready to devour one another. The action of these two principles depends on twelve organs: heart, liver, lungs, spleen, left kidney, brain, the large and small intestines, the stomach, gall bladder, urinary bladder and the right kidney. Each of these organs has a canal whereby it communicates with the others. Thus the liver, kidney and spleen are connected with the heart by special vessels; and the vas deferens arises from the kidney. Some of these communicating channels end in the hands and some in the feet. One of the vessels in the little finger is used to determine the nature of most infantile diseases. Six of these vessels carry the active principle yang, and six carry the passive principle yin. These two forces spread through the whole organism by means of the gases and the

blood. The latter makes a complete circulation of the body about fifty times in twenty-four hours. In these fifty revolutions the blood passes twenty-five times through the male channels or those of the active principle and twenty-five times through the female channels, or those of the passive principle. The blood returns to its starting point every half hour approximately, instead of once in twenty-five seconds, according to the teaching of modern physiologists, having traversed a course of some fifty-four meters. The yang is of a subtle nature and resides in the abdomen and six viscera. It has a constant tendency to rise. The yin resides in the brain, the vertebral column and the five viscera and tends to descend.

The viscera of the body are classified under two groups:—the six viscera in which the yang resides and the five viscera in which the yin resides. The six viscera are: The gall bladder, stomach, small intestines, large intestines, bladder and the left kidney, with its three heat centers, the three lumbar sympathetic ganglia. The five viscera are: The heart, liver, lungs, spleen and right kidney. The diaphragm is placed beneath the heart and lungs, it covers over the intestines, spine and stomach. It is an impervious membrane. It covers over the foul gases, not allowing them to rise into the heart and lungs. The stomach, spleen and small intestines are the digestive organs. They prepare the blood which is received by the heart and set in motion by the lungs. The liver and the gall bladder filter out the various humors. The lungs expel the foul gases. The kidneys filter the blood, while coarser material is evacuated by the large intestines. Two substances are found circulating in the body, gases and blood. The former acts upon the latter as the wind upon the sea, the interaction of these two as they circulate in the vessels produces the pulse.

The pulse may be palpated at eleven different points, as follows: Radial, cubital, temporal, posterior auricular, pedal posterior tibial, external plantar, precordial and in three places over the aorta. Usually, however, the physician is satisfied with palpation of the pulse of the right and left wrist. With the right hand he feels the left pulse and with the left hand the right pulse. He applies three fingers,—the ring, middle and index over the pulse and the thumb underneath the wrist. Then he palpates the pulse with each finger successively. Under the ring finger the pulse of the right hand reveals the condition of the lung, middle of chest and the large

intestines, while in the left hand the ring finger determines the state of the heart and small intestines. The pulse under the middle finger corresponds on the right to the condition of the stomach and spleen, on the left to the state of the liver and gall bladder. The index finger placed over the pulse of the right radial shows the condition of the bladder and lower portion of body, over the left radial it reveals the state of the kidneys and ureters. For each of these six pulses the physician must practice weak, moderate and strong pressure, to determine whether the pulse be superficial, moderate or deep. This must be done during nine complete inspirations. If the pulse be rapid the yang principle is predominant, if slow, the yin is predominant. There are twenty-four main varieties of pulse and there are twenty-seven which prognosticate death. The Chinese physician must be trained to palpate the pulse so skillfully that by this single means the nature of diseases and even the month of gestation in a pregnant woman may be determined. Ten or more minutes must be spent in the palpation of the pulses.

Sometimes a Chinese physician will consider other factors. For example it is said that by examination of the tongue thirty-six symptoms may be diagnosed according as the tongue is white, yellow, blue, red or black, and depending on the extent of the coating. From the general appearance of the face and nose the state of the lungs may be discovered. Examination of the eyes, orbits, and eyebrows shows the condition of the liver. The cheeks and tongue vary with the state of the heart, the end of the nose with the stomach. The ears suggest conditions of the kidneys; the mouth and lips the state of the spleen and stomach. The color and figure of the patient also count in a diagnosis. Each organ has its appropriate color. Red corresponds to the heart, white to the lungs, black to the kidneys and bladder, yellow to the stomach and spleen and blue to the liver and gall bladder. Organs also have their own peculiar times and seasons. Thus the heart has red as its color, fire as its element, summer as its season and noon as its hour. It is more likely to be inflamed at noon during the summer season. The elements of nature are supposed to be complicating factors in disease. They are arranged in pairs of opposites thus: active and passive, weak and strong, water and fire, cold and heat.

Auscultation and percussion are wholly unknown as diagnostic aids to the Chinese physician. Entire reliance is placed on palpation

of the pulse and the general facies of the patient, in making a diagnosis. Questions may be asked but only to suggest the remedy required. Often a prescription is given because of the resemblance of the drug to the organ affected. Thus for renal diseases, haricot or kidney beans are given. Minerals are administered as salts. Plants are used in the form of roots, stems, leaves, flowers and dried fruits. The bones of a tiger are frequently ground up and given to a debilitated person. The grasshopper is dried and used as a medicine and the shells of the cicada are collected from the bark of trees and mixed with other ingredients. Tinctures and extracts are prepared from rice wine. Pills are often made with a thick shell of paraffine which is broken off and the contents chewed up. Various forms of plasters and blisters may be applied to the skin. The actual cautery is often used as a revulsive.

The use of the acupuncture needle seems to be seldom resorted to in the neighborhood of Canton. The theory on which it is based is that if one punctures the vessels connecting different organs the disease will be aborted. Three hundred and eighty-eight points suitable for acupuncture are described. Diseases of the liver and the eyes, which are sympathetic organs, are cured by giving pork's liver. In Kwongtung province human blood is considered an excellent remedy and at executions people may be seen collecting the blood in little vials. It is then cooked and eaten.

Diseases are said to be produced by internal and external agents. Among the external influences are: (1) Wind, which causes headache or apoplexy, dizziness, chapping of face, diseases of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, teeth, etc. (2) Cold may cause cough, cholera, heart pains, rheumatism and abdominal pains. (3) Heat causes chills and diarrhoea. (4) From dampness develops constipation, distention of abdomen, watery diarrhoea, gonorrhoea, nausea, pain in kidneys, jaundice, anasarca, pain in small intestines, and pain in feet. (5) From dryness comes thirst, and constipation. (6) Fire causes pain in the sides, diabetes, etc. The diseases of internal origin are classified as disorders of the gases, blood, sputum and depressed spirits.

In the past few years there have been established two charitable institutions in Canton for the treatment of the sick, according to native methods of practice. No surgery is practiced. At one of these so-called hospitals I was informed that bullets were removed

by placing a kind of plaster at the opening of the wound. The ingredients of the plaster have a remarkable magnetic power over the imbedded bullet and gradually draw it out through the same opening by which it entered. My informant had never seen this line of treatment actually carried out, however.

There is a great desire on the part of many Chinese young men to learn the science of western medicine, and in the next few years there will be a demand for thousands of Chinese trained as scientific physicians.

CHINA: GEOGRAPHY AND RESOURCES

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The ultimate greatness of a nation as a political power depends primarily upon its geographical position and its physical resources. Those qualities of racial character that we are apt to think of as the basis of a people's progress, are, in the last analysis, largely determined by physical surroundings; and even a progressive people in a land of scanty resources or of unfavorable geographic position could not hope to attain and maintain the highest stage of national greatness.

What are the actual facts as to the geography of China that justify the current belief that this nation is destined to become a power of the first magnitude? that here in eastern Asia will continue to be enacted some of the greatest and most far-reaching events in national and international affairs? What are its actual resources that give credence to the belief that here the wealth of the world is to be enormously increased? that here will develop a trade and commerce sufficient to bring fortunes to the individuals or the nations that can control it? Be his interests economic, commercial or political, these are questions that should receive first consideration by the student of the Far East.

The Chinese Empire consists of China proper and her four dependencies—Tibet, Eastern Turkestan, Mongolia and Manchuria. China, however, although it has but one-third of the area of the Empire, contains practically all its wealth and population. This article is confined to China itself, referring only indirectly to the dependencies.

I. *Geographical Position*

Isolation.—The fact of greatest influence on China's history is its almost complete separation from the rest of the world, by land and by sea. It is this fact that has made possible the maintenance of its civilization, almost unchanged for over 2,500 years. China faces the Pacific, the largest of the oceans, across whose waters the

small boats of the Chinese could not hope to cross. And even had they crossed, they would have found the distant shores almost uninhabited. On the shore of this ocean there was no other nation, either in the old world or the new, save the small island Empire of Japan, with its kindred people and civilization, which could penetrate to China by sea, bringing new peoples and new thoughts. Chinese influence upon Japan's development was strong, but, until within the last two decades, Japan has had little influence upon the huge Empire of the Chinese.

India, on the Indian Ocean, possessed a great population and an ancient civilization, but the sea voyage even to India was long and stormy, and the way infested by pirates who found ready shelter in numerous islands and bays. The distance from Canton to Calcutta is over 3,500 miles, further than from Philadelphia to Liverpool, so that even with this one other populous section in Asia intercourse was difficult.

As for sea connections with European nations, the way was absolutely unknown until 1498, and the great distance even then shut out Western invasion, save in a very small way, until well on in the nineteenth century. By sea China has been all but completely isolated from the rest of the civilized world.

By land, China is likewise all but barred out from intercourse with the remainder of Asia and with Europe by a system of high mountain ranges, broad plateaus, and sandy desert wastes unrivaled as a land barrier anywhere else on the earth's surface. From the China Sea this triple barrier of mountain, sand and plateau encloses China in a great curve, over 6,000 miles in extent, passing through Indo-China to Central Asia and on through eastern Siberia to the Ckhotsk Sea. The outer edge of this curve consists of the highest and most inaccessible of mountain ranges, the Himalayas, the Pamirs, the Tian-shan, the Altai, the Yablonovyi. From the southern province of Yun-nan to the Dzungaria pass in central Asia, a distance of about 2,800 miles, the lowest passes are over 10,000 feet and many reach 16,000 to 18,000 feet. The lowest passes in the mountains between Burma and southern China are from 5,000 to 7,000 feet in altitude and narrow and difficult. North of the Pamirs the general east-west extension of the mountain ranges gives lower and somewhat easier passes into western Asia. The wide pass of Dzungaria, north of the Tien

Shan Range, has an elevation as low as 5,000 to 6,000 feet. Northeast from this opening, other passes from 5,000 to 8,000 feet in altitude are found leading to Siberia.

The inside of this high mountainous curve is occupied by broad, high, desert plateaus, from 1,500 to 2,000 miles in width, and ranging in height from 9,000 to 18,000 feet in Tibet to 3,000 to 5,000 in the plateau of Mongolia, and crossed by higher mountain ranges. These plateaus are occupied by the Chinese dependencies of Tibet, Eastern Turkestan and Mongolia, buffer states over which China has maintained control as a still greater protection from western invasion. Even without the outer encircling ranges of mountains, this desert plateau in itself would be sufficient to shut out any but the most desultory communications.

Isolation—Present Significance.—The all but complete isolation made by the natural boundaries of China as just indicated have been partly removed in recent times by improvements in transportation. The cutting of the Suez Canal has greatly shortened the route from Europe, and the opening of the Panama Canal will bring eastern America somewhat nearer. The steamship and the railroad have shortened the time of journey by many days, or even weeks, and have brought the products, the peoples, and the ideas of every land to China's doors. China is no longer completely cut off from outside influences. But yet her position far distant from Europe and the Americas and her mountain and desert boundaries, will long continue to exert a great influence upon Chinese affairs and Chinese progress.

In spite of transportation improvements, Shanghai is still forty-five days by sea from western Europe and fourteen days from western North America. In the peaceful pursuits of commerce, although the sea is a connecting highway, these great distances offer barriers to trade in increased freight rates, both for imports and exports, as well as in length of time required for transport. The expense of travel limits both the number of foreign visitors to China and Chinese visitors to foreign countries, thus cutting off one means of acquiring new ideas and progressive methods. This separation may in time prove of benefit to Chinese far eastern trade, in that it will encourage the growth of manufacturing industries in China. When she learns to use her resources of mechanical power and of cheap and efficient labor in manufacturing, the long dis-

tance away of her competitors will be to their disadvantage and to China's gain.

In war, even in modern times, the sea is a most effective barrier. It is true that China presents 2,100 miles of seacoast open to attack from foreign navies. But these navies, when in Chinese waters, are far from their bases of supplies. In the event of a war of conquest, involving the transportation of large armies, the thousands of miles of sea between China and the great powers of Europe will prove scarcely less effective as a protection than they have in the past.

"It is this limited capacity of navies to extend coercive force inland that has commanded them to the highest political intelligence as a military instrument mighty for defence, but presenting no menace to the liberties of a people."¹

In peace and war, the land barriers must always remain effective. Great Britain in the south and Russia on the north have extended their dominions to the mountain circle that forms the outer bulwark of China's natural defences; and here they have stopped. Not only do the high mountains and plateaus oppose further conquest, but the desert lands are hardly worth the taking. Yet it is almost certain had not the mountains intervened, those two powers would have extended before this their borders to, if not within, China itself. This, in fact, is what Russia nearly accomplished in the only weak point in the mountain barrier, namely Manchuria.

Manchuria alone, of all the land boundaries of China, can be regarded as at all open. The Manchurian plain, rich and fertile, opens readily into northern China and the mountain divide separating Manchuria from Siberia is relatively low and easy of passage. It is from this direction that Russia has stretched forth her conquering arm, taking possession of all the northern half of the Amur valley and reaching down the Pacific coast to Korea. She was finally entrenching herself in all of Manchuria when forced to loosen her hold by Japan. Here alone, by means of the Siberian Railway, is China directly connected by land with Europe, and here has her territorial integrity been most threatened. The retention of Manchuria by China is a vital necessity to maintain protection along her land frontier.

¹ Mahan, A. T., "The Problem of Asia," p. 42

Except for the Siberian Railway, the mountain-desert barrier has kept from China any international railways.² In Burma and India many roads reach up to the base of the Himalayas, while in Turkestan the Russians have penetrated to the Pamirs with their railroad lines, but none have yet crossed. Both the lack of resources in the central Asiatic plateaus and difficulty of construction over these high ranges will undoubtedly long prevent any such extension.

Accessibility—Seacoast and Harbors.—The preceding section has emphasized China's isolation and its effects both past and present. Turning to the other side of the question, to what extent do physical features make China accessible to modern trade and commerce?

The prime requisite for the growth of a modern nation is ready access to the sea. China's seacoast extends over 2,000 miles, following the main outlines of the coast; or, including the minor depressions, over 4,500 miles. But this long seacoast presents but comparatively few good harbors. Remarkably free from deep indentations, it encloses all of eastern China in a single great curve, convex to the east, and broken only where the Shan-tung peninsula projects eastward toward Korea in the north, and the Lei Chau peninsula reaches toward the island of Hainan in the south. These projecting peninsulas form the only large inclosed bays along the China coast, the Gulf of Pe-chi-li and the Gulf of Tongking. The largest depression in this great curve is Hang-chow Bay, at its most eastern edge. And this bay is but sixty miles wide, extends inland about the same distance, and is too shallow for large ocean-going vessels.

The northern coast, north of Hang-chow is especially deficient in harbors. Except for the Shan-tung peninsula, it is made up of alluvial material brought down by the two great rivers of China, and has, therefore, a low, flat, swampy shore, straight and regular and gradually advancing seaward. Off shore it is very shallow and filled with shifting sand bars. Ten miles off the coast of Chi-li water is but twenty feet deep, and, moreover, is obstructed by ice during the winter months. There are no harbors worthy the name on the Gulf of Pe-chi-li nor along the coast south of the Shan-tung promontory. Shanghai is situated on the Wang-poo River, a short

² A short line from Hanoi in Annam into the province of Yun-nan, is an international railway, but it does not cross the mountain barrier.

tidal tributary near the mouth of the Yangtze. The Yangtze enters the sea in a great estuary sixty miles wide, but filled with islands and shifting channels, and constantly threatening to silt up the entrance to Shanghai whose connection with the sea is maintained by artificial means. Passengers and cargo sometimes have to be unloaded at the Woosung Bar, at the mouth of the river, and taken by barges fifty miles up to Shanghai. Its existence as a great port is due entirely to its position at the mouth of a great navigable river. It is the only port in China that has good natural access to the interior.

The Shan-tung peninsula only, in all of the northern coast of China, has a few good natural harbors, due to the fact that here the mountains reach the sinking seacoast forming a series of bays and protecting headlands, but these harbors have no natural connections to the interior. The two best have been taken possession of by foreign powers. Wei-hai-wei, a large protected harbor with a depth of forty-five feet, was leased by Great Britain in 1898, and Ts'ingtao, on Kiaw-chau Bay, one of the largest and best harbors in the East, was taken by Germany in the same year. The Chinese treaty port of Che-foo possesses a large and deep harbor.

South of Hang-chow Bay, the coast, like Shan-tung, is formed by the depression of a mountainous region and possesses several good natural harbors, but, also like Shan-tung, they have poor access to the interior. Foo-chow, Amoy, Swatow, Hong Kong, and Kwang-chow-wan are all good harbors, capable of receiving the largest ocean vessels. Canton cannot receive ships of over ten feet draught, while Macao is fast silting up.

Navigable Streams.—Not only is China's coast free from deep indentations that allow penetration of the sea inland, but its rivers, with the notable exception of the Yangtze, are unnavigable by ocean-going vessels except in their lower courses. The mighty Hwang-ho is used only by junks, even in its lowest courses, due to bars at its mouth and sands in its channels. Above its entrance to the highlands, it is unnavigable even for junks.

The Si-Kiang in the south is navigable only to Wu-chow for vessels of less than six and one-half feet draught, a distance of about 125 miles. Small boats and barges, however, can go far up its main stream as well as its tributaries.

It is the Yangtze that opens the interior of China to the sea.

Ocean-going vessels drawing sixteen to eighteen feet of water come to the wharves at Han-kow, 680 miles from the ocean, into the very heart of China. River steamers can proceed 370 miles further, to Ichang where the gorges of the Yangtze seriously hinder navigation. These gorges are navigated, however, with difficulty by large junks to Chang-king (400 miles), and small junks go on even to Ping-shan, 1,750 miles from the mouth. A small, specially-constructed steamboat now makes regular trips from Ichang to Chang-king through the gorges. Small steamers navigate the Han for three hundred miles northwest from Han-kow. Even in the Yangtze navigation by the large ocean going vessels is prevented in the dry winter season, when not over six feet draught boats can be taken up the river. At all seasons, shifting sand bars are a serious evil. But in spite of these handicaps, the Yangtze is the chief natural instrument for making the interior of China accessible to the outside world. Here commerce and industry are gaining firmest foothold. The fact that the present revolutionary movement has had its origin in the Yangtze Valley and has here gained its strongest support is significant of the openness of this central valley to outside influences.

Accessibility by Land.—In the description of China's land boundaries their isolating effects were noted. But in spite of these effective barriers China has long continued to hold some intercourse with the rest of Asia. Immigrations from the West were the beginnings of her civilization; her religion has come from India, as witnessed by the Buddha worship; Christian missionaries from Europe established the church in China in the middle ages; Chinese goods found their way to Europe in very early times; and some degree of commerce is still maintained across the deserts and mountains.

The early peoples bringing Chinese civilization undoubtedly came from western Asia, passing along the Tarim Basin or through the Dzungaria pass north of the Tian Shan, thence along the northern edge of the Nan Shan to the valleys of the Wei-Ho and the Hwang-Ho. This is the easiest of the routes between the East and West and has long been the line of a small caravan trade. It is very long, however, the distance from Kan-su province to the plains of Turkestan being 2,500 to 3,000 miles and it traverses a high, cold, desert region.

From Pekin northward a long but easy pass leads through Kalgan to the Mongolian plateau, 5,000 feet above sea level; and followed now by the recently completed railroad to Kalgan. Here begin two long caravan routes to Siberia, one leading to the Lake Baikal district, crossing the high desert; the other, after crossing a rough and sandy region for more than a thousand miles, passes north of the Altai mountains and reaches the headwaters of the Irtysh River in Siberia through a snow-covered pass 8,000 feet high.

Connection with Tibet and Burma in the southwest is maintained through very high and difficult passes. From Cheng-tu, the capital of Sze-chuan, a trade route leads to Lhasa in Tibet over three mountain passes, up to 10,000 feet in height; and from Kan-su province, a still more difficult route reaches the same destination over passes as high as 16,000 feet. From Lhasa a high, but not so difficult, way leads into India.

Between Yun-nan and Burma a high and deeply dissected plateau, fever-infested, makes progress very difficult. The valleys are cut in this plateau from 3,000 to 4,000 feet below the general level of the region and extend north and south across the line of travel, but a trade route, possible only for pack-laden coolies, crosses from Yun-nan to the Irawadi, in Burma. In Burma, a railroad now extends toward China for 150 miles northeast of Mandalay, and it has been proposed that this line be extended connecting Yun-nan with Burma. The physical difficulties in the way of such a road, while probably not insurmountable, are exceedingly great, and would involve an enormous expenditure. The construction of such a railroad is probably very far in the future. The only way that these highlands of southwest China are less effective than the rest of the land barriers lies in the fact that they are narrower and a trade route here would connect the two most densely populated regions of Asia and furnish an outlet of China's wealth into Indian ports. But even modern engineering skill hesitates to assume the task that would be involved in constructing a railroad on this high and deeply dissected plateau. Political reasons only, if any, will have weight in bringing about its construction.

II. Physical Features and Resources

Surface Form—Mountains.—China is essentially a mountainous country, rough, rugged and high. It consists for the most part

of ancient crystalline and sedimentary rocks that have been faulted, folded and worn down by the forces of erosion, only to be again uplifted or deformed and dissected by the streams into valleys, deep, steep-sided and narrow. Only where recent deposits of wind- or water-borne silt have filled up the irregularities of the surface are level areas to be found, as in the loess-filled valleys of the northern provinces or in the delta deposits at the mouths of the rivers. Less than one-fifth of the area of China is under 1,000 ft. in altitude, and most of this is in the great delta plains of the east and north-east. The average elevation is estimated at 1,500 ft., as compared to 500 ft. for the United States, and 300 ft. for Great Britain.

The northern and western edges of China are in the high plateaus and mountains of central Asia. Two-thirds of the great province of Sze-chuan comprises the inaccessible mountains, bordering on Tibet, and reaches altitudes of from 10,000 to over 16,000 ft. Much of Yun-nan and Kan-su are likewise situated, while the northern portions of all the northern provinces lie on the high edge of the Mongolian plateau.

The descent from these highest plateaus to the south and east is often abrupt, the line of separation being in many cases great fault escarpments. But instead of leading down to low plains the descent generally is to a rugged plateau and mountainous region, from 1,500 to 6,000 feet in height, which covers the remainder of the area of China to the very ocean's edge, except where interrupted by the delta plains of the Hwang-ho and Yangtze.

Plains.—The Great Plain of the northeast, forming a great half circle with the Shan-tung peninsula at its center, and the extensive flood plains of the lower Yangtze constitute the only large plain areas in China. Though large in themselves, these plains occupy scarcely one-eighth of China's surface. Elsewhere only narrow flood plains or small deltas relieve the usual monotony of slope and mountain ridge. The northern or Great Plain consists for the most part of the fertile Hwang-ho delta, reaching inland for 400 miles. North of this delta the plain is of marine origin, covered with alluvium from the mountain streams. The Yangtze plains extend inland in a series of silt-filled basins for 600 miles, separated from each other and from the northern Great Plain by ranges of hills and mountains. These two plains coalesce, however, in the east, so that a continuous wide plain extends from

Hang-chow to Peking, a distance of about 750 miles. Ichang, at the head of the Yangtze plains, 1,000 miles up the river, is but 130 feet above sea-level.

Low and flat, these plains are covered with many large lakes and swamps. The rivers, flowing across them in beds higher than the level of the plains, are held in by great embankments, sixty feet high in places, but subject to frequent overflows in time of flood that cause enormous losses to life and property. But the soil is rich and inexhaustible, the surface easily tilled and well watered and capable of yielding enormous crops. These extensive plains, equal in area to the combined states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Kentucky, constitute the great agricultural resource of China. They now support an enormous population, fully forty per cent of China's total, though constituting but one-eighth of its area, and furnish foods and raw materials for export. Control of the devastating flows would enormously increase their wealth-producing ability.

Climate.—Although occupying a latitude corresponding to that between New York and Santiago de Cuba, China has a climate with a lower average temperature and greater seasonal extremes than are found in these same latitudes in America. High altitude, combined with close proximity to the extensive high plateaus of central Asia, with their great extremes of heat and cold, largely account for these conditions. Frosts occur in practically all parts of China, and snow occasionally falls even in Canton, within the tropics. Everywhere there is a distinct change from summer to winter, much less marked in the central and southern provinces, which are without great temperature extremes, but very decided in the north, where the winters are long and severe and the summers warm.

Under the influence of the monsoons China has an abundant summer rainfall. Although decreasing in amount in the west and north, no section has less than twenty inches of annual rain, most of which falls during the growing season, when it is of greatest benefit to agriculture.

Geographic Divisions.—China may be conveniently divided, for purposes of regional study, into three divisions—northern, central and southern China—partly on the basis of physical features, partly because of climatic differences. Northern China is occupied by the

drainage basin of the Hwang-ho, and is separated from central China by the high and inaccessible Tien-shan in the west, and the lower mountains which continue the divide eastward nearly to the coast. Central China corresponds in general to the basin of the Yangtze, while southern China occupies the wide, mountainous plateau that stretches in a wide belt across all of southern China, and which is drained in its northern part by the Si Kiang. Many intersecting mountain ridges divide all these divisions into smaller, well-defined sub-divisions.

Northern China.—The western and northern parts of this section consist of high plateaus, sloping south and east and crossed by deep gorges. In a great semi-circle around the base of the plateau rise the mountains of southern Shen-si and eastern Shan-si, in a northward and westward facing fault escarpment over 4,000 feet high, inclosing the basins of the Wei-Ho and Fon-Ho, and forming a barrier of the first magnitude to the descent from the high plateau. This barrier is broken through only by the Hwang-Ho when it abruptly turns to the east in a narrow, unnavigable gorge that offers very limited connection between the interior valley of the Wei-Ho and the Great Plain. East of these mountains extends the Great Plain, followed by, and partially surrounding, the dissected mountain mass of Shan-tung.

In spite of this variety in surface form, northern China possesses many features in common. It is distinct from the rest of the country in climate, soil, agricultural productions and people.

Climate.—In this northern section are the greatest extremes in temperature to be found in China, less marked in the Shan-tung region, most decided in the extreme north and west. Winters are cold, rivers are frozen over for several weeks, cold west gales sweep over the plains, and agricultural activities cease. Temperatures of 5 degrees below zero (F.) have been recorded in Peking, while the January mean is 23 degrees. The summers, however, are warm, the July average being 79 degrees, with recorded extremes of 105 degrees. But the rains are less than in central and southern China. The annual rainfall of the Shan-tung peninsula and of Peking is about 24 inches. The northern provinces are in the boundary zone separating the humid monsoon regions from the arid interior, and a slight decrease in the annual rainfall or delay in the coming of the summer monsoons, may bring failure in crops and famine.

These crop failures in the western province seem to be increasing in number and severity, due in part, at least, to the fact that the mountains, completely deprived of their forest covering, are no longer able to hold the moisture. The mountains are characteristically bare, brown and gashed with soil-destroying gullies.

Soil.—The most important resource of this northern basin is the loess soils, known to the Chinese as "Hwang-tu," or "yellow earth." Loess deposits occupy most of the Great Plain of eastern China, but in the mountains it occurs for the most part only in valleys or isolated basins. Sometimes it is found high up on the mountains.

Sorted and transported repeatedly and alternately by winds and waters, the material (the rock-waste from which loess is formed) came to consist in great part of fine dust, the loess, which both agents could carry in largest amount; but this was always mingled, as it is now, with some coarser sand and gravel introduced by flood waters. Beyond desert basins, the path along which the Huang-tu was distributed was chiefly down the valleys of a previous physiographic epoch, as it is now down the valleys of the present far more mountainous surface. It was deposited on flood-plains and in lake basins. The lighter portions of it were blown out onto mountain slopes and gathered beneath wind eddies or in sheltered hollows. In course of distribution it became thoroughly decomposed and oxidized; and where it accumulated and was exposed to subaerial conditions it acquired vertical cleavage, a secondary characteristic due to gravity and movement of ground waters, and became charged with salts brought in by such waters. The process of transportation and accumulation are in progress now and are believed to have been similar in past ages.³

Streams and roads have often cut deeply into the thick loess deposits, and, bare of forests, it is being rapidly carried away by the forces of erosion. Original level surfaces are, therefore, now often rugged, and not easily tilled.

Its indestructible fertility is dependent upon a sufficient water supply, and its surface being above the level of the streams is incapable of irrigation. With increasing forest destruction and possible decrease in rainfall, crop failures and famines have become more common, even in the loess-covered provinces.⁴

Agriculture.—Agriculture is largely restricted in the mountainous sections to isolated loess-filled basins. The Wei-ho and Fon-Ho valleys are rich in agricultural resources and support a dense popu-

³ Willis, Bailey. "Research in China," pp. 184-5.

⁴ Little, A. "The Far East," p. 26.

lation, but it is the Great Plain, with its loess-covered soils, level surface and summer rains, that forms the chief crop-growing region. Most of the mountain provinces can barely supply the needs of their own people, and are thinly populated, but the Great Plain has food to spare beyond the needs of its own exceedingly dense population.

Lower temperatures and rainfall give northern China a distinct type of agricultural productions. Rice is not grown to any extent north of the dividing ranges. Some is grown in the milder and moister southern Shan-tung province and northern Kiang-su, but it is not the staple crop. The chief food crops are barley, wheat, millet, maize, peas, beans and fruit. Opium is extensively grown in all the provinces, but especially in the mountainous ones of the north and west, where, because of the ease of marketing a crop of high value and little bulk it serves the most satisfactory money crop for the isolated mountain-valley farmers. It answers the same purpose that whisky did in the early days in western Pennsylvania.⁵ Cotton, hemp and tobacco are grown to a considerable extent, and, especially in the eastern provinces, silk. Considerable grazing is carried on in the mountains of Shan-tung and Chi-li.

Short seasons restrict agriculture to one crop per year in most of northern China. In a limited area of the Wei valley two crops are grown, and also in the extreme southern part of the Great Plain.

People.—The isolated position of Shen-si, Kan-su and Shan-si largely accounts for the strong anti-foreign spirit of their peoples: their conservatism, ignorance and fanaticism. The Boxer troubles of 1900 had their strongest support in these provinces, and here the outrages against foreigners were most marked. Here at Si-nan, in the isolated valley of the Wei, the Imperial court sought refuge. In the present revolution outrages against foreigners have been frequently reported from here, while in other sections there has been comparatively little molestation of strangers.

The people of northern China are larger and more sturdy and robust than the people of the south. This is largely due, probably, to the frequent invasions of the sturdier northern races into this section, and their absorption by the Chinese. But the dry, cool and invigorating climate has undoubtedly also contributed to this superior physical robustness.

⁵ Ross, E. A. "The Changing Chinese," p. 150.

The early civilization of China was long confined to this region, after entering the valley of the Wei. The mountain borders on the south prevented migration in that direction, and the fertile soils of Shan-si and the Great Plain drew them to the east. Crossing the plain to the higher peninsula of Shan-tung, with its many fertile valleys and mild and more equable climate, the growing race here "attained its highest development, and produced, in the seventh and sixth centuries before our era a school of philosophers worthy to rank with their contemporaries in the West—in India and in Greece."⁶

Central China. The Yangtze Valley.—The southern boundary of this division is not well defined. Many of the southern tributaries of the Yangtze penetrate far into the plateau of southern China, while in the west, in Yun-nan, this plateau is crossed by the Yangtze itself.

The Yangtze Valley is often compared to the Mississippi. The comparison holds to only a limited extent, and fails in many important particulars. Both in length and volume of water the two rivers are comparable, both open up the heart of a great country, both present many of the same problems of control and navigation. But while the Mississippi River and its tributaries flow practically throughout their whole extent across great plains, the Yangtze flows across mountains and plateaus, and two-thirds of its course is in deep gorges, in which the valley is scarcely wider than the stream bed.⁷

Leaving the high plateaus, the Yangtze flows in a deep gorge along the southern edge of the Red Basin, and not until it leaves the gorges at Ichang, at the beginning of the lower third of its course, does it enter a valley plain, and this plain is comparatively narrow, and hemmed in by mountains. It consists of three silt-filled basins, together with the present delta, swamp and lake covered, and subject to destructive floods. Although covering a somewhat larger area, these plains are comparable only to the Mississippi flood plain and delta.

The Mississippi Valley occupies a single great plain in which communication is easy by land as well as by water, and in which no section is separated by natural barriers from other sections. The

⁶ Little, A. "The Far East," p. 23.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

Yangtze Valley is divided into three main divisions, separated from each other by effective barriers: 1. The alluvial plains, occupying the lower course of the river. 2. The Red Basin, separated by difficultly crossed mountains from the alluvial plains and other parts of China. The gorges of the Yangtze not only hinder navigation between these divisions, but are too narrow for roadways. Ten per cent of the junks attempting to go up the gorges are lost.⁸ 3. The high mountains and plateaus of western Sze-chuan, practically uninhabited, except in a few isolated inter-mountain valleys, and, except in minerals, making no contribution to China's wealth. A fourth isolated basin with rich soils is found in the upper course of the Han River, between the two high ranges of Tsin-ling and Ta-pa-shan.

Climate.—The climate of this central section is milder in temperature, and has a greater rainfall than the northern provinces. Terraced cultivation is, therefore, common. Rice is the chief food crop, while cotton, tea and silk come to be very important. Two to five crops are grown yearly where one crop is the rule in the north. The eastern provinces more resemble in the summer and winter changes of climate the northern provinces. In the mountain-protected Red Basin of Sze-chuan, the climate is distinctly sub-tropical. Frosts are unknown in the valleys. Fogs and cloud are so usual that the saying has become common that when the sun shines in Sze-chuan the dogs bark.⁹

Agriculture.—The Red Basin and the alluvial plains are both important agricultural sections. Both sections raise practically the same crops, rice being the staple. Tea, cotton and silk are also very important. Sugar, oranges and other sub-tropical products are raised in the Red Basin, as well as in the eastern provinces. In the mountains of the far west herds of sheep, goats and yak are found, while buffaloes and ponies are on the lower lands.

The Red Basin of Sze-chuan is a region of exceedingly fertile soil and a dense population, isolated from the rest of the country, and 1,500 miles in the interior of China. Containing an area of about 70,000 sq. miles of red sandstone, from which it derives its name, it is an anciently filled lake basin, which has been elevated and dissected by streams into a succession of steep slopes, deep

⁸ Manifold, C. C. "Recent Exploration and Economic Development in Central and Western China." *The Geographical Journal*, Vol. 23, p. 286.

⁹ Little, A., "The Far East," pp. 72, 123.

ravines and flat-topped hills. These hills are terraced to their very summits, and the fertile soil, abundant rains and mild climate produce several crops per year.

While all the basin is extremely fertile and to the patient Chinese yields abundant crops, the northwest corner contains one of the most remarkably fertile agricultural sections in the world. This is the plain of Cheng-tu, a drained and level lake basin, containing an area of about 2,800 sq. miles, but supporting a population of between 4,000,000 and 5,000,000 people—from 1,800 to 2,000 per sq. mile. A remarkable system of irrigation, begun 250 years, B.C., takes the turbid and turbulent waters of the Min River, spreads them over the plain in an intricate network of canals, and furnishes abundant water for irrigation and soil fertilization at the same time that it dissipates the otherwise destructive flood waters. From five to seven crops are said to be grown each year on this small area.¹⁰

People.—The population of Sze-chuan is about 60,000,000, a great part of whom are in the Red Basin, making this region one of the most densely populated regions in the world. Over-population results in appalling poverty, and there is considerable migration to the less densely inhabited provinces to the south.

In spite of its isolation, the people of Sze-chuan are progressive, quick to adopt western ways and ideas. Its capital, Cheng-tu, possesses many fine schools and public buildings, and is rapidly introducing modern improvements.¹¹

Southern China—Surface.—Except for the narrow valley bottoms and small deltas of its streams southern China is uniformly a high, dissected plateau and mountainous region. As here defined, it includes all the broad plateau south of the main Yangtze Valley, the southwestern province of Yun-nan, and the basin of the Si Kiang. Highest and most rugged in western Yun-nan, which is a part of the great Tibetan plateau, it maintains a general altitude from the base of this plateau to the ocean of from 2,000 to 5,000 feet. A few low passes allow communication between the Si-Kiang Valley, and the Yangtze, the most important of which, historically, the Mei-ling or Plum Tree Pass, north of Canton, is but 1,000 feet in altitude. One hundred miles east of this is a second

¹⁰ Ross, E. A., "The Changing Chinese," p. 302.

¹¹ Ross, E. A. *Ibid.*, p. 303.

pass, through which water connection between the two river systems is maintained by a short canal, and through which will go the proposed railroad from Han-kow to Canton.

Isolated in this mountainous region from the outside world and from each other, the inhabitants of southern China, except in the open and accessible region about Canton, are among the rudest and least educated in China. Here will be found many of the aboriginal Chinese people, maintaining their old customs, violently opposed to governmental control, turbulent, anti-foreign in feeling, constantly fomenting revolution and strife. Here the Tai-ping rebellion had its origin, and again and again these southern provinces have revolted against Manchu rule and foreign influences.

Climate.—Southern China, on account of its altitude, has a cool, sub-tropical climate. Winter frosts occur in practically the entire area, snow sometimes falling, though rarely, even in Canton, within the tropics. But winters are everywhere mild, even in the cooler sections of the west, while the influence of the sea gives the eastern provinces a still more equable climate, with tropical summers. Rainfall is abundant, falling throughout the year, but principally during the summer monsoons. Along the coast the annual average is eighty inches and over, decreasing to the west to forty inches and less.

Agriculture.—Adapted climatically for the growing of a wide range of temperate and sub-tropical crops, agriculture flourishes in the valley bottoms, and extensive hillside terracing has partly overcome the disadvantages of rugged surface. Most of the provinces, however, with difficulty produce food for their own people and this lack of agricultural resources has resulted in relatively sparse populations in many of the southern provinces. Kwang-si is the least densely populated province of China, about sixty-six to the square mile. On the other hand, Fokien, in spite of its inaccessible mountains, maintains a very dense population because of its rich soils, heavy rainfall and elaborate hillside terracing.

Rice is everywhere the most important crop, both east and west, and wheat, barley, maize, opium, tea, sugar cane, tobacco, silk, spices and fruits are almost universally grown. Tea, silk and cotton are grown most abundantly in the east; while opium, with grains, is the leading crop in the west. Grazing of ponies, mules, cattle and sheep is largely carried on in the western provinces,

which are adapted to agriculture only in a few small and isolated valleys.

Forest products and timber constitute an important source of wealth in the mountainous provinces between the Yangtze and Si-Kiang and in Yun-nan, for here preserved in the distant or difficultly accessible mountains, are practically all the forests that are left in China. Great rafts are floated down the rivers to Canton, Shanghai and Foo-chow. The forests are rapidly disappearing, and it is a matter of but a short time when these last remnants will have disappeared.

Agriculture must remain at a great disadvantage in southern China, although undoubtedly the western provinces, especially Yun-nan, are capable of great improvement. Emigration from other crowded provinces, especially Sze-chuan, to this region, is already taking place. In the east, however, especially in Fokien and Kwang-tung, the land is unable to support its over-crowded population, and emigrations in large numbers are taking place to the Straits Settlements and elsewhere.

Mineral Resources.—Lack of detailed information makes an account of the mineral resources of China unsatisfactory. Except in a few localities, trustworthy investigation of mineral deposits has not been made. That China is immensely rich in minerals, however, can be asserted with confidence. Its geologic history—the formation of its ancient rocks and their transformation into mountains—furnished the conditions favoring mineral deposition, while subsequent denudation and dissection of the mountain masses have made them accessible. There is no province in China that does not possess valuable minerals. Coal, iron and copper—the three minerals of greatest economic value to a modern nation—are especially abundant, while the minor metals—tin, lead, zinc, antimony, mercury, gold and silver—are known to occur in considerable quantities. Scientific surveys are almost sure to reveal mineral deposits now unknown even to the Chinese. The Chinese themselves have long mined their minerals in crude and primitive ways, but no attempt has been made to exploit the resources, even for supplying their own immediate needs. Although a coal and iron country, China is a large importer of both minerals, her exports of coal in 1905 being less than one per cent of her imports, and of iron, less than one-sixth of her imports. Copper also is imported to a considerable extent.

Coal.—Coal is found in varying amounts and qualities in all of the eighteen provinces, but the largest field is in northern China, the Shan-si field, occupying the province of that name, but extending into the neighboring provinces of Ho-nan, Chi-li, Shen-si, and even to Kan-su. Like most of the known coal deposits of China, this field is in carboniferous strata, the great coal-bearing formation practically of all the large coal fields of the world.

The oft-quoted estimates of Richthofen give this field an area of 30,000 sq. miles, consisting of beds twenty to thirty-six feet in thickness, the eastern half of anthracite coal, the western of bituminous, extending in horizontal strata across the Shen-si plateau, "sufficient to supply the whole world for thousands of years." According to these estimates, the anthracite deposits of Shan-si would be infinitely larger than those of Pennsylvania. Bailey Willis,¹² of the United States Geological Survey, however, in more recent researches in this region, raises the question of the horizontality of these coal-bearing rocks. If folded, as his observations indicate, the coal measures would occur only in "more or less restricted synclines" or down folds of the rock, somewhat as the coal occurs in eastern Pennsylvania, and the amount of coal estimated by Richthofen, on the basis of the beds being level and undisturbed, would be very greatly reduced. Until further investigations are made, the amount of coal must remain unknown. Though very large they are probably much less than originally estimated.

Upraised from 2,000 to 3,000 feet, these coal measures outcrop around the eastern edge of the Shan-si plateau, allowing mining into the side of the plateau, and furnishing easy means of transportation to and across the plains at its base. Two railroads already extend from the main Pekin-Hankow Railroad westward into this field—one to central Shen-si, the other to northern Ho-nan. In 1906, Shan-si produced 3,000,000 tons of coal.¹³

Near Pekin occur several small coal fields, accessible both by railroad and by sea that have been quite extensively worked for several years by modern methods. Coal here is both bituminous and anthracite. These fields produced in 1906 2,200,000 tons of coal. In 1910 the first cargo of coal and coke from one of these fields was shipped to San Francisco in the attempt to create a market for Chinese coal on the western coast of America.

¹² Willis, Bailey. "Research in China," p. 175.

¹³ Estimate by Prof. Drake, Imperial University of Tien-tsin. Quotation in *Scientific American*, vol. 99, p. 286.

The Shan-tung peninsula contains several small coal fields that are now being operated by modern mining methods. Coal here is of rather poor quality, friable and smoky.

Next in importance to the Shan-si coal field are the fields of southern China, centering in Hu-nan. The coal fields of Hu-nan are said to cover 21,000 square miles, and consist of coking and non-coking bituminous and of anthracite. Coal from the numerous native workings and from government coal mines is readily transported by barge to the Yangtze, to Han-kow and, especially the anthracite, to Shanghai. Four to five million tons, mostly anthracite, are reported to be sent from this province to Hupeh annually.¹⁴ In eastern Kiang-si coal is now mined for supplying the government iron works at Han-kow. Coal and coke are taken by railroad from the fields seventy miles westward, to barges on the Siang River, and thence to Han-kow. In quality the coal of this region appears to be much inferior to that of Shan-si, and very much less in amount.

The populous province of Sze-chuan is underlaid by coal. The coal is exposed in the gorges of the Yangtze, and its affluents, where these cut through the cross ranges. It, as well as iron, is largely mined through adits run into the mountain side, in the primitive but effectual Chinese way, and forms the staple fuel of the country.¹⁵ It is used only by the natives, however. Steamers on the Yangtze are supplied with Japanese coal.

Yun-nan, Kwei-chow and Kwang-tung contain scattered coal fields of unknown amounts, as also the hills in southern Ngan-hwei, and, in small amounts, all the other provinces.

Iron.—Like coal, iron is widely distributed, and often occurs closely associated with coal. Shan-si contains abundant deposits in the coal fields, and has long been smelted by the natives in crucibles in open furnaces. This region supplies nearly the whole of north China with the iron required for agriculture and domestic use,¹⁶ and the total amount smelted in the crude Chinese furnaces is probably very large. The coal fields of Shan-si are underlaid with limestone. Thus there are provided in large quantities in this one province the three raw materials necessary for the smelting of iron.

The provinces of Ho-nan and Kiang-si are rich in iron ores in

¹⁴ Broomhall, M., "The Chinese Empire," p. 173.

¹⁵ Little, A., "The Far East," p. 67.

¹⁶ *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1910), article, "China."

close proximity to coal. In southern Ho-nan excellent steel is made and exported, while ore is carried to the government steel works at Han-kow by barge. Already iron ore and pig iron have been shipped from the Han-kow district to the United States, while regular shipments are sent to Japan. The iron ores of this district are made easily accessible because of the navigable Yangtze and its tributaries.

Sze-chuan, Yun-nan, Shan-tung and Kwang-tung likewise are rich in iron, and furnish most of the iron locally used.

Copper and the Minor Metals.—With the exception of iron, the metallic minerals occur most abundantly in the southern plateau, especially in the western half, practically all the metals of economic importance being found here. Very little modern development has yet taken place, but the primitive Chinese methods are producing a considerable quantity. The mineral resources of southern China will probably come to be its greatest source of wealth.

Copper is found to be especially rich in Yun-nan and Kweichow, and considerable mining is there done to secure the metal for coining the Chinese "cash." Tin is also abundant and, in spite of primitive mining methods and long distances from the coast, there was exported from China in 1910 over 4,500 long tons of the metal.

Antimony seems to be very abundant in Hu-nan and Kwang-si, and already a considerable export—8,000 tons of the metal—is sent from this section. Mercury is the chief source of revenue for Kweichow, which contains probably the richest fields of this metal in the world. Lead and zinc are very common in most of the southern provinces. Silver and gold are widely distributed, although the production of the latter, almost entirely by washing river gravels, is small. On the Han River the flood gravels of each summer are carefully washed for their small content of placer gold brought down from the mountains. The little explored mountains of western Sze-chuan and Yun-nan are thought to contain many and rich mineral deposits.

Non-Metals.—Kaolin deposits have furnished the basis of an important and characteristic Chinese industry. Northeastern Kiang-si contains the largest and best-known deposits, and furnishes material for the pottery industry that has grown up there, supplying the rice bowls that are used everywhere in China. King-to-chen, the center of the industry, at present has one hundred and

sixty furnaces, and employs 160,000 people. Before the Taiping rebellion (1850) a million people were employed.¹⁷

Petroleum and natural gas are found in Sze-chuan. For 2,000 years natural gas has been used to evaporate salt in this province.¹⁸ Salt is a very important product in many parts of China. Along the coast it is evaporated from sea water; in Shan-si, from a salt lake, while in Sze-chuan and Yun-nan it is secured from brine wells.

China is now, and for forty centuries has been, an agricultural nation. Much of her mountainous surface, naturally ill-adapted to cultivation, has been transformed by a stupendous amount of human labor into food-producing, fertile fields. To the minerals hoarded in these mountains she has paid little attention, never dreaming of the vast potential wealth locked far beneath her soils, awaiting but the magic touch of modern industry to release it. To her present agricultural industries these resources of coal and metals, once developed, will supply new raw materials and mechanical power, which ultimately will make possible, in the hands of her enormous population, the development of a manufacturing industry of almost inconceivable magnitude, and will lay the foundation of a world-wide commerce.

¹⁷ Richards, "Comprehensive Geography of the Chinese Empire," p. 144.

¹⁸ King, F. H., "Farmers of Forty Centuries," p. 138.

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AMERICAN COMMERCIAL INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA

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The three Eastern Provinces of the Chinese Empire, collectively known as Manchuria, have a combined area of about 363,610 square miles, and a population variously estimated at from fifteen to twenty-five millions.¹ They are remarkably rich, both in agricultural products and in minerals. The soil, with the aid of an abundant and fairly uniform rainfall, produces heavy crops of beans and grain year after year, without showing signs of depletion; while underground there are immense deposits, as yet unexploited, of gold, silver, copper, lead, and coal. The population consists largely of immigrants, who are coming to Manchuria in great numbers from the less fertile provinces of the empire.² These are more progressive and less opposed to foreigners than the people of many other parts of China; and because of this fact, and also because of the greater per capita wealth due to the richness of the land, Manchuria offers an unusually favorable market for foreign products. In the year 1910, although the provinces were just beginning to recover from the destructive war recently fought within their limits, the total volume of their trade amounted to \$110,000,000.

This great commercial activity is partly due to the fact that there is no other part of the Chinese Empire so accessible to foreign enterprise. Most of the important cities have been opened to foreign trade, and an extensive railway system, combined with four large navigable rivers,³ has afforded transportation such as is unknown in the other provinces. Until 1808, Newchwang, opened to trade in 1864, was the only port of entry for foreign

¹ The names of the provinces, together with the estimated population of each, as given in the *Statesman's Year Book for 1911*, are: Shenking, 10,312,241; Kirin, 6,000,000; and Heilung-Chiang, 1,500,000.

² A recent report from the United States Consul at Harbin states that a government committee, in a two weeks' session at Harbin, sold 40,000 small farms in Heilung-Chiang Province to immigrants, at a total cost to the purchaser of \$2.22 per acre.

³ The Amur, the Sungari, the Yalu, and the Liao.

commerce in Manchuria, although a certain amount of foreign goods came into the country over the Trans-Siberian Railroad in the North. From Newchwang, merchandise was sent into the interior by means of junks on the Liao River, or overland by cart. In 1898, Russia opened the port of Dalny, within her leased territory of Liaotung, but in spite of constant efforts to divert trade to the new port, Newchwang still retained its commercial leadership. In 1901, the Chinese Eastern Railway, built by Russia, was opened to traffic, connecting these two ports in the South with the Trans-Siberian system and with the cities of the interior. The Treaty of Portsmouth gave the southern section of this line, now called the Southern Manchurian Railway, to the Japanese, who rebuilt it and replaced the old Russian wide gauge by standard gauge, thus making it necessary to transship freight at Changchun, the point of division. Since the war, also, a great number of new ports have been opened, and Japan has built a railroad connecting Mukden, on the Southern Manchurian line, with Antung and the Korean Railway. China herself is building a railroad from Changchun to Kirin, which will draw traffic from a large section at present inaccessible.⁴

In spite of these improvements in commercial facilities, trade in this section of China is by no means free from certain disadvantages which have hampered business elsewhere in the empire. The most serious of these is the appalling chaos of the currency system. This cannot be described here, but the state of affairs can be imagined from the statement that there are generally at least a dozen forms of money circulating at each port, and that these vary considerably from month to month in their rate of exchange, not only in regard to gold, but also in regard to each other. Such a condition adds a gambling element to the most conservative business. Recently, on account of pressure from the United States and other powers, steps have been taken towards the adoption of a uniform currency throughout the empire, and a substantial improvement is looked for in the next few years. Another hindrance to trade is the tariff system. Likin, or transportation, dues are levied on merchandise at every point where it is possible to establish a barrier, and the resulting expense and annoy-

⁴ According to the Daily Consular Reports for Nov. 18, 1911, the Antung-Mukden line was to have been open to traffic about Nov. 3, 1911, and the Changchun-Kirin line by the end of 1912.

ance burden commerce considerably. The payment of a $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent ad valorem surtax at the maritime customs house is supposed legally to free foreign goods from these dues, but the transit passes secured in this way are often not respected in the interior.⁵

Nevertheless, on account of the improvement of trade routes and the opening up of the country, there has in recent years been a great development both of the export and of the import trade of Manchuria. The principal exports are beans, bean-cake and bean-oil, produced mostly in the two southern provinces. Since the Chino-Japanese war of 1894-5, Japan has bought practically all of Manchuria's bean crop, and her control of the export trade has been an important factor in the competition for the import trade. Recently, small shipments of beans and bean-oil have been made to Europe, and European firms in the Orient hope to increase these to offset Japan's advantage.⁶ In the northern section much grain is produced, which is for the most part consumed locally. The neighboring Russian-Siberian provinces, however, are dependent on this section for flour, grain and wheat, and as they develop by colonization, Northern Manchuria is certain to become more and more prosperous. Other leading items in the export trade are lumber, wild silk, and minerals. The lumber is cut under Japanese direction from the forests on the Yalu River. The wild silk industry is chiefly in southeastern Shengking. The vast mineral resources of the country are as yet comparatively undeveloped, although there is an average annual output of about \$10,000,000 in value from the gold, silver, copper, lead and iron mines,⁷ which are operated chiefly by the natives, and a large amount of coal is taken from the Japanese mines at Fushun, for use on the railroad and on steamers.

The import trade covers a wide range of articles, but there are certain great staples which have always formed the bulk of foreign shipments to this region. The most important of these are manufactures of cotton, which exceed in value all other foreign imports put together. Other items are kerosene, which is more

⁵ See Monthly Consular Reports, No. 300, p. 93.

⁶ In 1910, the total exports of bean products through Vladivostok, Dairen (Dalny), and Newchwang were: Beans, 920,266 tons (average price \$14.50 per ton); bean-cake, 516,160 tons; bean-oil, 40,124 tons. In 1909, of \$13,926,522 total foreign exports at Dalny, bean products accounted for \$12,884,043. Exports to Japan were \$8,302,533.

⁷ Monthly Consular Reports, No. 319, p. 69.

and more widely used, lumber and tobacco.⁸ Flour, brought from the United States, once stood high in the list, but the great output of the mills in Northern Manchuria, which can grind the native wheat and sell it at a price which no foreign flour can touch, has driven out the American product. At present, there is a promising but as yet undeveloped market for machinery of all kinds, especially for modern agricultural implements, which could be used to good advantage on the rather large farms of the region. These goods must be sold by native dealers in native stores, and the primary consideration which determines the popularity of an article is its cheapness. The better grades of Western manufactures find a market only among the small European element, while inferior goods, produced by cheap Oriental labor, and sold at a low price, are readily accepted. The Chinese are, however, good judges of quality, and are ready to pay better prices for superior goods if they can afford to, so that as the country develops there will undoubtedly be an increasing demand for first-class products.

Before the Russo-Japanese war, Manchuria imported more goods from the United States than from any other foreign country, and American imports at Newchwang between 1900 and 1904 amounted to about five million dollars annually.⁹ By far the most important commodities in this trade were cotton piece goods. In 1901, out of a total of \$24,813,692 native and foreign imports at Newchwang, \$14,660,000 represented cotton products, and of this about one-third was native Chinese textiles, one-third American piece goods, and the rest chiefly imports of yarn from India, Great Britain, Japan, and China. In 1902, about thirty-five per cent of the total foreign imports at Newchwang came from the United States, and the greater part of this was cotton goods. In 1903, the total foreign imports were \$13,314,012, and America's share was \$5,562,255, of which \$4,873,960 was cotton goods. These figures will suffice to show the position held by the United States in former years in regard to the most important import of Man-

⁸ Imports of tobacco, especially in the form of cigarettes, have increased immensely within the last few years, probably because of the curtailment of the supply of opium.

⁹ The figures given here are taken from the reports of United States Consuls, who secured them from the reports of the Native and Imperial Maritime Customs. As there has been almost no period since 1900 when there have been customs houses at all the ports of entry in Manchuria, such statistics must be considered rather as comparative than as exact.

churia.¹⁰ The balance of the goods from America consisted chiefly of flour and kerosene, for each of which Manchuria offered a very important and continually expanding market.

Between 1901 and 1904, American commerce suffered considerably from the policy of Russia. This power had always exercised great influence in Manchuria, and she had, under various pretexts, finally established a measure of military control over the provinces. When she leased the Liaotung Peninsula in 1898, and opened Dalny as a free port, she blocked the establishment of a Chinese customs house there until July, 1903. In 1901, as a result of the Boxer uprising, she occupied Newchwang. The same year, the Chinese Eastern Railway was opened to traffic, under her control. By discrimination in rates, and by preventing the collection of customs duties at Dalny, she attempted to divert to that port, where her own merchants were established, the trade formerly enjoyed by Newchwang, which was the base of the commerce carried on in Manchuria by other foreign countries. She also took measures to increase her own imports to the provinces. Fourteen steamers, subsidized to the amount of \$309,000 annually,¹¹ were put in operation between European Russia and Vladivostok, Port Arthur and Dalny; and the Russo-Chinese Bank advanced large sums to Chinese merchants for the purchase of Russian goods. The same bank established a commercial branch to sell Russian oil and sugar. While other foreigners were still excluded from the interior, Russian subjects were to be found everywhere, building flour mills, meat packing establishments, and factories, opening mines, and selling Russian goods. Harbin, founded by the railroad company in 1896, had a European population of 60,000 in 1904, and other Russian settlements increased rapidly in size.

This policy, however, was not entirely successful. Russian trade was stimulated, but it by no means drove out that of other nations. American cotton goods were imported in as great quantities as before, although the Russian government was exerting every effort to supplant them by the product of Russian mills, and the volume of American trade thus remained nearly the same. Nevertheless, because of the competition of Russian oil imported

¹⁰ In addition to the trade at Newchwang, there was also a certain amount at Dalny, but no statistics are available for this because the customs house was not established there until July, 1903.

¹¹ U. S. Consular Reports, Vol. 73, p. 40.

duty free at Dalny and carried at low rates on the railroad, the importation of American kerosene at Newchwang fell from 3,172,000 gallons in 1901, to 603,180 gallons in 1902; and American flour was almost driven from the market by the product of the Russian mills near Harbin. But these articles made up only a small part of the total trade. Russia's control of the railroad was not so great an advantage as it seemed, since the cost of transporting bulky freight on it was prohibitive, and thus it was not nearly so effective a means of distribution in the interior as were the junks on the Liao River at Newchwang. It had already become evident that Russia could not hope to monopolize the commerce of Manchuria without a more serious disregard of the "open door" than she had yet shown, when the war with Japan drove her out of the southern province and confined her influence to the sparsely settled North.

After the restoration of peace, American trade in Manchuria seemed to have a clear field. The subsidized Russian lines to Port Arthur and Dalny had disappeared, and the disorganized condition of the country had caused the flour mills in the North to close, so that American flour was in greater demand than ever before. American kerosene was in full control of the market, and American cotton goods seemed to have no important competitor, for over \$9,000,000 worth were imported into Manchuria in the year 1905. The year after the war was one of unprecedented commercial activity. There followed, however, a period of depression. Foreign imports at Newchwang decreased by one-half in 1906, and decreased further in 1907. This was due partly to the fact that Dalny was again without a customs house, but chiefly to the disastrous effects of the war on the interior. In 1908, a healthy revival set in, and the total imports increased steadily throughout Manchuria, especially with the opening of Antung, Mukden, and the important cities of the North. American trade, however, improved but little and soon began to fall off. In 1908 and 1909, American consuls reported serious decreases in the amount of goods coming from the United States. In 1910, our imports had fallen to a comparatively insignificant figure, and our trade in cotton goods, that is, the great bulk of all our trade, had largely passed into foreign hands. Our position of leadership in the Manchurian market was lost.

The nation which almost alone profited by this immense decline

in American trade was Japan. In order to explain the great commercial advance of this power in Manchuria, it is necessary to sketch briefly the history of her systematic attempts to secure markets there for her products.

In the first place, Japan's geographical location gives her a decided advantage over Western nations competing with her for Manchurian trade. She is far nearer to China than any of her rivals, and is thus able to maintain regular, efficient, and cheap transportation with all of the ports in Shenking Province and with Vladivostok, where many goods are imported for use in the North. Her ownership of Korea makes it possible for her to send quick freight from Tokio to Harbin almost all the way by rail, over the Korean railroad and the Antung-Mukden line. She has a further advantage in her practical monopoly of the foreign export trade of the provinces, since a firm in China which does not do exporting as well as importing is exposed to serious financial difficulties from the variations in the rate of exchange.

Japan has not only made the most of her natural advantages in order to secure for herself the trade of Manchuria, but she has also taken extraordinary measures to assist her exporters. She had always enjoyed the greater part of the shipping and a fair share of the commerce of the provinces, but even before her war with Russia ended, it became evident that she intended to take advantage of her military occupation of the country to establish her trade still more firmly.¹² Great quantities of goods were sent into the interior, and after the conclusion of peace, the transports which carried the army home made their return trips profitable by bringing thousands of immigrants, who established themselves everywhere as farmers and merchants. While these merchants were doing an excellent business, foreign traders were rigorously excluded from the interior on the ground that military secrets were involved.¹³ It was asserted that the Japanese, supported by their troops, refused to pay the likin dues to which the goods of other nationalities were subjected, and further that they seized all of the desirable land in the cities which, according to treaty pro-

¹² See the report of Special Agent Crist, in *Monthly Consular Reports*, No. 301.

¹³ The United States Foreign Relations for 1906 record numerous complaints from American merchants who were not allowed to go into the interior to look after their property and interests.

visions, were soon to be opened to foreign trade.¹⁴ All concessions obtained or claimed by the Russians were taken over by the Japanese as a matter of course. In the summer of 1906, a great industrial and commercial exposition was held at Mukden to promote interest in Japanese products, and similar expositions were subsequently organized in other cities. Great quantities of Japanese goods were brought in duty-free at Dalny and over the Korean boundary, while other foreign goods were going through the customs house at Newchwang.¹⁵ These conditions were ameliorated with the gradual opening of the interior in 1906 and 1907, and comparative equality of opportunity was again restored when customs houses at Dalny, Antung and Tatungkou, ports which had formerly been under Japanese control, were established on July 1, 1907.

Equality of opportunity, however, could not be said to exist. Japan still retained control of the railroad, and, to a certain extent, of the financial system. By means of the railroad, she attempted to divert the trade of Newchwang to Dalny, or Dairen, as it is now officially called, by discriminatory rates, much as Russia had done. This policy has undoubtedly increased the commercial importance of the latter, although the former is still the chief port of entry. Japan also retained a certain amount of control over the currency of the provinces, which gave her banks an opportunity practically to regulate the rate of exchange. During the war with Russia, Manchuria had been flooded with Japanese "war notes," which were called in after the conclusion of peace and exchanged for notes issued by the Yokahama Specie Bank. These made up a large part of the currency, especially in Shenking, and were naturally a great aid in establishing a strong Japanese banking system.

When Manchuria was finally re-opened to foreign trade, Japanese products had secured a firm footing in the interior. Foreign merchants believed that this would be lost with the removal of the extraordinary advantages conferred by military occupation, but it soon became evident that even with the "open door" Japan was now a very dangerous competitor. The imperial government

¹⁴ In 1906, the Chinese government had great difficulty in finding a site for the customs house at Antung, because the Japanese had taken possession of all of the land on the river front. See *Foreign Relations for 1906*, p. 221.

¹⁵ In 1907, it was estimated that Japanese imports to Manchuria in 1906 amounted to over \$12,000,000, of which less than \$1,500,000 paid duty at Newchwang.

and the great business interests of the country united in a systematic attempt to get control of the import as well as the export trade of Japan's new "sphere of influence," as a part of their general scheme for national economic and industrial development. The liberal and progressive element, which was in complete political control after leading the nation to victory over Russia, extended the time-honored system of economic paternalism and did every thing in its power to promote the national industrial prosperity. The railways were already owned by the government, and the steamship lines were controlled through large subsidies. Manufactures were encouraged, and where an industry was injured by competition a trust was formed and placed under government supervision. For the surplus manufacturing products, and especially for those of the cotton mills, Manchuria offered an excellent outlet, if the United States could only be ousted from its commercial leadership there. The government and the manufacturers accordingly turned their attention to this task.

On May 30, 1906, the *Jiji Shimpō* announced that several large Japanese spinning and weaving companies had united in the Manchurian Export Gild, to advance their common interests and to export their goods under a common trade-mark. The Mitsui Bussan Kaisha, the leading commercial house of Japan, was to act as the general agent of this gild in Manchuria, and the Yokohama Specie Bank and other institutions were to loan money at 4½ per cent to merchants doing business there to enable them to purchase Japanese goods. The government guaranteed these loans, and also secured favorable rates on the railroads and on the subsidized steamship lines. In Manchuria itself, permanent representatives were appointed at all important towns, and travelling salesmen, well equipped with samples of goods and speaking Chinese fluently, were sent throughout the country. The consuls in the Eastern Provinces offered every possible assistance, and the manufacturers at home carefully followed their suggestions. In addition, commercial students, paid by the government, and under the direction of the nearest consul, studied the trade conditions in each locality, and their reports enabled the export houses to work more intelligently than was possible for those of other nations. In Japan itself, the mills steadily endeavored to improve the quality of their output, which was at first of a very inferior grade, and finally

succeeded in making it nearly as good as, while far cheaper than, similar Western products.

This policy has met with remarkable success. In spite of the ingrained respect of Chinese merchants for long established trade-marks, and in spite of the intense unpopularity of Japanese goods caused by the dispute over the seizure of the steamer *Tatsu Maru* in 1908, and by the resentment among the Chinese at the Japanese policy in Manchuria itself, the imports of cotton goods from the Island Empire have now taken the leading place in the Manchurian market.¹⁶

The methods used to attain this position have been severely criticised. The counterfeiting of trade-marks, in particular, has caused much bitterness on the part of Western merchants, and strenuous efforts have been made to secure adequate protection against this practice. In 1904, in accordance with her treaty obligations, China adopted a series of regulations for this purpose, which have proved entirely inadequate. In the following years, the United States made agreements with numerous powers for mutual protection by means of the consular courts in China, but Japan did not enter into such a compact. Trade-marks are of even more importance in China than in occidental countries, because the Chinese consumer always endeavors to secure the brand he has been accustomed to use, recognizing it by the trade-mark.

The decline of American trade in Manchuria is due primarily to Japanese competition, but the development of the native Chinese industries is a factor that should not be overlooked. The trade in native goods profited greatly from the steady decline in the value of silver which set in after the war, since this made the silver prices of foreign articles, which were manufactured by laborers paid in gold, much higher than those of goods made by laborers who still received their customary wages in silver. Chinese cotton goods, manufactured chiefly at Shanghai, have been gaining in popularity in Manchuria for at least ten years, since they are low-priced and are said to be of durable quality. The once large importations of American flour had already ceased before the war. After the war the mills in the North were unable to distribute their products in

¹⁶ In 1904, according to the *Jiji Shimpō* (quoted in U. S. Foreign Relations for 1906), the imports of sheetings and drills from Japan at Newchwang and Dalny were valued at only \$18,206, as compared with \$5,347,900 worth from the United States. The change effected by Japan's policy is striking.

the South because of the destruction of part of the railroad, and great quantities of American flour were brought in. This importation practically ceased with the withdrawal of the army and the rebuilding of the railroad, and American flour is not now seen in Manchuria.

The competition of Japanese and native commerce was indeed formidable, but it could never have overcome the established reputation and popularity of American goods in so short a period if the exporters of the United States had made any intelligent effort to retain their hold on the Manchurian market. The one real fundamental cause of the decline in our trade has been the way in which it has been handled. In the first place, there has never been any regular direct steamer communication between our ports and those of Manchuria, although the volume of our trade, and the great saving in the cost of transshipment would make such a service very valuable. Our goods have generally gone to Shanghai, and have been imported into Manchuria from there largely by Chinese merchants or by firms of other nationalities, that is, the sale of our products has been in the hands of our commercial rivals.¹⁷ In the second place, American exporters seem to have paid no attention to the suggestions of consuls at Manchurian ports as to the peculiar requirements of the Manchurian market. Instead of sending samples of goods, which are an absolute necessity there, as a Chinaman will not buy wares which he has not seen, they have sent catalogues in English, which are entirely unintelligible to most of the merchants whom it is necessary to reach. Complaints are constantly heard of carelessness in packing and in sending shipments. Little effort, moreover, has been made to develop the great opportunities which Manchuria offers for the extension of trade into new lines, although the Consular Reports for the last decade have been full of suggestions regarding such possibilities. In short, the former American leadership in this trade has gone practically by default, because of the incompetence and carelessness of American exporters.

The present commercial position of the United States in Man-

¹⁷ In 1905, when our trade in Manchuria reached its highest point, there were three American business houses there, out of a total of 143 foreign establishments. (Monthly Consular Reports, No. 306, p. 90.) In 1907, American trade was largely handled by the firm which was also agent for the Japanese Manchurian Export Guild, and by a German firm. (Monthly Consular Reports, No. 318, p. 102.)

churia may be summarized as follows. Imports are practically confined to cotton goods, kerosene and tobacco, of which cotton goods are still the most important, although they have seriously decreased within the last three years.¹⁸ Our trade in kerosene and in tobacco, especially cigarettes, is still prosperous because these have been sold by aggressive and intelligent companies which have followed the same methods as are employed by Japanese firms in extending their trade. The Standard Oil Company is far ahead of its competitors from Sumatra, Russia and Borneo, and in 1910 over ten million gallons of American kerosene were imported out of a total of not quite fifteen million. The British-American Tobacco Company, which is practically an American concern, has been able to compete with no little success against the products of the Japanese government monopoly, largely because its factories are located at Shanghai, so that it has the advantages of direct transportation and of cheap Oriental labor. Each of the firms has an effective selling organization in the interior. With the exception of these two lines, however, our trade is at present either gone or rapidly disappearing.

How much chance will there be in the future for American trade to regain its former position in Manchuria? The answer to this question will depend largely on the respect shown by Japan for the "open door," the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations. At the present time, it seems probable that the Mikado's government will continue to respect this principle, both from necessity and from regard for its own interests. In the first place, it is not likely that Japan will be able to acquire more extensive political control over the Eastern Provinces than she already enjoys. Japanese immigration to Manchuria has not been large, because, as a close student of Chinese conditions has pointed out, her immigrants have never been able to compete with the native stock either as merchants or as farmers.¹⁹ The country

¹⁸ In 1905, the United States practically monopolized the trade in piece goods. The number of pieces of drills, jeans, and sheetings imported into Manchuria during the last two years was, however, as follows:

	Drills		Jeans		Sheetings	
	1909	1910	1909	1910	1909	1910
American	319,428	186,698	98,111	3,968	706,735	378,121
Japanese	114,814	252,342			261,743	694,574
British	12,359	6,750	278,258	323,246	69,953	15,231

These figures, given in the Daily Consular Reports for Nov. 18, 1911, clearly show the gains made by Japan in the import of these wares.

¹⁹ J. W. Jenks in the *Outlook*, March 11, 1911.

will remain distinctly Chinese, and any outside control must take the form of domination rather than of absorption. Moreover, any attempt seriously to interfere with foreign trade would bring on the active hostility of all the other powers which are important in Eastern affairs, and especially that of the United States and Great Britain, whose friendship Japan could not afford to lose. These powers, even if they did not consider their own commerce, would not tolerate any interference with the tariff or with the trade on which the amount of the duties levied depends, because of their interest in the Chinese debt, which is secured by the customs revenues. China herself, also, would be an insuperable obstacle to Japanese political control in Manchuria. The concessions now held by Japan for the most part revert to China at the end of varying periods, and in view of the remarkable national development of the Celestial Empire during the last few years, it seems probable that she will be able to insist on and secure her rights when these periods expire.

Moreover, even if Japan were able to shut out the commerce of other nations from Manchuria, it would not be to her interest to do so. Her geographical advantages alone enable her to control a large share of the trade in commodities which she produces, and the increased prosperity which the general commercial development of the country will carry with it must, in the long run, be favorable to Japanese exporters. The few American merchants who have shown sufficient interest in Manchuria to send their goods to the commercial expositions, held by the Japanese at all of the important distributing points, report that they were treated with courtesy and that their goods were well exhibited at very reasonable charges. It must also be considered that Japanese capital can never suffice for the development of the great concessions of which Japan took possession after the war. For the sake of these, foreign capital must be attracted to the country, and this can only be done by the frank acceptance of the "open door" policy.

The actions of Japan which have recently given rise to the numerous accusations that she intended to do away with the open door in Manchuria, may generally be ascribed, not so much to a desire to injure foreign commercial interests as to a determination to maintain the value of her own concessions. For instance, the opposition to China's attempts to build the Hsinmintun-Fakumen

railroad into the interior has arisen from a fear that this line would compete with the Japanese-owned Southern Manchurian line and would also draw trade away from the Japanese port of Dairen, or Dalny. The indirect attempts to injure the commerce of Newchwang are due to a desire to make Dairen more prosperous. Whatever the secondary effects of Japan's policy may be, she seems to have no intention, at present, of trying to stifle foreign enterprise, and where foreign trade is being driven out, it is not by a system of exclusion but by strenuous competition.

It should be remembered, moreover, that Japan's sphere of influence covers only about one-third of Manchuria. The two-thirds still under the influence of Russia is, it is true, less thickly populated and less important commercially, but a large immigration is constantly increasing its value as a market, and it is said to be fully as fertile as the southern region. Without some radical violation of the open door principle, however, which will be as difficult for her as for Japan, Russia's commercial rivalry will not be formidable here. The cost of bringing bulky goods from Europe on the railroad is prohibitive, and goods brought by sea must come through Vladivostok, which is closed by ice part of the year, or through the southern ports and from there into the interior on the Japanese railway. In either case, the sea route from European Russia is longer and more expensive than that from the United States. Japanese trade has already secured a foothold north of Changchun, and no doubt properly handled American trade could do the same.

It seems probable, then, that in the future Manchuria will be open to the commerce of all nations on equal terms. There is no reason why American exporters, by adopting a new policy, should not be able to increase greatly the sale of our products there, if they will only make an effort to do so. American banks should be established in the principal Manchurian trade centers and Manchurian products should be brought direct to the United States. A considerable amount of Manchurian bean-oil is now used here, but it is imported from Europe, after being expressed there.²⁰ In addition, an efficient method should be adopted for selling goods after

²⁰ Under the Payne-Aldrich tariff the duty on beans is 45 cents per bushel of 60 pounds, which is nearly 100 per cent in the case of Manchurian beans. This naturally would prevent their importation into this country. The duty on expressed oils is only 25 per cent.

they have reached the Eastern Provinces. In dealing with Chinese merchants, personal relations by means of local agents are necessary, and samples of wares should be used rather than catalogues written in English. If a really effective policy were adopted, soon we should again be sending large quantities of goods to Manchuria. Even though our cotton products were unable to compete with the government-aided output of Japanese mills, we could still sell machinery of all kinds, and stoves, shoes, condensed milk, and countless other manufactures for which a demand exists or will soon exist in the Manchurian market. We could thus always have a fair share in this trade, whereas at present the amount of American goods imported grows smaller each year. It would be a great misfortune for American industry if we should lose entirely our part in this already great and rapidly growing trade; and if this is to be avoided, an active policy of developing our Manchurian commerce must be inaugurated at once.

NOTES ON THE MAMMALS OF ECONOMIC VALUE IN CHINA

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In China, where there is so much poverty, and where so little goes to waste, almost every animal has some economic use. In the following notes, gathered during three years of travel, I have tried to touch only on the mammals which are of most economic value to the Chinese themselves. My aim is to give some notion of economic conditions in China to-day, not to furnish information for anybody desirous of exploiting the furs or hides of the country.

Domestic Mammals

Most of the domestic mammals of China are so well known to Western people that it is scarcely necessary to mention them. I will treat them briefly.

Cattle of a small hump shouldered variety are commonly used in northern China as beasts of burden. On the great highway which connects Peking with Urga and Uluassutai in Mongolia, one sees caravans of hundreds of carts, each drawn by an ox. They bring salt and borax to Peking from remote parts of Mongolia. In other regions they are used as pack animals or for general work on the farm. Cows are never milked by the Chinese, cheese and butter are unknown. The skins of cattle are smoke-tanned and used for making boots, saddlery, etc.

Yak.—Farther westward, where the provinces of Kansu and Sze-chwan border on Tibet, the place of the ordinary cattle is taken by a cross between the wild yak and the cow. These hybrids are much larger than their domestic parent, long horned, and black in color, with a white median stripe down the back. Like the wild yak, they have long hair hanging from the breast, legs, and tail. In western Kansu they are used as cart animals; in western Sze-chwan they are the pack animals which carry nearly all the freight of tea into Tibet. The tribes-people on the Tibetan frontier, who are more Tibetan than Chinese in their customs, milk these animals,

and make butter and cheese, and an intoxicating liquor like kumiss. A few of the Chinese who come in contact with these pastoral "western barbarians" use these products. The hides of the yak are valuable for the leather they produce, and the flesh, which is excellent, is much used for food.

Water Buffalo.—Throughout the lowlands of the Yang-tze basin, and even back into Sze-chwan to an altitude of 3,000 or 4,000 feet, one often sees the slow-going water buffalo. It is used chiefly for cultivating paddy fields, but is too slow for a pack or draught animal on the road. Its hide is of considerable value. I do not think the water buffalo is ever killed for food, it is too expensive an animal, but when it dies of old age or disease, its flesh is eaten. Of course under these conditions it is wretched food.

Camel.—In Chi-li and Shansi, and to a less extent in the provinces of Shensi and Kansu, the Bactrian camel is much used as a pack animal, or sometimes for drawing large carts. Its hair is valued and is exported to Europe. The Chinese use it for making ropes and coarse sacking. It seems probable that it is the high cost of the camel which restricts it to the wealthier vicinities.

Sheep.—Black-headed, fat-tailed sheep are commonly raised in the poorer mountain regions of northern and western China. Their flesh is a staple food, and may be purchased in any city or market town of these regions. Woolen garments are not much used by the Chinese in general, but in some districts wool is spun and knitted into stockings, mittens, and winter garments for little children. In northern China, where the winters are severe, felt made of sheep's wool is much used in the shape of sleeping rugs, waistcoats, capes, caps, and stockings. Sheepskins with the wool on are made into coats and gowns of all grades, from those used by the poor muleteer, costing only a few cents, to those worn by well-to-do officials, costing upwards of ten dollars.

Goat.—Like sheep, goats are raised in the poorer regions of northern and western China. There are a number of varieties, but all of less value than the sheep. Goats are able to pick up a living where even sheep have a hard time, and so are often owned by the very poorest country people who live high on the mountainsides where the soil is scarcely productive enough for tilling. The flesh and wool of goats are put to the same uses as those of sheep, but the quality is poorer.

Swine.—As a producer of food the domestic hog is undoubtedly the mammal of greatest value. This animal has its place in nearly every household, whether rich or poor, in the dense city or the country. Even the smallest market has its stall where pork is sold. If a private family kills a hog they take what flesh they do not wish to keep to market. The Chinese understand smoking, salting, and drying of flesh, after their own fashion, and hams and bacon are to be purchased. Every part of the hog is put to some use. Europeans in China do not eat pork owing to the filthy conditions under which the animals are kept, but there is no flesh the Chinese like so well. They call it "*da-roë*," the great meat.

Pigskin is occasionally made into leather, but is more often used as rawhide for straps and thongs. Brushes are made from the bristles.

Horse.—There are various breeds of horses in China, but they are mostly of small size. They have, however, excellent powers of endurance. Horses are seen most in the northern provinces, where they are chiefly used for riding, but also as pack and draught animals. Their hides are made into leather, and their flesh is sometimes eaten by the poor.

Mule.—Mules are bred in Mongolia, in the region northwest of Peking, and also in the far west of China on the borders of Tibet. They are larger than the usual Chinese horse, faster travelers with a load, and of more endurance. Though much commoner than horses, they bring a higher price. She-mules are much used as cart animals in and about Peking, but on the pack trails in the mountains one sees only stud-mules.

In order to give some idea of the cost of travel with mules, I will relate a personal experience. In the city of Si-ngan-fu, the capital of Shensi, I hired mules at the rate of forty-three cents per animal per working day, and about twenty-five cents per day when we did not travel. This included the hire of the three muleteers, who cared for five animals and acted as our servants besides. The mules were supposed to carry 200 catties (about 260 pounds) each, and cover from eighteen to twenty-seven miles a day, according to the character of the country. In truth, my loads were not so heavy as this, but we often did over twenty miles a day, even in rough country, and, in the plains, sometimes over thirty miles.

Donkey.—Donkeys are exceedingly common in the northern

provinces of China, where they are used as pack animals, and to do general farm work. Their initial cost is small compared with the price of a mule, and they are much cheaper to keep, so they are more popular with the poor people.

Dog.—Every country family has a dog, and often several. In some places they seem to be as numerous as the people. There are of course numbers of breeds, but the common Chinese dog is an animal much resembling a wolf, only smaller, and not always colored like a wolf. They are chiefly for watching purposes, and seldom fail to bark when one passes. Though their tempers are bad, they are too ill-fed to have much courage, so seldom attack one. Dogskins with long hair are much in demand among the poor as sleeping rugs. The notion that dogs are a common food is false. Except in a time of actual famine dogs are rarely or never eaten, even by the poorest. I speak for the provinces of north, central, and western China.

Cat.—There are several varieties of domestic cats kept by the Chinese. Most attractive looking is the long-haired gray cat of Peking. In central Sze-chwan all cats are highly valued as ratters, but it is hard to see how they kill any rats, for their owners keep them tied up for fear of their being stolen. Catskins are of some value as fur in all parts of China, and when dyed and disguised are sold as the fur of other animals.

Rabbit (*Lepus cuniculus*).—The domestic rabbit is seldom seen except in central Sze-chwan, where it is commonly raised. The flesh is eaten fresh, or the animals are skinned and dried whole for food. Coats, gowns, and leggings are made of the fur.

Wild Mammals

Deer (*Cervus* sp.).—A large deer more resembling the American elk (*Cervus canadensis*) than anything else inhabits the wilder mountains of far-western China. It is much hunted by the tribespeople for the sake of the antlers, which bring a good price with the Chinese, who use them for making eye medicine. The flesh and skin of the animal also have their value, and the tendons of the legs are particularly prized. These, when boiled into a gelatinous mass, are served by the Chinese at their feasts.

Roe Deer (*Capreolus bedfordi*).—This is a very much smaller deer than the elk, and being also very common in some regions of

the northwest is of comparatively little value. The antlers, which are small, are used for making medicine, and the flesh is relished. Deerskins are seldom tanned, but are often stretched and dried, and used thus as sleeping rugs.

Musk Deer (*Moschus moschiferus* and *M. sifanicus*).—These species, though rare, are still met with in the remoter mountains of central and western China. The flesh and skins are of little importance, but the musk, produced only by the male, in a gland near the navel, is of high value to the Chinese as a medicine and perfume. The long sharp incisor teeth, which grow as tusks from the mouth of the male musk deer, are much used as toothpicks by the merchants and literati of China.

Takin (*Budorcas sp.*).—This peculiar animal, of a size approaching that of an ox, and characters between those of an ox and those of a goat, inhabits portions of Tai-pei-san, a lofty mountain in central China. I cannot claim that it plays an important part in the economy of China, but it is regarded as of great value by those who know of its existence. Skin, flesh, bones, blood, every part in fact is supposed, by the superstitious and ignorant Chinese, to have some special virtue. It is not very often that one of them is killed, for living as they do in precipices at high altitudes (9,000 to 11,000 feet), and going in herds, hunting them requires not only energy, but great skill, and, in the case of the poorly armed Chinaman, much risk.

Goat-antelope (*Nemorhædus argyrochates*, and other species).—The species of *Nemorhædus* found in western China are perhaps not of much economic importance, yet one often sees their bones and horns in the medicine shops, and the skins of the smaller species on the backs of the tribes-people.

Wild Swine (*Sus sp.*).—In the hills and mountains of northern, central and western China wild hogs are numerous, and are much more of a hindrance than an economic help. The peasants are much in dread of their raids on cultivated fields, and during the seasons when crops are most in danger the fields are watched night and day. For this purpose little shacks of poles, covered with thatch of straw or cornstalks, are put up in commanding positions, and members of the peasant's family take turns in watching there. The flesh of the wild hog is relished by the Chinese. They make little use of the skins, but in some localities they are used for containers for the liquor distilled from maize, or millet.

Mink (Lutreola siberica).—This common, medium sized mink is valued somewhat for the fur it produces, which is not good, but it is valued more especially for the hairs of the tip of the tail, of which the Chinese make their writing brushes. The animal lives very frequently about human habitations. It destroys rats, but is also a serious enemy to poultry.

Indian Marten (Martes flavigula borealis).—This rather rare marten is one of the most beautiful animals in the fauna of China. Its fur is valued quite highly, being used for the lining of garments. It is not often seen.

Wild Cat (Felis microti).—The wild cat of China produces a much used fur, for the animal is common in the mountains of the north. The fur is soft, even, and thick, and the skin is light. On account of the animal's abundance the fur is not an expensive one. It is used for the lining of coats and waistcoats and for the making of fur stockings. Mongols and Tibetans wear it as collars and caps.

Tiger (Felis tigris).—The Chinese claim that there are many tigers in the more remote mountains of all parts of the Central Kingdom, but it is my conviction that the tiger is very rare and that the leopard is often mistaken for the tiger. That tigers are occasionally found is evidenced by the skins one sometimes sees in the shops of larger cities. They are tanned whole and used by officials, or other wealthy persons, to cover divans in reception halls. The flesh and bones are regarded as of great medicinal value, the notion being that, as the tiger is such a powerful animal, any part of him must be strengthening food for the weak and sick. The bones are powdered and consumed in that form with food. They are given to children with rickets.

Leopard (Felis pardus).—The leopard is quite a common animal in the rugged mountains of northern and western China. Its footprints are often seen, and its cry is sometimes heard by the traveler, while the inhabitants tell many stories of its thefts of calves, sheep, hogs, and dogs.

In Chentu, Sze-chwan, a good leopard skin can be bought for \$5.00 or \$6.00. In southern Shensi I once purchased a good skin and entire skeleton from some hunters for \$3.00. Leopard skins, like those of tigers, are used for rugs on divans and saddles. The flesh and bones are supposed to have medicinal properties. In Tibet an occasional black leopard is found. These are probably melanistic

individuals of *F. pardus*. At any rate, they are regarded by the Chinese as of greater value than the ordinary form. On the Tibetan frontier one also sees examples of the highly prized and truly beautiful snow leopard (*Felis uncia*), the skins of which, like so many other furs, are made into lining for gowns.

Lynx (Felis lynx).—A good many skins of the lynx come to China from the "Inside County," *i. e.*, Tibet. These are very beautiful, and of a very soft fur exceedingly pleasing to the touch. The Chinese treat these skins as they do all furs of value. After tanning, the skins are cut into small pieces and these are sewed together in such a way that the fur of one quality or one color, as the case may be, all comes together. For instance, one gown will be made out of the fur of the backs, another out of that of the paws and legs, and another out of the skin of the chin and throat.

At Tau-choe, a fur trading town on the border of Kansu and Tibet, I once priced a lynx skin lining for a long gown. I was asked fifty ounces of silver, but I have no doubt that it could have been purchased for thirty ounces, about \$18.00.

Wolf (Canis lupus).—The wolf ranges singly or in pairs throughout northern China, from Shantung to Kansu, and is quite common in certain localities. It resembles the American timber wolf, and is so much like certain large Chinese dogs that one does not always know which is which. Occasionally wolves seem to take advantage of this likeness and come close to dwellings and people in broad daylight. Wolf skins are used in China for covering divans, and are worth several dollars apiece.

Fox (Vulpes vulpes).—The red fox is one of the most common fur-bearing carnivorous animals in China, and the one of which the fur is most popular. There is a wide range of color in this species, from a rather unpleasing reddish-yellow to a deep reddish-brown. The deeper the red the better the Chinese like it, and the better price the skin will bring. Prices of fox skins vary greatly in different localities, but in Kansu I have seen a rather poor raw skin sold for about thirty-three cents and a good, red, winter skin for nearly one dollar. As described in the case of the lynx, the Chinese cut up the fox skins and piece them together to get an even quality of fur. The white soft fur of the throat is regarded as the choicest part, and I fancy the skin of the legs is the least desirable. Coats, waistcoats, and gowns are made of this fur.

Otter (Lutra vulgaris).—Though ranging widely through China, the land or common otter is neither common nor easy to secure. One occasionally sees a raw skin hanging in a shop, and these range in price from about \$1.20 to \$3.00 or even \$4.00, according to the quality and size. A few times I have seen caps of otter skin worn. Long gowns lined with it are seen in the shops. These are of high price.

On the upper Yang-tse-kiang and its tributaries the otter is used for fishing. The fisherman has the animal tied to his raft by a long chain, and when they reach a favorable spot for fish the otter voluntarily dives off the side. Whether he makes a catch or not, he returns very soon to the raft, and the fisherman proceeds to another spot.

Bear (Ursus sp.).—Bears are among the rarest mammals in China, but I know of a species of black bear which occurs in western Sze-chwan. In Kansu I have seen the fragmentary skins of a "blue" bear of unknown species, but reminding one of the "blue" bear of the Mt. St. Elias region. Bear skin is, if course, too heavy for garments, and is used in China only in the shape of rugs, so far as I have seen.

Badger (Meles leptorhynchus).—This "pig-nosed" badger, a fairly common animal in northern China, furnishes a coarse fur used by the peasantry for winter jackets and caps. Pieces of the raw skin are often used by Chinese hunters to protect the breaches of their matchlock guns against dampness. Badger flesh is eaten with relish by the poor.

Hares (Lepus swinhoei and subsp.; Lepus sechuenensis).—Swinhoe's hare occurs in Shantung, Chi-li, Shansi, and Shensi, often in large numbers. It is much hunted by the Chinese, and its flesh may be bought in the market of any large city. On account of the tenderness of the skin the fur is not of much value, but is sometimes used for lining caps and ear mufflers.

The Sze-chuen hare is a much rarer animal of larger size, living at high altitudes in northwestern China. When secured its fur is used in the same way as that of the other hare.

Squirrels (Sciurus vulgaris; Sciurotamias davidianus et subsp.; Sciuropterus sp.).—The common squirrel of Eurasia certainly inhabits Siberia and Manchuria, and possibly northern Chi-li. But whether the skins are all imported from the north or not, they are

very widely used throughout China for the lining of ladies' gowns. The skin is very light and the fur soft and thick, but not very long. The white or creamy fur of the underparts is considered the choicest, so the skin is opened down the back, preserving the belly intact. When sewn into a garment the creamy white bellies contrasting sharply with the gray of the sides produce a very pleasing effect.

Père David's squirrel produces a fur used in the same way. It is an animal eight or nine inches in length of head and body, and of colors produced by a mixture of gray and buff. It has not the excellent quality of fur found in *S. vulgaris* nor the beautiful contrast of upper and underparts, therefore it is less prized.

There are several forms of flying squirrels in China, all valued for the softness of their fur, but being nocturnal and arboreal in habit, they are seldom seen and difficult to secure.

Rodent Mole (*Myosphalax cansus*, *M. fontanieri*).—Another rodent of some economic value is the rodent mole of northern China. This is an animal some seven inches in length, resembling a mole in its habits, and to a certain extent in its appearance, but it lacks the sharp nose. The fur is mole-like and is used by the Chinese for lining light garments and for making ear-mufflers. The flesh is thought to have medicinal value.

On the Tibetan border of Kansu Province the tribes-people regard the flesh of the rodent mole as very delicate food. In April, when the animals are emerging from hibernation, these natives capture them with bow and arrow traps set to spear them through the surface earth as they pass through their burrows. They are then skinned and cleaned and spread out by spitting them with little sticks. Thus they are cooked and eaten.

Macaque (*Macacus tcheliensis*).—This monkey can scarcely be called a fur-bearing animal, but it furnishes a skin much used by the Chinese for waistcoat linings.

An ape, probably a species of *Scenopithecus*, inhabits the mountains of western China and his skin is very much prized by the Chinese. The hair is two or three inches long and of a sandy color. I was told that a good skin was worth forty ounces of silver, about \$25.00. This skin is used by the Imperial Family for making leggings.

The reader who has taken the pains to peruse these pages will

see that the most important economic mammals of China are very much like our own. In most cases the species are different in the two countries, but from an economic point of view this makes no difference. I have presented to the reader a rather long list, and I hope I have been able to correct in his mind the common notion that China is lacking in wild mammal life. A full list of the mammals of China would mount up into the hundreds.

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